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Abstract 
 
Weather forecasting is full of uncertainty, and as in domains such as air traffic 
control or medical decision making, decision support systems can affect a forecaster’s 
ability to make accurate and timely judgments.  Well-designed decision aids can help 
forecasters build situation awareness (SA), a construct regarded as a component of 
decision making.  SA involves the ability to perceive elements within a system, 
comprehend their significance, and project their meaning into the future in order to 
make a decision.  However, how SA is affected by uncertainty within a system has 
received little attention.  This tension between managing uncertainty, situation 
assessment, and the impact that technology has on the two, is the focus of this 
dissertation. 
To address this tension, this dissertation is centered on the evaluation of a set of 
coupled models that integrate rainfall observations and hydrologic simulations, coined 
“the FLASH system” (Flooded Locations and Simulated Hydrographs project).  
Prediction of flash flooding is unique from forecasting other weather-related threats due 
to its multi-disciplinary nature.  In the United States, some weather forecasters have 
limited hydrologic forecasting experience.  Unlike FLASH, current flash flood 
forecasting tools are based upon rainfall rates, and with the recent expansion into 
coupled rainfall and hydrologic models, forecasters have to learn quickly how to 
incorporate these new data sources into their work.  New models may help forecasters 
to increase their prediction skill, but no matter how far the technology advances, 
forecasters must be able to accept and integrate the new tools into their work in order to 
gain any benefit.  A focus on human factors principles in the design stage can help to 
	 xiii 
ensure that by the time the product is transitioned into operational use, the decision 
support system addresses users’ needs while minimizing task time, workload, and 
attention constraints. 
This dissertation discusses three qualitative and quantitative studies designed to 
explore the relationship between flash flood forecasting, decision aid design, and SA.  
The first study assessed the effects of visual data aggregation methods on perception 
and comprehension of a flash flood threat.  Next, a mixed methods approach described 
how forecasters acquire SA and mitigate situational uncertainty during real-time 
forecasting operations.  Lastly, the third study used eye tracking assessment to identify 
the effects of an automated forecasting decision support tool on SA and information 
scanning behavior.  Findings revealed that uncertainty management in forecasting 
involves individual, team, and organizational processes.  We make several 
recommendations for future decision support systems to promote SA and performance 
in the weather forecasting domain.  
	1 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
On the morning of 10 June 2014, a major flash flood swept through Prince 
George’s County, Maryland.  With little warning, local residents found themselves 
amidst house flooding while drivers became stranded in their vehicles.  Emergency 
management services reported eleven incidents including high water rescues from 
vehicles and evacuations of stranded homeowners from flooded buildings (National 
Climatic Data Center, 2014).  The Washington Post reported that at least twenty-four 
rescues occurred and that some local residents evacuated to an emergency shelter in a 
local school (Bui, 2014). 
While the local National Weather Service (NWS) Weather Forecast Office 
(WFO) had issued a flash flood warning at 9:28 AM EDT (National Weather Service, 
2014a), some residents were not able to take necessary precautions in advance of the 
flooding (Halverson, 2014).  In the warning text issued at 9:28 AM, the Sterling WFO 
wrote: “At 9:24 AM EDT… National Weather Service Doppler radar indicated very 
heavy rain capable of producing flash flooding.  Additional rainfall amounts of 1 to 2 
inches can be expected” (National Weather Service, 2014a).  However, according to 
local media, the reality was that the area received up to five inches of rain in just two 
hours (Halverson, 2014).  The Baltimore Sun reported that the rainfall stopped around 
11:00 AM EDT, allowing the floodwaters to recede (Rector, 2014).  Despite the issued 
warning, some considered this to be a “missed” event due to the short lead time given to 
locals (Halverson, 2014). 
Could anything have provided more lead time to those affected by this event?  
Although forecasters had relevant training as well as access to computational models 
	2 
and observational tools, the unfolding rainfall event showed minimal chance of 
producing flash floods (Halverson, 2014).  In this case, Halverson (2014) posited that 
false expectations were in part due to a lack of high-resolution gridded flash flooding 
and rainfall prediction models and few observational data sets.  In order to assist users 
in drawing connections between conceptual models and environmental dynamics, some 
researchers have called for the development of analysis tools, referred to in the current 
work as forecasting decision support systems (Stuart et al., 2006; Trafton & Hoffman, 
2007). 
Decision support systems are information technology products that aid users in 
making efficient and effective decisions (Shim et al., 2002).  Advances to forecasting 
decision support systems may improve outcomes if systems complement the way in 
which forecasters create, update, and implement their mental models (Trafton & 
Hoffman, 2007).   One promising line of research involves the development of decision 
support tools that automate parts of the situation assessment process.  Automation is 
frequently used to reduce workload and time pressures, allowing the operator to allocate 
his or her attention to other aspects of the work (Röttger, Bali, & Manzey, 2009).  
Furthermore, decision support systems are viewed as a low level of automation, in 
which the system provides guidance to a user who is in control of the decision and 
resulting action (Endsley & Kiris, 1995).  In the weather forecasting domain, an 
appropriate level of decision support may promote situation awareness development, 
which could help to reduce missed weather events. 
Situation awareness (SA) is regarded as an integral component of the decision 
making process involved in professional forecasting (Quoetone, Andra, Bunting, & 
	3 
Jones, 2001).  Although sometimes referred to as “situational awareness” in operational 
settings (Byrne, 2015), here, we will adopt the term most frequently used in theoretical 
research (“situation awareness”) as supported by Endsley’s 1995 Model of SA 
(Endsley, 1995c).   
SA is a measurable construct and reflects an individual’s degree of knowledge 
regarding the state of their environment (Endsley, 1995a, 1995c).  In one of the most 
widely-accepted models of SA, Endsley (1995c) defined SA as a construct with three 
levels.  Level 1 SA comprises an individual’s perception of the environment, while 
Level 2 SA involves comprehension, or turning the perceived information into meaning.  
Level 3 SA (projection) centers around an individual’s ability to project the current state 
of the environment correctly into a likely future state. SA is not a static construct, but 
updates over time as decision makers gain experience with similar situations.  
Additional mechanisms such as information processing, memory, goals, preconceptions, 
background training, and system design also contribute to building and maintaining 
high levels of SA.  In the current work, we follow the precedent set by Endsley (1995c, 
2015b) and distinguish the measurable product (situation awareness; SA), from the 
process in which SA is developed and maintained (situation assessment). 
Grounded in the field of human factors, this work explores the role of decision 
support system design on the situation assessment process in the weather forecasting 
domain.  Throughout this dissertation, we investigate SA in weather forecasting from a 
qualitative and a quantitative standpoint; in doing so, we are able to identify behavioral 
patterns that facilitate accurate situation assessment while also developing 
recommendations for decision support system design.  Although some studies have 
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described the situation assessment process for experts in fields like air traffic control 
(Dao et al., 2009; Moore & Gugerty, 2010; van de Merwe, Oprins, Eriksson, & van der 
Plaat, 2012) and driving (Endsley & Kiris, 1995; Moore, 2009), a smaller number have 
provided empirical support for the situation assessment process in weather forecasting 
(Bowden & Heinselman, 2016; Jones, Quoetone, Ferree, Magsig, & Bunting, 2003; 
Quoetone et al., 2001).  Understanding how forecasters develop SA will lead to 
improvements in forecast lead time and accuracy if we can find new ways to convey 
information to forecasters, particularly in heavy-workload, time-sensitive forecast 
situations. 
In addition to extending theoretical accounts of SA to the weather forecasting 
domain, this work is motivated by the impending transition of the Flooded Locations 
and Simulated Hydrographs (FLASH) project from research to operational application 
(Gourley et al., 2016).  FLASH is a suite of real-time tools that use rainfall observations 
to force hydrologic models to predict flash floods.  Two examples of the types of 
forecast guidance products included in the FLASH project are shown in Figure 1.  
Potential users include forecasters at both the national and regional scales in the United 
States, including, but not limited to, National Weather Service Weather Forecast Offices   
 
 
Figure 1. Two members of the FLASH product suite, the QPE-to-FFG Ratio 
(Quantitative Precipitation Estimate to Flash Flood Guidance) dynamic visualization 
(on left) and the QPE Return Period dynamic visualization (on right) 	
	5 
(WFOs), River Forecast Centers (RFCs), and national centers.  Both at the national and 
regional scale, FLASH is designed to assist national forecasters in identifying areas of 
dynamic flood risk.  National forecasters would then work with local forecasters to 
predict specific threats.  When fully transitioned to operations, professional NWS 
forecasters at offices across the United States will be able to access the decision support 
tools and use them for situation assessment and judgment justification.  
Situation Awareness and Decision Making 
Situation awareness is considered to be a prerequisite for decision making, but 
as of yet, the human factors community has not agreed upon a single, unifying 
definition.  Smith and Hancock (1995) defined SA as “adaptive, externally directed 
consciousness,” developed through intentional, analytical behavior at an individual 
level.  Likewise, Sarter and Woods (1991) framed SA as the “accessibility of a 
comprehensive and coherent situation representation which is continuously being 
updated.”  Alternatively, Endsley (1995c) referred to SA as “the perception of elements 
in the environment within a volume of time and space, the comprehension of their 
meaning, and the projection of their status in the near future.”  The current work draws 
on Endsley’s (1995c) definition and model due to its widespread acceptance within the 
weather forecasting operational domain (Jones et al., 2003; Quoetone et al., 2001). 
While Endsley’s 1995 Model of SA has received a large degree of attention 
within the literature, several competing models have attempted to address its perceived 
limitations.  The 1995 Model focused on individual cognition, but as many work 
environments involve interaction among actors, the Team SA framework was 
developed to describe information transfers and performance in such situations (Endsley 
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& Jones, 2001; Salas, Prince, Baker, & Shrestha, 1995).  Sensemaking theories, such as 
the Data/Frame Theory, share some similarities with the 1995 Model of SA (Endsley, 
2015b), but they also provide insight into the manner in which decision makers assign 
meaning and draw conclusions from information (Klein, 2015b).  Conversely, the Joint 
Cognitive Systems (JCS) perspective has envisioned SA as an emergent property within 
complex systems (Stanton et al., 2006).  Although the current work examines SA at the 
level of the individual decision maker, weather forecasting occurs within a 
sociotechnical system, and as such, alternative perspectives on SA may provide 
additional insight. 
In addition to the weather forecasting domain, SA has been studied in contexts 
ranging from aviation and air traffic control (Dao et al., 2009; Moore & Gugerty, 2010; 
van de Merwe, Oprins, et al., 2012), medicine (Levin et al., 2012), driving (Endsley & 
Kiris, 1995; Ma & Kaber, 2005; Moore, 2009), and nuclear power management (Burns 
et al., 2008).  SA has received traction in many operational communities, and is 
regarded as a means to assess and improve task performance (Jones, 2015).  Various 
assessment techniques frame SA as a measurable construct, and they include, but are 
not limited to probe-based accuracy and response time measures (Endsley, 1995a; Loft, 
Morrell, & Huf, 2013), self-report measures (Taylor, 1990), physiological measures 
(Catherwood et al., 2014; Moore & Gugerty, 2010), and qualitative assessments 
(Hoffman & Coffey, 2004; Klein, 2015a). 
Problem Statement 
Endsley and Hoffman (2002) state that maintaining SA is one of the most 
important components of decision making in the weather forecasting domain.  Without 
	7 
an accurate situational model, forecast accuracy and timeliness can suffer, leading to 
possible negative societal impacts (Quoetone et al., 2001).  Endsley’s (1995c) model 
provides a theoretical foundation for understanding SA, and has been widely applied as 
an explanatory device in the weather forecasting domain (Bowden & Heinselman, 2016; 
Endsley & Hoffman, 2002; Quoetone et al., 2001; Trafton & Hoffman, 2007).  What is 
less understood, however, is how situational uncertainty affects SA. 
Previous research has indicated that a gap exists in the knowledge related to the 
relationship between SA, decision support system design, and weather forecasting.  
Minotra and Burns (2015) recommended further study of SA within uncertain and 
dynamic sociotechnical systems, and we propose that the weather forecasting 
environment is an ideal example of this.  Given that uncertainty proliferates within the 
weather forecasting system, the question then arises of how to accommodate decision 
makers in ways that promote accurate SA and decision selection.  Findings from 
multiple domains suggest that decision support systems may promote the development 
of accurate SA, thereby improving operators’ abilities to make informed decisions.  In 
weather prediction tasks, forecasters operate on what is sometimes termed “the 
forecasting funnel,” meaning the time-uncertainty continuum (in plain language, the 
further away in time a forecaster is from a weather event, the more uncertainty there is 
inherent in what will actually happen).  This tension between managing uncertainty, 
building situation awareness, and the impact that decision support technology has on the 
two, is the topic of this research.  
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Significance 
In the United States’ weather and climate prediction system, accurate and timely 
weather prediction requires effective interactions among a number of stakeholders.  
Forecasters are often responsible to emergency management personnel, broadcast media 
partners, and members of the general public.  A loss of SA in the forecasting stage may 
translate into negative effects as information is transmitted to decision makers at various 
levels.  Indeed, between the years of 1934 and 1999, flash floods occurred at least once 
per year across the United States causing property and crop damages with an increasing 
trend (Pielke, Downton, & Barnard Miller, 2002).  Flash floods also threaten human 
life, with several recent events including the 2013 Boulder, Colorado flash flooding 
(National Weather Service, 2014b) and 2013 Oklahoma City, Oklahoma flash flooding 
(National Weather Service, 2014c).  By examining SA in tasks involving decision 
making under uncertainty, we will be able to explore the role of uncertainty in the 
situation assessment process.  In doing so, we will also be able to develop guidelines for 
the user-centered design of forecasting decision support systems. 
User-centered design of forecast decision support systems may improve forecast 
accuracy and lead time (Bowden, Heinselman, Kingfield, & Thomas, 2015) and reduce 
forecaster workload (Karstens et al., 2015).  In a survey of professional forecasters, 
media personnel, and emergency managers, Morss, Demuth, Bostrom, Lazo, and Lazrus 
(2015) found that situation awareness (or lack of it) could be transferred among 
decision makers through risk communications.  In the context of the development of the 
FLASH system, this work contributes to an understanding of behavioral aspects of the 
flash flood forecasting process.  Applying this new knowledge to practice may increase 
	9 
the likelihood that forecasters will be able to use the guidance products effectively 
during situation assessment to build their own SA, develop their long-term mental 
models, and execute timely decisions. 
Research Questions 
This dissertation focuses on resolving four interrelated research questions with 
the shared goal of contributing knowledge related to SA, decision support technology, 
and flash flood forecasting.  Three studies, discussed in the following chapters, 
employed quantitative and qualitative research methods in order to address these 
questions.  Each research question addresses a unique aspect of situation awareness in 
weather forecasting, and are presented below: 
• How does data aggregation in a FLASH visualization affect user performance in 
terms of signal detection, task completion time, and congruence in decisions for 
a flash flood prediction task? (RQ1) 
• How do forecasters build and maintain situation awareness while working under 
the constraints imposed by uncertainty leading up to a flash flooding event? 
(RQ2) 
• Which tools did forecasters use, in combination and individually, to build 
situation awareness?  How did their SA requirements change at different points 
along the forecasting compound warning decision process and at different 
environmental activity levels? (RQ3) 
• How is SA influenced by recommender automation at different processing levels 
during a weather forecasting task? (RQ4.1) To what degree are eye tracking 
measures (total fixation duration, mean fixation time percentage, time to first 
	10 
fixation, and mean number of fixations) able to predict situation awareness? 
(RQ4.2) 
Hypotheses 
The first research question examined the effects of data aggregation algorithms 
on signal detection within one of the FLASH guidance products.  For the particular 
decision support visualization, the original design employed a data aggregation 
technique in order to present a large dataset on a human-interpretable map.  With an eye 
towards understanding how data aggregation affected Level 1 SA (perception) and 
Level 2 SA (comprehension), we questioned how choice of data aggregation technique 
would affect performance in terms of signal detection, response time, and likelihood of 
correctly identifying a threat within the visualization.  Based on previous research 
related to focal attention and visualization design (Pirolli and Card, 1999; Hoffman, 
Detweiler, Conway, and Lipton, 1993), we hypothesized that the type of data 
aggregation technique would affect signal detection with the particular FLASH 
visualization. 
The second and third research questions sought to investigate behavioral 
patterns among forecasters during situation assessment.  A focus group methodology 
was used to explore the relationship between situation assessment and uncertainty 
management (RQ2); as this was an exploratory, qualitative study, we did not express 
any testable hypotheses.  Conversely, a time- and frequency-based analysis of forecaster 
behavior related to forecast guidance usage addressed the third research question.  Here, 
we hypothesized that information-seeking behavior during situation assessment would 
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differ across forecast timeframes (watch phase versus warning phase) and across 
environmental activity levels. 
Whereas the first three research questions primarily addressed Level 1 and Level 
2 SA, the final research question investigated the effects of decision support automation 
across all three levels of SA.  In other domains, high levels of automation have often 
been associated with low levels of SA (Kaber & Endsley, 1997).  Likewise, we 
hypothesized that the forecasting decision support automation would lead to lower 
levels of SA.  Additionally, this work assessed the ability of eye tracking measures to 
predict an individual’s amount of SA.  Several studies have suggested that eye tracking 
can accurately predict SA in air traffic control tasks (Moore & Gugerty, 2010; van de 
Merwe, van Dijk, & Zon, 2012), but to our knowledge, the current work is the first 
attempt to validate eye tracking as a predictive measure in the field of weather 
forecasting.  Based on previous studies, we hypothesized that eye tracking measures 
would predict SA. 
Scope 
 The current work is bounded by several delimitations.  While many decision 
support systems are used throughout the weather and climate domain, this work limits 
itself to the human-centered design and evaluation of the Flood Locations and 
Simulated Hydrographs (FLASH) suite of guidance products.  Although end users could 
come from a variety of populations, the FLASH products are primarily intended for use 
by NWS forecasters; as such, this research is focused on human behavior at the level of 
the individual forecaster.  However, we posit that findings would be generalizable to 
decision makers in environments which involve integration of information sources.  
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Finally, each study concentrates on situation awareness specifically in flash flooding 
situations.  To some degree, hydrologic forecasting requires some different forms of 
expertise than other types of weather forecasting, but general behaviors are understood 
to be similar.  Developing systems that support SA development would not only benefit 
forecasters issuing flash flood watch and warning products, but findings could also be 
implemented in systems that present information related to other weather threats. 
Summary 
  Situation awareness is a critical component in dynamic decision making 
processes (Endsley, 1995c).  In the weather domain, loss of SA among forecasters can 
contribute to increased workload as well as reduced lead time and spatial accuracy in 
emergencies (Quoetone et al., 2001).  However, from a theoretical perspective, SA in 
weather forecasting is not fully understood; indeed, previous research has identified a 
gap in the knowledge related to SA development under uncertainty (Minotra & Burns, 
2015).  Previous studies have found that technology can provide support for situation 
assessment and mental model building (Andra, Quoetone, & Bunting, 2002; Endsley & 
Kiris, 1995; Kaber & Endsley, 1997; Trafton & Hoffman, 2007).  The current work 
explores the interactions between decision support tools and SA in the weather 
forecasting domain.  As such, we aim to contribute both practical recommendations for 
weather forecasting decision support systems as well as a theoretical account of the 
effects of decision support on SA in uncertain, dynamic decision making tasks. 
This dissertation begins with a literature review over situation awareness theory, 
SA assessment methods, and weather forecast decision making.  The chapters following 
the literature review describe three interrelated studies and are written as standalone 
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research topics to be submitted as individual scholarly publications.  Using qualitative 
and quantitative research methods, the studies examine interactions among weather 
forecasting, situation awareness, and decision making under uncertainty.  In Chapter 3, 
we investigate the relationship between data aggregation in a static flash flood 
prediction visualization and signal detection.  Based on the results, we present evidence-
based recommendations for future visualizations using data aggregation.  At the time of 
this work, the material presented in Chapter 3 was in submission as a standalone journal 
article.  Chapter 4 contains a discussion regarding a mixed methods analysis of 
forecasters information-seeking behaviors during the watch and warning decision 
making process.  This analysis not only resulted in new insight related to situation 
assessment under uncertainty, but it also revealed information about specific 
information requirements for building SA in flash flood forecasting.  Following this 
section, Chapter 5 presents results from an experiment that assessed the effects of a type 
of decision support automation on forecaster SA levels in a flash flood forecasting task.  
In addition, in Chapter 5, we discuss the adequacy of eye tracking as a predictive 
measure of SA in weather prediction tasks.  This work concludes with a general 
discussion in Chapter 6, which ties current findings to existing literature. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
On a daily basis, weather forecasters apply meteorological expertise and 
analytical ability to evaluate threats to life and property.  Current understanding 
suggests that forecasters extract and integrate information from a variety of decision 
aids in order to build situation awareness and reach a decision about the environmental 
risks (Trafton et al., 2000).  However, forecasters regularly face challenges related to 
interpreting and using complex data (Doswell, 2004; Pagano et al., 2014), using 
automated decision support effectively (Karstens et al., 2015; Pagano et al., 2014), and 
maintaining situation awareness (Hoffman & Coffey, 2004; Trafton & Hoffman, 2007). 
Situation awareness (SA) has many definitions, but it is widely regarded as a 
prerequisite to successful decision making (Adams, Tenney, & Pew, 1995; Durso & 
Gronlund, 1999; Endsley, 1995c, 2015b; Hoffman, 2015; Wickens, 2015).  As an 
operational concept, situation awareness (SA) has utility for communicating a critical 
aspect of the weather forecasters’ decision processes (Jones, 2015).  From a theoretical 
perspective, although research has considered the development and evaluation of 
situation awareness (SA) models for more than twenty years, the role of imperfect 
information and uncertainty in the situation assessment process remains largely 
unexplored.  Overcoming this limited knowledge will be of utmost importance in order 
to provide forecasters with decision support systems that promote human-system 
integration as well as SA development.  This chapter explores existing literature related 
to situation awareness, weather forecasting, and decision support technology in complex 
sociotechnical systems. 
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The following discussion begins by defining SA as framed by several models of 
situation awareness and sensemaking.  In addition, the discussion will address research 
methods commonly used to assess SA in operational and experimental contexts.  The 
discussion will also review findings regarding their methodological strengths and 
weaknesses.  After establishing the state-of-the-research in terms of SA, components of 
the weather forecasting sociotechnical system will be examined with an emphasis on the 
role of the human forecaster.  Finally, outcomes from human factors, meteorological, 
and decision making research will be synthesized in order to inform user-centered 
designs for future weather forecasting decision support systems. 
Theoretical Models of Situation Awareness and Decision Making 
 Perhaps due to its longstanding presence in decision making research, SA has a 
number of definitions within several explanatory models.  SA has been framed as a 
process and product of dynamic cognition in relation to individuals (Chiappe, Strybel, 
& Vu, 2012; Endsley, 1995c; Smith & Hancock, 1995), groups of individuals (Chiappe, 
Rorie, Morgan, & Vu, 2012; Salas, Prince, Baker, & Shrestha, 1995), and 
sociotechnical systems (Stanton et al., 2006).  SA has also been closely linked to 
aspects of attention, memory, and judgment, including sensation, cue detection, 
monitoring, and comprehension (Hoffman, 2015).  For an excellent review of SA 
theories, refer to Salmon et al. (2008).  With several differences in theoretical 
underpinnings, various models of SA provide unique perspectives into decision making 
and human performance in complex systems.   
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Situation Awareness Theories 
  Sarter and Woods (1991) define awareness in terms of “the accessibility of a 
comprehensive and coherent situation representation which is continuously being 
updated in accordance with the results of recurrent situation assessments.”  This early 
definition of awareness sets the stage for later theories of SA, such as Endsley’s (1995c) 
Model of SA.  Smith and Hancock (1995) took a slightly different perspective, defining 
SA as “adaptive, externally directed consciousness,” which emphasized the view that 
SA and behavior are driven by ecological factors.  Furthermore, Smith and Hancock 
(1995) caution against models that frame SA as a component of working memory or a 
type of mental model, arguing in favor of a well-structured and empirically supported 
definition of SA. 
 Several explanations of SA center around Neisser’s (1976) perceptual-action 
cycle.  The perceptual-action cycle frames cognition and perception as a process in 
which objects, information, schema, and human behavior are interrelated.  Citing the 
perceptual cycle model, Adams et al. (1995) hypothesize that SA is also a function of 
perception, memory, and human performance.  Similarly, Smith and Hancock (1995) 
discussed SA as a construct that aligns with Neisser’s (1976) perceptual-action cycle, 
and that SA is equally as important to decision making as attention and workload.   
Endsley’s 1995 Model of SA.  Perhaps one of the most widely cited models of 
SA, the Endsley 1995 model describes SA at an individual-level, introducing three 
components of cognition that relate to SA in decision making (Endsley, 1995c, 2000, 
2015b; Salmon et al., 2008).  Endsley (1988a, 1988b, 1995a, 1995c, 1997, 2000) 
defines SA as “the perception of elements in the environment within a volume of time 
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and space, the comprehension of their meaning, and the projection of their status in the 
near future.”  Although the Endsley 1995 model has received criticism for failing to 
distinguish between SA as a product and SA as a process (Baxter & Bass, 1998; 
Chiappe, Strybel, et al., 2012; Salmon et al., 2008; Stanton et al., 2006), Endsley’s 
(1995c) early work emphasized that the model described both in tandem.  In situation 
awareness—the product component—SA is described as a measure of knowledge, and 
is furthermore “only that portion pertaining to the state of a dynamic environment.”  
Thus, an individual may hold additional knowledge within memory, but if it is 
irrelevant to the task at hand, it does not count as SA.  The process component, situation 
assessment, incorporates the processes involved in acquiring and updating SA (Endsley, 
1995c).  Additionally, SA is viewed as distinct from decision making processes and 
action choice processes; each occur at different points along the decision making 
timeline and are governed by different cognitive structures (Endsley, 1995c, 2015b; 
Wickens, 2015).  For the purposes of the present discussion, the term “SA” will be used 
to refer to both product and process, and when meaningful, will indicate if process or 
product is more relevant. 
In the Endsley 1995 model, presented in Figure 2, the decision making process 
is cyclical and dynamic, with SA undergoing updates as an environment changes over 
time (Endsley, 1995c, 2015b).  Endsley has proposed that SA is comprised of three 
distinct levels: perception, comprehension, and projection.  In order to acquire and 
maintain SA, a decision maker must perceive individual environmental elements, which 
he or she must then compile in order to make sense of the whole picture.  If the decision 
maker is able to perceive and comprehend the meaning of the current state of the 
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system, he or she must then be able to envision the future system state based on the 
current state.  When navigated successfully, the decision maker should have a high level 
of SA. 
SA is but one of many factors that drive human decision making.  As such, it is 
still possible for a decision maker to choose poorly or execute a decision incorrectly.  
While SA influences decision making, SA itself is influenced by individual factors 
including the operator’s goals, expectations, training, and experience; system factors 
such as system design, workload, task complexity, automation; and individual cognitive 
factors such as long term memory, attention, and additional information processing 
structures (Adams et al., 1995; Endsley, 1995c).  An operator’s ability to acquire SA 
	
Figure 2. The 1995 Model of SA, proposed by Endsley (1995c) 
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can be limited by working memory capacity, attentional capacity, and presence of 
suitable mental models (Endsley, 1995c, 1997). 
Despite its comprehensive approach to SA in decision-making, the Endsley 
1995 model has received criticism on numerous fronts.  In a recent set of articles, 
Endsley (2015a, 2015b) attempted to rectify several of the most common critiques.  
Perhaps most prominent is the argument that Endsley’s model fails to account for the 
environment in which an individual operates, and that the model takes a Cartesian, “in-
the-head” view of SA (Chiappe, Strybel, et al., 2012; Chiappe, Strybel, & Vu, 2015; 
Salmon et al., 2008; Stanton, Salmon, Walker, & Jenkins, 2009; Stanton et al., 2006).  
In a more extreme position, van Winsen and Dekker (2015) question whether it is 
meaningful and even possible to study SA at an individual level, and instead support a 
joint cognitive systems approach as an alternative to individual and team SA.  Dekker, 
Hummerdal, and Smith (2010) argue that the Endsley 1995 model studies cognition 
independently from the environment, neglecting ecology in which the individual 
operates—essentially, focusing on the awareness, regardless of the situation. 
The “in-the-head” criticism can be traced to the debate between triadic and 
dyadic perspectives within cognitive science (Flach, 2015).  With roots in information 
processing studies, dyadic perspectives seek to understand how internal processes relate 
to external outcomes (such as how memory affects decision making).  Conversely, 
triadic perspectives frame research questions in terms of the relationship between 
internal processes, agent characteristics, and ecological properties.  For a more complete 
discussion on the history of this philosophical debate, refer to Flach (2015).  Endsley 
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(2015b) refutes that the 1995 model takes a Cartesian, dyadic perspective, pointing to 
the inclusion of task and individual factors in the decision making model. 
For all its criticism, the Endsley 1995 model was one of the first to frame SA in 
the context of attention and its relation to perceptual learning of dynamic information 
(Hoffman, 2015).  The model has been generalized to a diverse set of domains, and 
although it is sometimes construed as a dyadic, information processing based model, it 
is precisely this generalizability that lends itself to use as an explanatory framework for 
both dyadic and triadic perspectives (Flach, 2015). 
Team SA.  Many work-related tasks and environments involve interaction 
between multiple individuals.  In light of this, interest in group decision-making and SA 
has grown considerably over the years.  As with individual-centered models of SA, a 
collection of theories of team SA exist. Endsley (1995c, 2015b) defines team SA as “the 
degree to which every team member possesses the SA needed for his or her job.”  In 
this explanation, team members operate as individuals while in coordination with each 
other.  The unit of analysis is still the individual, and team SA in effect represents the 
degree of overlap between each team member in terms of SA. Team SA can exist in 
dynamic environments wherein individuals’ goals may adapt to the needs of the team, 
thus leading to changes in the extent of overlapping SA requirements (Salas et al., 
1995).  Alternatively, Dekker (2000) defines crew situation awareness as “the extent of 
convergence between multiple crew members’ continuously evolving assessments of 
the state and future direction of a process.”  As with individual human error, some 
explanations of team SA processes have attributed team errors to the failure of a team as 
a cohesive entity to maintain SA within individual members (Endsley, 1995c; Kaber & 
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Endsley, 1998).  A breakdown in team SA occurs when even a single team member 
lacks the amount of SA required to fulfill their role within the team.   
Models of team SA that focus on interactions between individuals tend to 
represent the concept by integrating models of individual SA, team characteristics, and 
teamwork processes (Endsley, 1995c; Endsley & Jones, 2001; Salas, Fiore, & Letsky, 
2013; Salas et al., 1995).  With the Endsley 1995 model as a foundation, Salas et al. 
(1995) proposed that team SA was a function of individual SA and communication 
within the team.  Shown in Figure 3, Salas’s (1995) model points out the links between 
individual characteristics and information processing mechanisms and teamwork 
processes.  In addition, Salas et al. (1995) emphasized the importance of understanding 
team SA in the context of overlapping knowledge as opposed to the study of multiple 
individuals’ SA levels.  
 
Figure 3. Model of team SA, as shown in Salas et al. (1995) 
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While definitions of team SA are often tied to the Endsley 1995 model or other 
individual-focused definitions of SA, additional research has examined mechanisms and 
processes that facilitate multi-actor decision making.  In addition to individual-level 
situation assessment processes, Salas et al. (1995) suggested that team SA is developed 
over time through processes involving information gathering, leadership, and fluid 
communication between team members. Endsley and Jones (2001) expanded upon this 
framework, introducing a model that explains the team situation assessment process in 
terms of SA requirements, information processing mechanisms at the team level, 
communication devices, and workflow processes.  Discussions of team SA 
requirements have aligned with the three levels contained in Endsley’s 1995 Model of 
SA.  When translated into teamwork, SA involves tasks related to perception of relevant 
information, comprehension of one’s own goals as well as those of other team 
members, and the projection of team members’ behaviors (Endsley, 2015b).  While 
many researchers have emphasized the importance of communication to the 
development of team SA, the relationship between team SA and other measures of 
teamwork, including team attitudes and behaviors have received less focus (Salmon et 
al., 2008). 
An extension of team SA is the concept of shared SA, which refers to the degree 
that information is shared based on goals shared between team members (Dekker, 2000; 
Endsley, 2015b; Endsley & Jones, 2013; Salas et al., 2013; Salas et al., 1995).  
Although scholars occasionally interchange the terms, the role of goals distinguishes the 
concepts of team SA from shared SA; in team SA, SA is measured as the level of SA 
possessed by individuals with differing SA requirements within the team, but in shared 
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SA, it is conceptualized as the overall amount of SA shared by individuals with similar 
SA requirements within the team (Kaber & Endsley, 1998; Salas et al., 2013).  Endsley 
and Jones (2001) define shared SA as “the degree to which team members have the 
same SA on shared SA requirements.”  In an ideal scenario, team members with shared 
goals each possess the same required knowledge to support their tasks, facilitating a 
coordinated effort.  When team members with similar SA requirements have unequal 
levels of awareness, teams can become uncoordinated, leading to performance 
decrements (Kaber & Endsley, 1998).  However, shared SA has come under fire in the 
literature for lacking clarity and for its irrelevance to teams within complex systems 
(Salmon, Stanton, Walker, Jenkins, & Rafferty, 2010; Stanton et al., 2006). 
Some criticism of the individual-level models of team SA originates from 
literature on distributed cognition approaches to SA (Chiappe, Rorie, et al., 2012; 
Salmon et al., 2008; Salmon et al., 2010; Stanton et al., 2006).  Salmon et al. (2010) 
claim that current definitions of shared SA are murky at best, and question whether it 
refers to team members each possessing exact replicas of SA, or simply possessing 
relevant portions of the total situational picture.  The debate between individual-level 
and systems-level SA scholars may require further discussions in order to arrive at a 
common ground.  Discussions predating the systems-level SA approaches establish that 
operators can share SA even when individual SA is not identical.  Endsley and Jones 
(2001) state that “the mental models of two team members do not need to be identical, 
as each member has different functions, nor is it likely they will be” and that effective 
teamwork can occur as long as “they have enough commonalty to allow comprehension 
and projection regarding actions that affect each other’s tasks.” 
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In further evidence of Endsley (2015b), Bolstad, Riley, Jones, and Endsley 
(2002) discuss a case in which two military officers had different end goals, and each 
comprehended the same Level 1 SA elements differently.  Yet, despite the differences 
between the two operators, they shared Level 3 SA requirements; both used their 
different views of the same situation to project a shared situational outcome (Bolstad et 
al., 2002; Endsley, 2015b). 
Mutual SA, a potential remedy to this debate, has received some support in the 
literature, and is a concept that describes when multiple operators are aware of each 
other’s SA (Chiappe, Rorie, et al., 2012; Shu & Furuta, 2005); put simply, each knows 
what they individually know and they both know that the other knows, too.  
Nevertheless, there are several aspects of team SA that remain yet undiscovered.  
In particular, how team SA changes over long periods of time is not well understood, 
especially when teams are engaged in projection activities (Salas et al., 2013).  
Furthermore, while several studies have determined that shared displays and shared 
mental models improve team SA and team performance (Endsley, 2015b; Endsley & 
Jones, 2001), some scholars have called for the need to address issues related to how 
perception and comprehension affect projection of the future (Wickens, 2015). 
Distributed Situation Awareness.  Grounded in the field of distributed 
cognition (Artman, 2000), schema theory (Bartlett, 1932), genotype/phenotype schema, 
and Neisser’s (1976) perceptual cycle model of cognition, the theory of Distributed 
Situation Awareness (DSA) describes team SA from a systems-level perspective 
(Salmon et al., 2008; Salmon et al., 2010; Stanton, Salmon, Walker, & Jenkins, 2008; 
Stanton et al., 2006).  DSA originated from the supposition that teamwork involved 
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different cognitive processes than individual properties.  Thus, an alternative but 
complementary model was needed to describe SA in complex sociotechnical systems 
(Stanton et al., 2006).  Prior SA theories represented team SA as a state of knowledge 
within the heads of individual team members, but Stanton et al. (2006) developed a 
model of SA based on propositional networks of distributed knowledge. 
DSA describes awareness as an emergent property from complex systems in 
which human and non-human actors interact (Salmon et al., 2008; Stanton et al., 2006).  
In DSA, ownership of SA moves away from the limited domain of individual operators 
and into the broader realm of the system in which many operators exist. 
In order to understand the differences between team SA and DSA, it is important 
to acknowledge several underlying assumptions of DSA.  From its inception, DSA was 
intended as an alternative approach to team SA, which was seen as too restrictive in its 
focus on individual cognitive mechanisms (Salmon et al., 2010; Stanton et al., 2006).  
Stanton et al. (2006) developed DSA as a means to explain the development of SA in 
dynamic, sociotechnical systems in which humans and technology both possess forms 
of SA.  The construct of SA in distributed systems was redefined as “activated 
knowledge for a specific task within a system” (Salmon et al., 2008; Stanton et al., 
2006).  However, this is not to negate the utility of individual SA models.  Individual 
SA theories of SA development, such as the Endsley 1995 model, may in fact occur 
during an individual actor’s performance; however, the DSA concept seeks to 
understand SA in terms of linkages between actors and the non-human elements within 
the system. 
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DSA centers upon a set of theoretical propositions; namely, that SA can be held 
both by human and non-human system members, that several agents may have different 
interpretations of the same situation, and that communication activities are key to 
acquiring SA within the system (Stanton et al., 2006).  As shown in Figure 4, Salmon et 
al. (2008) represent the emergent SA with the largest circle, showing information 
transactions between human and nonhuman actors with arrows.  As depicted in their 
model, while individuals may indeed possess SA, they argue that the most meaningful 
SA occurs when knowledge is activated in dynamic complex networks. 	 In line with 
                        
 
Figure 4. Example of the Distributed Situation Awareness (DSA) model, adapted 
from Salmon et al. (2008) 
	27 
concepts such as shared SA, DSA supports the notion that system agents may have 
overlapping SA when their goals have similar SA requirements, and that system actors 
with varying levels of individual SA may counterbalance the DSA of the entire system 
(Stanton et al., 2006).   
However, according to the DSA perspective, shared SA and DSA do not refer to 
the same concept.  According to Stanton et al. (2006), although they may measure the 
same SA at times, shared SA refers to instances in which system agents share both goals 
and SA requirements, and in DSA, agents have different but compatible purposes and 
SA requirements.  Salmon et al. (2010) questioned the meaning of shared SA as 
proposed by Kaber and Endsley (1998).  Specifically, they refer to uncertainty 
regarding whether the concept refers to individual agents “sharing” in the sense that 
each agent has identical SA, or in the sense that each agent holds a unique but relevant 
piece of the whole picture (Salmon et al., 2010).  Instead of a shared approach, Salmon 
et al. (2010) suggest using transactive SA and compatible SA constructs for 
understanding a system’s DSA.  Whereas transactive SA refers to the process in which 
system actors exchange information, compatible SA refers to the phenomenon in which 
system agents hold distinct components of system awareness based on differing 
information sources, yet are compatible due to overlapping operator goals. The 
existence of compatible SA is what unites members of distributed systems (Salmon et 
al., 2010; Stanton et al., 2009; Stanton et al., 2006). 	 DSA has received several criticisms from proponents of individual-level SA.  
The concept of SA as an emergent property has been met with skepticism.  In a review 
of the DSA model, Endsley (2015b) voices the concern that the DSA perspective 
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overlooks valid and time-honored definitions of what SA is, and confuses SA with the 
nonhuman entities that may be used to gain it.  However, this critique is countered by 
the supposition that in complex systems, SA represents activated knowledge and is an 
emergent property that cannot be reduced to the individual level (Salmon et al., 2010; 
Stanton et al., 2006).  While DSA supporters argue that SA is primarily meaningful 
when knowledge transactions occur, they also suggest that human operators have 
drastically different backgrounds, and thus cannot create the same situation model even 
after encountering the same information (Salmon et al., 2010).  However, this view has 
met with some discomfort, even from supporters of distributed cognition approaches to 
SA.  Chiappe, Rorie, et al. (2012) state that this view opposes current understandings of 
human perspective-taking and ability to share one’s intentions.  Such debates show that 
though distributed approaches to SA are fairly recent developments, a sharp divide 
between the individual-level and systems-level perspectives has already appeared.  Both 
concepts may have utility, but in future research, it will be necessary to distinguish 
which applications and goals are more appropriately modeled at each level. 
Situated Situation Awareness.  The Situated approach to situation awareness, 
proposed by Chiappe, Strybel, et al. (2012), is a relative newcomer to the SA debate.  
As with DSA, Situated SA is based on a distributed cognition perspective, but instead 
identifies the individual as the appropriate unit of analysis (Chiappe, Strybel, et al., 
2012).  Citing memory constraints and criticisms of the Endsley 1995 model, 
particularly the perceived Cartesian “in-the-head” approach and the product versus 
process debate, Chiappe, Strybel, et al. (2012) justify an alternative explanation of 
individual SA.  The situated approach utilizes the three levels of SA included in the 
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Endsley 1995 model, but introduces the idea that the most efficient processing strategy 
involves using the environment as its own representation, instead of storing all relevant 
information in internal models as suggested by Endsley (Chiappe, Strybel, et al., 2012; 
Chiappe et al., 2015).  In the situated approach, SA is not maintained entirely by 
internal cognitive processes but by off-loading SA into props within the environment; 
props could include checklists, mnemonic devices, automated reminders, or any number 
of memory aids.  Thus, the boundaries defining SA expand from an individual alone 
into the inclusion of ecological entities that an individual encounters while acquiring 
SA.  Further work extends the framework of individual distributed cognition into team 
settings (Chiappe, Rorie, et al., 2012). 
Early studies of SA have suggested that working memory capacity limits the 
amount of relevant information that can be used in situation assessment, but that long-
term memory structures aid SA through mechanisms such as mental models and 
schemata (Adams et al., 1995; Endsley, 1995c). Chiappe, Strybel, et al. (2012) believe 
that phenomena like change blindness and perception failures indicate that focus on 
internal representations is overemphasized in current understandings of SA.  Chiappe, 
Strybel, et al. (2012) view SA as a synthesis of two explanatory models of sensemaking: 
the Construction-Integration Theory (CI) of sensemaking (Durso, Rawson, & Girotto, 
2007; Kintsch, 1988) and Relevance Theory (Wilson & Sperber, 2002).  Based on 
premises from these theories, Chiappe, Strybel, et al. (2012) posit that factors, including 
ease of encoding, frequency of information use, ease of access, and individual factors 
such as expertise and working memory capacity affect whether SA is stored as an 
internal or external representation. 
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Proponents of the Situated SA model argue that SA is distributed, or off-loaded, 
into structures in the environment in order to reduce load upon working memory; 
however, this premise has received sharp criticism from others in the field.  Endsley 
(2015b) rejects the notion that long-term memory plays a minimal role in SA, 
emphasizing that a distributed cognition approach is not appropriate for an individual 
processing situation.  In the words of Endsley (2015b): “Information that exists in the 
environment… but of which the operator is not aware… does not constitute SA.  It is by 
definition information of which he or she is not aware.” 
Although partially disputing this assessment, Chiappe, Strybel, et al. (2012) 
acknowledge that off-loading may not always be the most effective strategy, stating 
that, “individuals must incorporate external representations into their operations in a 
way that increases the likelihood of successful performance.”  Chiappe et al. (2015) 
emphasize activated knowledge as being key to understanding the situated approach.  
Indeed, knowledge that an operator is not aware of may not be SA, but situated SA is 
instead created when the right information is activated at the right time.  In other words, 
knowledge may be present within props, but such knowledge does not translate into SA 
until it is activated by the operator (Chiappe et al., 2015). 
The central premise to the situated approach—that SA cannot be contained 
entirely within working memory—is actually expressed as a condition in the Endsley 
1995 model of SA (Endsley, 1995c, 2015a, 2015b).  Endsley (2015a) offers the 
commentary that the situated approach is based on a set of studies that use novice 
operators as participants, yet several studies have shown that experts are able to use 
mental models and schema more effectively than novices.  Despite framing itself as an 
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alternative to “in-the-head” views of SA, the situated approach is not as opposed to 
more traditional models of SA as how the concept has been theorized (Endsley, 2015a).  
Acknowledging that working memory and relevance limit storage capacity, Endsley 
(2015a) questions how best to identify the quantity and content of information, as well 
as the moments in time in which knowledge activation must occur for representations to 
be used for awareness.   
Sensemaking 
 While the concept of sensemaking has many similarities to situation awareness, 
it offers a unique perspective on decision making processes.  Sensemaking has been 
present in the literature since at least the mid-twentieth century, but Weick (1995) 
brought renewed attention to it within organizational contexts (Klein, Phillips, Rall, & 
Peluso, 2007).  At individual and team levels of decision making, sensemaking models 
have been applied to domains including fire ground command (Klein, 1993; Klein, 
Calderwood, & Clinton-Cirocco, 1986), military command and control (Jensen, 2009; 
Klein, 1989), weather forecasting (Pliske, Crandall, & Klein, 2004), air traffic control 
(Malakis & Kontogiannis, 2013), and intelligence analysis (Pirolli & Card, 2005).  As a 
field of study, sensemaking is often associated with naturalistic decision making 
methods (Klein, 2008, 2015a). 
 Klein et al. (2007) define sensemaking as “the deliberate effort to understand 
events,” and is often associated with an initial condition of surprise; that is, a subject 
will engage in sensemaking purposefully when a situation does not match his or her 
expectations (Klein et al., 2007; Weick, 1995).  Klein, Moon, and Hoffman (2006a) 
report that sensemaking integrates several cognitive processes, including curiosity, 
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comprehension, mental model creating, and SA.  In addition, several models represent 
sensemaking as a function of problem detection and identification (Klein, Moon, & 
Hoffman, 2006b).    
Although it contains elements of many recognized aspects of cognition, 
sensemaking has the greatest intersection with mental model construction (Klein et al., 
2006a).  Klein and colleagues (Klein, 1999, 2008; Klein et al., 2006a, 2006b; Klein et 
al., 2007) represent the concept as an iterative process in which decision makers attempt 
to comprehend stimuli and events in order to identify an appropriate action to take.  
That this perspective has similarities to several definitions of situation awareness has 
not escaped scholars.  Klein et al. (2006a) recognized the commonalities between 
sensemaking and SA, but stated, “in contrast [to Endsley’s SA product], sensemaking is 
about the process of achieving these kinds of outcomes, the strategies, and the barriers 
encountered.”  
While this perspective falls prey to the SA product versus process debate, 
sensemaking may then be likened to situation assessment.  Nevertheless, there are 
several distinctions that make it a unique and valuable concept for understanding 
decision making.  Sensemaking is often represented as a retrospectively-driven process 
in which a decision maker makes sense of the present based on past events (Weick, 
Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 2005).  Although sensemaking involves retrospective analysis in 
large part, it also has a forward-looking component, similar to Level 3 SA, in which the 
ultimate goal is to determine an appropriate action in the context of the situation (Weick 
et al., 2005).  However, unlike comprehensive models of SA, sensemaking theories tend 
to be constrained to the activities involved in problem detection and comprehension. 
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The following discussion will present two explanations of sensemaking.  While 
other theories exist, this section focuses on those theories put forth by scholars who 
have connected the concepts of sensemaking and decision making to situation 
awareness.  
 Recognition-Primed Decision Model.  The Recognition-Primed Decision 
(RPD) model, proposed by Klein et al. (1986), provided groundwork for several 
theories of decision making, including the Endsley 1995 model of SA (Endsley, 1995c).  
Klein (1993) recognized that in some decision scenarios, decision makers experience 
significant limitations in terms of time and resources.  Analytical decision making, in 
which a decision maker evaluates several alternatives, often requires enough time to 
compare and contrast the options; in time-constrained situations, this may be a luxury 
that one does not have.  The RPD model takes an adaptive approach, asserting that 
experience and iterative evaluation play a role in finding a workable solution.  Similar 
to the decision feedback loop contained in the Endsley 1995 model of SA, the RPD 
model explains aspects of situation assessment; however, it excludes cognitive 
processes involved in comparison of alternative choices (Klein, 1993).  This 
recognitional model addresses rapidly made, expertise-driven decisions; additionally, it 
provides a framework for understanding what has been known as intuitive decision 
making (Klein, 1989, 2015a). 
According to the RPD model, shown in Figure 5, sensemaking in such situations 
involves two processes, situation assessment and action assessment (Klein, 1999).  
When a decision maker is initially subjected to a situation, they may find it familiar and 
typical, or in the case when sensemaking is needed, they may find something atypical 
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and surprising (Klein, 1993).  In order to identify solutions to an unfamiliar or 
unexpected situation quickly, decision makers imagine potential actions based upon 
their goals, expectancies, situational cues, and past experience.  Then, potential actions 
are subjected in order of occurrence to rapid analysis.  Cognitive processes like mental 
simulations internalize and thus speed up the decision making process.  Once the first 
workable action—the satisficing solution—is found, the decision maker can implement 
it.  Thus, the solution either resolves the situation, or the decision maker receives 
feedback and can reassess the situation.  Pattern recognition and experience plays a 
critical role in recognition-primed decision making (Klein, 1989). 
	
Figure 5.  Recognition-Primed Decision (RPD) model 
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 The focus on satisficing solutions is one of several characteristics that 
distinguish the RPD model from models of SA.  Instead of choosing the best decision, 
Klein (1989) suggests that in some scenarios, it may be more efficient for a decision 
maker to choose the first functional solution.  Klein (1993) found that when decision 
makers lacked relevant experience, they rarely had the mental models required for 
conducting mental simulations of potential solutions.  Indeed, novice decision makers 
lacked the mental models required to generate action choices rapidly or accurately, a 
finding which was later supported by Endsley (1995c).  This recognitional approach 
provides a framework for understanding decision making by experts under great time 
pressure and great uncertainty (Klein, 1993).   
 Data/Frame Theory of Sensemaking.  After establishing the RPD model, 
Klein and colleagues (Klein et al., 2006b; Klein et al., 2007) sought to understand 
deliberate sensemaking processes, encapsulating their findings in the Data/Frame 
Theory of sensemaking.  Like the RPD model, the Data/Frame Theory presents a 
focused view of intentional and conscious sensemaking; it goes beyond previous 
frameworks in its attempt to explain how people construct and interpret data.  Existing 
models of sensemaking and SA, including the Endsley 1995 model, placed great 
importance on the role of data; however, as models focused on data processing, the data 
itself had rarely been studied closely.  Klein et al. (2007) argued that prior efforts to 
explain sensemaking and situation awareness had neglected to define how data is 
identified, and set forth the Data/Frame Theory to explain processes involved in data 
construction and interpretation.  The Data/Frame Theory presents sensemaking as a  
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“closed-loop sequence between mental model formulation (backwards) and mental 
stimulation (forwards)” (Klein et al., 2006b). 
 Central to the Data/Frame Theory are the concepts of data and frames.  
According to Klein et al. (2007), a frame is “an explanatory structure that defines 
entities by describing their relationship to other entities” and which provides a 
“structure for accounting for the data and guiding the search for more data.”  Frames 
can be likened to Neisser’s (1976) schema concept, a cognitive construct involving 
attention, memory, and experience in order to direct information management.  While 
frames can take a variety of forms, mental models are perhaps the closest to being the 
primary variety (Klein et al., 2006b).  Klein et al. (2007) distinguish between two types 
of frames that play different roles in sensemaking: “just-in-time” frames and 
“comprehensive” frames.  With “just-in-time” frames, interpretation of data is based on 
basic, assumed knowledge of the data elements.  “Comprehensive” frames are those in 
which data are interpreted based on knowledge of complete relationships between data 
elements.  In weather forecasting, a “just-in-time” frame could be likened to a member 
of the public looking at a radar image and recognizing that the representation indicated 
severe weather.  In the same situation, a “comprehensive” frame would be one held by a 
professional forecaster, whose mental models of the weather would contain knowledge 
about atmospheric and environmental relationships that could promote further severe 
weather. 
 Compared to the environmental elements perceived in Level 1 SA (Endsley, 
1995c), Klein et al. (2007) proposed that “data” is a relative concept.  In the Data/Frame 
Theory, data are abstractions of elements in the environment.  In this definition, in order 
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to be understood, one must not only consider the actual state of the environment, but 
also perceptive and abstractive cognitive processes that shape what becomes data (Klein 
et al., 2007).  This alternative perspective, based on doubt in the information-processing 
models, supports the idea that stimuli and events are rarely perceived without 
introducing individual bias. 
The Data/Frame Theory and the Endsley 1995 model of SA address related but 
distinct concepts.  Whereas Endsley’s (1995c) framework uses cognitive structures to 
explain how individuals perceive and make use of information, Klein et al. (2007) 
commits to a model in which frames are used to synthesize data and draw meaning from 
them.  While both explanations contain a forward-looking component, there are several 
critical differences involved in their structures and applications. 
Sensemaking involves two concurrent processes in which frames define what 
data are, and conversely, data determine the construction and selection of frames (Klein, 
2015b).  Shown in Figure 6, the Data/Frame Theory posits that sensemaking consists of 
a series of cyclical processes.  Initially, when a decision maker is exposed to a situation 
in which they must make sense of some information, her existing frames (such as 
mental models) will determine which informational elements are relevant to the 
situation at hand—these become the initial data set.  Concurrently, the perceived data 
will also be used to determine which frame is most appropriate.  Identifying a frame is 
followed by a series of synthesizing processes, in which the decision maker elaborates, 
preserves, questions, and reframes data.  In some situations, data may be incomplete, 
leading to gaps in the decision maker’s knowledge.  In the elaboration cycle, the 
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decision maker seeks out additional data or removes irrelevant data in line with the 
frame(s) in use.  The decision maker may also question the frame in use if anomalies in 
the data are found, or if data is of poor quality; this may be due to an imperfect frame 
choice.  If, in fact, the frame choice was adequate, but for some reason the decision 
maker senses inconsistencies between it and the data, she may seek to preserve the 
frame by engaging in further elaboration.  This activity may uncover additional relevant 
data that can then be used to update the frame in use.  Conversely, it may be more 
appropriate to reframe the data completely if the original frame is a poor fit for the data 
after a close analysis (Klein et al., 2006b; Klein et al., 2007). 
 
Figure 6. Data/Frame Theory of Sensemaking, adapted from Klein et al. (2006) 
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As with the RPD model and the Endsley 1995 model of SA, the Data/Frame 
Theory posits that expertise plays a large role in the sensemaking process.  Klein et al. 
(2007) argue that expert and novice decision makers use essentially identical procedures 
when engaged in sensemaking, but disparities in performance are due to differences in 
expertise.  After many experiences working through the Data/Frame cycles, experts 
build up extensive collections of frames, whereas novices have relatively few frames in 
their repertoire.  Over time, novices develop their frames, adding to their quantity and 
quality, and in addition, reframing when necessary.  The Data/Frame Theory has 
received criticism for failing to explain how cognitive processes and structures integrate 
to form, develop, and use frames.  Frames have proven to be a contentious idea, and 
even the proposing authors acknowledge limitations in knowledge about this construct 
(Chiappe, Strybel, et al., 2012; Klein et al., 2006b).  The usefulness of the Data/Frame 
concept has also come under fire in the SA literature.  Proponents of the Situated SA 
approach argue that the Data/Frame Theory has little utility for explaining SA due to its 
failure to separate long-term knowledge from short-term, situation-centered knowledge 
(Chiappe, Strybel, et al., 2012).  In addition, Endsley (2015b) has argued that it is 
inappropriate to focus so deeply on recognitional approaches to sensemaking, and has 
gone so far as to suggest that the Data/Frame Theory has few explanatory advantages 
over the Endsley 1995 model of SA.  While this opinion may overlook several benefits 
of the Data/Frame Theory, it is true that the framework neglects to identify the 
processes involved in recognizing when a situation merits analytical or recognitional 
decision making approaches. 
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In response to Endsley’s (2015b) critique, Klein (2015b) responds that the 
Data/Frame Theory was never intended to be a comprehensive model.  Its focus is on 
deliberate sensemaking in uncertain situations, and it represents a closer look at data 
construction than what the Endsley 1995 model provides (Klein, 2015b).  Where 
Endsley (2015b) states that the Endsley 1995 model and Data/Frame model each 
address problem detection, Klein (2015b) argues that the Data/Frame model adds value 
by incorporating reframing processes.  Where Endsley (2015b) argues that the 
Data/Frame model and Endsley 1995 model each describe data gathering and 
interpretation, Klein (2015b) responds that the Endsley 1995 model deals with data 
gathering and synthesis, but not construction, which is the purview of the Data/Frame 
model.  Clearly, both models offer insight into the decision making process, despite 
contention produced in scholarly debate. 
Summary of the Models 
The aforementioned models of SA and sensemaking provide a framework for 
understanding SA and decision making across multiple levels of analysis.  Sensemaking 
theories and SA models complement each other in several ways. Sensemaking explicitly 
addresses understanding of situations in which uncertainty exists; indeed, one would 
rarely need to engage in sensemaking if there wasn’t uncertainty.  Few SA models 
address how uncertainty management fits into the decision making process, or how its 
existence affects situation assessment.  In this way, sensemaking offers much to 
understanding the concept of SA. 
 Not all scholars fully accept the significance of SA as a factor in decision 
making and human performance.  Dekker and Hollnagel (2004) refer to current 
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explanations of SA as “folk models,” in which phenomena are essentially not 
measurable and therefore explained through substitution and overgeneralization.  
Instead, they call for an increased focus on explaining human decision making in terms 
of performance, as in their view, the joint cognitive system is much more meaningful 
than the study of human cognition separated from its ecological situation (Dekker & 
Hollnagel, 2004; van Winsen & Dekker, 2015). 
Several questions emerge from a synthesis of the SA and sensemaking literature.  
Crosscutting the different perspectives on units of analysis for SA is the representation 
of SA as functional understanding of a situation that results in action choice and 
performance (Chiappe, Rorie, et al., 2012; Endsley, 1995c; Klein, 1989).  There may be 
utility in viewing SA at multiple levels of analysis, and further discussions would be 
necessary to establish appropriate frameworks for discussing SA in individual cognition 
as well as across sociotechnical systems.  At the individual level of analysis, knowledge 
related to SA and human performance is lacking; for example, although a number of 
assessment techniques for SA exist, it is still unclear how to distinguish between 
inaccurate and incomplete SA (Baxter & Bass, 1998).  Likewise, it is important to 
question how an individual’s SA accuracy affects decision making and performance, 
which should shed light on the relationship between SA and situational uncertainty 
(Minotra & Burns, 2015). 
Assessment of Situation Awareness 
 Over time, a variety of methods and tools for assessing situation awareness have 
emerged from the research community.  The following section presents an overview of 
some of the most commonly used approaches in the literature. 
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Probe-based Techniques 
Probe-based techniques are perhaps one of the most commonly used methods to 
assess SA.  Several probe-based methods have been discussed in the literature, each one 
in turn addressing a different facet of SA.  Probes, designed based on expert knowledge 
of the human subjects’ workflow, assess SA in terms of absolute accuracy; either 
subjects demonstrate SA, or they do not.  Probe-based techniques have been criticized 
for assuming a situational ground truth, against arguments that this may not be true for 
all scenarios. 
Endsley (1988b) proposed the Situation Awareness Global Assessment 
Technique (SAGAT).  SAGAT has been validated in a variety of domains, including 
airfield combat (Endsley, 1988b, 1995a; Endsley, Selcon, Hardiman, & Croft, 1998a), 
air traffic control (Jones & Endsley, 2004), emergency medicine (Levin et al., 2012), 
and driving performance (Ma & Kaber, 2005).  SAGAT is a technique in which a 
subject is asked questions (also known as probes) while undergoing a simulated 
scenario; this is sometimes referred to as an on-line method.  At randomized intervals 
throughout the simulation, the scenario is paused and all relevant displays are 
temporarily cleared; at this point, the probes are presented.  Once all the probes are 
answered, the scenario is started from the pause point and runs until the next set of 
probes are due to begin.  When the entire simulation is complete, a composite score of 
performance is calculated from a comparison of responses to the ground truth in the 
scenario.  SAGAT responses can also be categorized into sub-scores associated with 
components of SA (Endsley, 1988b, 1995a). 
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Similarly, the Situation Present Assessment Method (SPAM) is an alternative 
technique that adopts a real-time approach to assessing SA (Chiappe et al., 2015; Durso 
et al., 1995).  Like SAGAT, SPAM presents queries to participants in a simulated 
scenario and evaluates response accuracy against a ground truth.  SPAM is 
distinguished from SAGAT, though, in its application of the probes and the inclusion of 
response time as a valid predictor of SA (Dao et al., 2009; Durso et al., 1995; Loft, 
Morrell, & Huf, 2013).  Instead of freezing the simulation, the SPAM procedure 
presents probes without pausing the workflow.  In principle, this allows subjects to 
access information as and when it is queried, demonstrating SA when the subject is 
aware where information is stored in the environment.  SPAM’s probe technique makes 
it an accessible assessment tool for proponents of the situated approach to SA.  By 
allowing subjects to access the information components, it inherently assumes that SA 
is not just what can be contained within the head, but that which can be stored using 
environmental and task-related cues (Chiappe, Strybel, et al., 2012).   
Comparisons of SAGAT and SPAM have produced evidence both for and 
against real-time and freeze-time probing techniques.  In a study of chess players, Durso 
et al. (1995) evaluated the efficacy of SAGAT and SPAM in predicting players’ SA 
levels; they found that while both methods were viable measures for SA, response 
accuracy was a significant predictor for SAGAT, but not for SPAM.  Conversely, 
response time was a significant predictor for SPAM, but less so for SAGAT (Durso et 
al., 1995).  However, in a similar comparison of real-time and SAGAT probes, Jones 
and Endsley (2004) found a correlation between accuracy-based probes and response 
time-based probes, albeit a weak one.  Furthermore, Jones and Endsley (2004) also 
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identified a weak correlation between workload measurements and the real-time probes, 
which indicates that further work is needed in order to identify performance effects 
from probe-based techniques. 
In line with this finding, some practitioners have expressed concern that SAGAT 
is that memory limitations may diminish SAGAT’s ability to measure SA.  It has been 
argued that by freezing the scenario, probes measure recall instead of overall SA (Dao 
et al., 2009).  However, referencing a study by Endsley (1994), Durso and Gronlund 
(1999) state that no significant difference was found in SAGAT scores measured at 20 
seconds and 6 minutes after freezing the scenario.  This finding suggests that concerns 
regarding memory limitations may be overstated, but it also assumes that memory does 
not decay significantly after 20 seconds (Durso & Gronlund, 1999).   
Dao et al. (2009) attempted to overcome limitations of SAGAT and SPAM by 
combining aspects of both techniques into one method.  In the combined probe method, 
participants were given access to the displays while answering the probes, but after the 
simulation had ended, so as to not affect mental workload (Dao et al., 2009).  This 
approach, along with other real-time probe-based techniques, provides a view of at least 
a portion of SA (Adams et al., 1995).  However, this view is partial at best; probes only 
reflect the components of SA that they directly query, and thus, reflect SA in the form 
of performance, and only indirectly represent the underlying cognitive processes.  In 
addition, conclusions from on-line probes are difficult to generalize past the scenario for 
which they were designed, and further problems can occur when simulated scenarios 
are not realistic (Adams et al., 1995).  This can be overcome by designing scenarios 
around real situations, such as historic events from the real world (Adams et al., 1995). 
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Rating Approaches 
 Similar to probe-based techniques, ratings-based approaches for assessing SA 
can be designed in more than one form.  Most often, SA is assessed through subjective 
rating methods, such as the Situation Awareness Rating Technique (SART), or through 
observer rating methods.  
The SART is an easy-to-use method that presents a questionnaire of subjective 
items to subjects at the end of a simulation in order to assess their own level of SA 
(Taylor (1990) as cited in Selcon, Taylor, and Koritsas (1991)).  SART consists of a 
series of questions that assess ten components of a subject’s SA; the questionnaire can 
be administered either at the completion of the simulation, or intermittently during 
pauses in the simulation, as done with SAGAT (Endsley, Selcon, Hardiman, & Croft, 
1998b; Selcon et al., 1991).  While completing the questionnaire, subjects rate each 
item on a seven-point scale (Selcon et al., 1991).  Components of SA considered in the 
SART are related to perceptions related to cognitive demand, availability of attentional 
resources, and the subject’s understanding of the present situation.  While requiring 
much less subject matter expertise than probe-based methods, some studies have shown 
that the SART is sensitive to background experience and task difficulty (Selcon et al., 
1991).  From the ten components included in the SART questionnaire, a total score can 
be calculated which is designed to reflect a subject’s overall SA. 
An alternative type of rating measure has subject matter experts observe and rate 
operators’ SA.  SA is assessed against a set of behaviors that are associated with high 
and low levels of SA, often developed from a grounded knowledge of workflow and 
task demands.  In the Situational Awareness Linked Indicators Adapted to Novel Tasks 
	46 
(SALIENT) method, observers watch operators perform their tasks while recording 
relevant operator behaviors using the checklist (Muniz, Stout, Bowers, & Salas, 1998).  
The SALIENT method was developed as a means to assess team interactions and SA, 
and so the checklist focuses not only on individual actions, but also interpersonal 
interactions and information handoffs (Muniz et al., 1998).  However, as with operator-
generated rating techniques like SART, observer ratings have received criticism of their 
subjective nature.  Self-guided ratings have been viewed as unreliable and even 
inappropriate.  Indeed, the issue of how much trust should be placed in a subjective 
score of SA has been raised, calling into question the degree that an individual can truly 
be aware of his or her own knowledge (Salmon et al., 2010).  An individual may believe 
that they have a high level of SA, but as Endsley (1995a) points out, many significant 
safety failures have occurred even when operators believe they are behaving 
appropriately.  Likewise, observer rating methods are subject to the same critiques. 
Methodological validation studies consistently show that other assessment 
techniques perform more reliably than SART (Loft et al., 2013).  Problems related to 
predictive power and timing bias may affect outcomes.  Endsley (1995a) cites poor 
correlation between SART and SA performance measures, having previously suggested 
that a positive or negative situational outcome could bias a subjective rating if presented 
at the end of a scenario (Endsley, 1988b).  In relation to probe-based techniques, Loft et 
al. (2013) also found that SPAM exhibited stronger predictive power than SART in 
relation to performance in a submarine track management task.  Finally, Salmon et al. 
(2009) identified a significant correlation between SAGAT scores and operator 
performance, but failed to find a correlation between SART and performance. 
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Observational Approaches 
 While many quantitative methods for assessing SA exist, alternative 
perspectives on SA can be produced using qualitative approaches.  A deeper 
understanding of SA can be gained through a variety of observational methods such as 
cognitive work analysis, naturalistic decision making (NDM) research (Klein, 2008), 
the critical decision method, and propositional network modeling (Salmon et al., 2010), 
among others. 
 In order to address perceived shortcomings of laboratory-based evaluations of 
decision making, the NDM perspective emerged as an alternative assessment method in 
the field of SA (Klein, 2008).  The NDM framework assesses situation awareness as a 
component of a decision making process situated within a specific ecology; thus, this 
approach shifts assessment out of the laboratory and into the environment in which 
decisions are made (Klein, 2008).  The naturalistic approach has been closely linked to 
the RPD model and theories of sensemaking, providing critical structure for 
understanding these phenomena in a qualitative manner (Klein, 2008).  Often 
employing interview-based approaches, NDM studies have uncovered a wealth of 
information undiscoverable through more empirical methods; NDM-based literature has 
explored decision decision-making in contexts including, but not limited to, weather 
forecasting (Pliske et al., 2004; Smallman & Hegarty, 2007), fireground command 
(Klein et al., 1986; Klein, Calderwood, & MacGregor, 1989), and military command 
(Klein et al., 1989).  
 The NDM framework has spawned a variety of techniques for eliciting 
knowledge regarding decision making from people engaged in the environment in 
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question.  Semi-structured interviews, such as the critical incident technique, are often 
used to conduct a post-event analysis with key decision makers (Klein et al., 1989; 
Randel, Pugh, & Reed, 1996).  While some studies analyze decisions following a real-
world event, such as a building fire (Klein et al., 1986), others employ a hybrid 
approach that blends laboratory-based controlled scenarios with post-event interviews 
(Randel et al., 1996; Smallman & Hegarty, 2007).  Studying electronic warfare 
technicians in the United States Navy, Randel et al. (1996) used the critical incident 
technique to elicit information about the decision making processes that participants 
used during the critical incident, defined as an event in which a successful outcome in 
the simulation is dependent upon the participant’s behavior during the event.  
Interviews assessed decision making and situation awareness through structured queries 
related to one or more of the critical incidents, an unstructured discussion of the entire 
simulation, a discussion of the simulation’s timeline, and an identification of key 
decision points and factors affecting the participant’s decision (Randel et al., 1996).  
The critical decision method is a derivation of Flanagan’s (1954) critical incident 
technique, and it focuses the interviews on decisions made during the scenarios as 
opposed to controlled incidents (Hoffman, Crandall, & Shadbolt, 1998). 
 Work analysis is a widely used method that facilitates the evaluation and 
modeling of complex sociotechnical systems.  The cognitive work analysis (CWA) 
approach, discussed extensively by Vicente (1999), allows designers to identify 
environmental and cognitive constraints that influence work demands on system 
resources.  Not only has CWA been used extensively for system modeling, but it has 
also lent itself well to understanding SA and decision making in complex systems 
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(Minotra & Burns, 2015).  The procedure often targets multiple aspects of the work 
environment, using methods such as analyses of the work domain, decision ladders, 
cognitive strategies, organizational and social transactions, and worker cognitive 
competencies (McIlroy & Stanton, 2011; Read, Salmon, Lenné, & Stanton, 2014; 
Vicente, 1999).  In combination, outcomes from these analytical components create a 
map detailing relationships between system entities and resources as well as 
requirements for successful decision-making and performance. 
Observational methods have long been used to shed light on decision-making 
processes within individuals and teams.  Recent applications of qualitative methods 
include modeling and assessing complex sociotechnical systems.  In relation to the DSA 
model, propositional network modeling uses verbal protocol analysis, hierarchical task 
analysis, and the critical decision method to develop a representation of information 
transactions between agents within the system (Salmon et al., 2010; Stanton et al., 
2006).  However, due to its qualitative nature, propositional network modeling is 
limited in its ability to assess the quality and quantity of operator and overall system 
SA; such assessments must be based on subjective measures based on observer 
judgments (Salmon et al., 2010).  The propositional network modeling technique is part 
of the broader Event Analysis of Systemic Teamwork (EAST), another methodology 
based on the NDM framework, which has been used to identify SA requirements in 
distributed sociotechnical systems in many contexts (Stanton, Salmon, & Walker, 2015; 
Walker et al., 2006). 
Although NDM methods have the potential to provide insight into decision-
making, several limitations exist to their effectiveness.  First, although they elicit rich 
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sets of knowledge related to operator behavior and task demands, models developed 
through such means are often very context-specific and thus difficult to generalize to 
broader applications.  Second, testing and validating models is also a challenge.  
Finally, from a data collection standpoint, the relationship between SA and decision 
processes is still not well understood, and a failure to account for this could affect NDM 
findings.  Indeed, while SA affects decision outcomes, it has also been suggested that 
SA also affects selection of decision-making strategies (Endsley, 1997; Minotra & 
Burns, 2015).  A deeper understanding into the mechanisms associated with SA and 
decision-making is needed in order to advance the NDM methods as SA assessment 
measures.   
Physiological Indices 
 While several probe- and rating-based approaches have been correlated to SA 
performance, these methods have only been shown to be effective in controlled 
laboratory environments (Moore & Gugerty, 2010).  In order to overcome the 
limitations associated with direct and indirect measures, physiological measures have 
been identified as potential predictors of SA.  Several physiological measures have been 
evaluated in relation to their ability to predict SA, including eye movements and 
electrical brain activity. 
 As a measurement method, eye movement analysis has had a surprisingly long 
association with SA, being both lauded and criticized for the information it has the 
potential to provide.  Tracking eye movements may provide a more direct way than 
probe-based methods for evaluating perceptual processing when developing SA (Adams 
et al., 1995).  Although early attempts to link SA to eye movements failed to identify 
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differences in levels of SA (Durso et al., 1995), recent efforts to gauge the effectiveness 
of the method have produced more positive results (Moore & Gugerty, 2010; Yu, 
Wang, Li, & Braithwaite, 2014).  In a study of air traffic controllers, Moore and 
Gugerty (2010) found that the number of eye fixations was a significant predictor of SA 
in terms of probe response accuracy; the number of fixations was inversely related to 
the number of errors that a participant made when answering probes. 
In a flight simulator-based study of pilots using a head-up display (HUD), Yu et 
al. (2014) measured the number and duration of eye fixations and compared them 
against self-reported perceived workload and subjective measures of perception and SA.  
In their procedure, SA was determined in an observer rating approach.  During the 
simulation, the experimenters would randomly switch on a warning light; if the pilots 
reacted correctly, the experimenters recorded the participant as having “high SA” and if 
an incorrect or no response was taken, the experimenters recorded the participant as 
having “low SA” (Yu et al., 2014).  While Yu et al. (2014) found a correlation between 
mental workload and SA, the appropriateness of a binary measure of SA should be 
called into question.  Yu et al. (2014) state, “Pilots who were able to identify the 
activated warning light have better SA performance and show significantly lower 
workload.”  This association has been supported by other studies, but a binary, 
observer-based judgment of SA seems to be more an artifact of the experimental design 
than a true measure of SA. 
Electroencephalography (EEG), a measure of electrical brain activity, has also 
been evaluated as a measurement technique for SA.  EEG has been used to measure SA 
with some success, but concerns have been raised that while EEG may provide insight 
	52 
into brain activity during situation assessment, the technique, still does not provide a 
measure of information contained in memory, information completeness, or 
comprehension level; this critique also holds for any measure of SA based on 
performance (Endsley, 1995a).  Nevertheless, recent applications of EEG measures for 
SA support explanations of top-down processes involved in SA.  In a series of two 
visual-based perception studies, Catherwood et al. (2014) used EEG to evaluate brain 
activity during loss of SA in situations with high levels of uncertainty.  Using a 
combination of EEG to measure brain activity and a signal detection-based approach to 
assess loss of SA, brain imagery revealed several high-order areas of the brain 
associated with SA.  Most notably, the orbitofrontal cortex, an area associated with 
cognition under uncertainty and stimulus-response contingencies, was activated during 
loss of SA during experimental tasks (Catherwood et al., 2014).  These findings suggest 
that top-down processes such as memory and mental models can be assessed 
objectively, despite suggestions otherwise (Dekker & Hollnagel, 2004). 
Although physiological measures have shown promise in relation to SA 
assessment, it is important to consider attentional limitations that may not be captured 
by such measures.  For example, eye tracking may not be able to capture loss of SA due 
to the change blindness, a phenomenon in which eyes fixate upon a stimulus, but the 
information is not encoded (Chiappe, Strybel, et al., 2012; Endsley, 1995a; Moore & 
Gugerty, 2010).  However, as Durso and Gronlund (1999) suggest that limitations in the 
coverage of physiological-based measures may be overcome if used in conjunction with 
additional SA measures. 
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Summary of the Assessment Methods 
Situation awareness can be evaluated with a number of different methods, 
including performance-based measures, subjective rating approaches, observational 
methods, and physiological assessments.  Performance-based measures show great 
promise as predictors of SA; however, Durso and Gronlund (1999) caution that one 
cannot assess SA by only looking at performance, but there is precedent for using it as 
an implicit measure of SA.  Physiological indices and performance-based measures do 
not always correlate well to SA (Salmon et al., 2010).  Furthermore, questions of 
methodological validity as well as ability to generate repeatable and meaningful 
outcomes have been raised with respect to probe-based techniques and NDM (Dekker, 
2000).  Each approach has strengths and weaknesses; a combination of methodological 
approaches has been advocated as a way to balance these trade-offs (Dekker, 2000).  
Existing SA assessment methods explain portions of the phenomena; it is possible that a 
more comprehensive model of SA in relation to its underlying mechanisms and 
influencing factors may be gained through methodological triangulation.  In order to get 
the broadest picture of this complex construct, future research should work to assess SA 
from multiple perspectives, balancing information gained through observational 
research with findings from performance-based measures, physiological measures, and 
subjective approaches. 
Decision Making in Weather Forecasting 
 Situation awareness (SA) has gained traction in operational environments, in 
part due to its ability to facilitate communication between disciplines, to translate 
cognitive theory into design deliverables, and to develop training systems (Byrne, 2015; 
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Jones, 2015).  The weather forecasting community often speaks about decision-making 
in terms of SA, and studies of forecaster SA and sensemaking have revealed much 
about forecast decision processes (Bowden, Heinselman, Kingfield, & Thomas, 2015; 
Hoffman & Coffey, 2004; Klein et al., 2006b).  In studying sociotechnical systems such 
as the weather forecasting domain, greater understanding of human decision making, 
mental models, and SA can allow system developers to match technology to the needs 
of the users (Endsley, 2001).  In this way, the study of SA can do much to inform the 
field of weather forecasting and decision support design. 
In order to take advantage of an enhanced understanding of SA and its 
underlying mechanisms, one needs to recognize the complexities in the weather 
forecasting domain; as a sociotechnical system, the forecasting domain consists of 
human and technological agents.  At an individual level, forecasting interweaves 
cognition, interpersonal communication, and technology use.  At the systems level, 
forecasters interact with emergency management personnel, broadcast media, and 
members of the general public, amongst other system actors.  Outside of operational 
forecasting responsibilities, forecasters may also interact with researchers and 
environmental modelers.  The weather domain is truly a system of systems.  While it is 
possible to look at situation awareness at multiple levels within the system, the 
following discussion presents a view of information requirements for situation 
awareness at level of the individual forecaster and the interactions involved between 
human and technical system elements.      
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Weather Forecasting from a Human Perspective 
Although details may vary between regional NWS Weather Forecast Offices 
(WFOs), the forecasting process generally remains constant across the United States.  
This also may hold true at the international level; comparing the work behaviors of 
weather forecasters in the United States and Australia, Kirschenbaum (2004) observed 
very similar decision making processes in the forecasters, despite each location using 
different types of decision aids and technology.  For a thorough discussion on the daily 
workings in a WFO, refer to Daipha (2010) who discusses observational fieldwork 
conducted over the course of nearly two years.  Summarizing Daipha (2010), operating 
in shifts, forecasters work individually and in small groups to maintain situation 
awareness over environmental states.  Forecasters receive information primarily via 
computer monitors placed on personal workstations.  In the words of Doswell (2004), 
the influx of information sources available through these modern workstations is like 
“trying to drink from a fire hose” and that excessive amounts of data can lead to 
information overload. 
Several scholars have described the flow of information through the forecast 
decision making process.  Weather forecasting involves a large amount of visual 
processing and information synthesis; these are necessary to gain awareness and make 
sense of unfolding environmental patterns (Daipha, 2010).  A number of observational 
studies have described forecaster information-seeking behavior and integrative 
reasoning during simulated forecasting activities (Barthold et al., 2015; Heideman, 
Stewart, Moninger, & Reagan-Cirincione, 1993; Karstens et al., 2015; Morss & Ralph, 
2007).  Morss and Ralph (2007) found that forecasting ability involved synchronization 
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of a variety of information sources, including computational model outputs, real-time 
environmental observations, individual background knowledge related to geography 
and weather patterns, end user needs, and feedback from previous forecasts and other 
forecasters. 
A forecaster’s ultimate goal is to maintain awareness over an environmental 
situation in order to predict weather threats in a timely and accurate manner.  In addition 
to timeliness and spatial accuracy, forecasters have cited low forecast bias and 
consistency between forecast products as desirable aspects of forecasts (Morss & Ralph, 
2007).  The NWS definition of a “good” forecast is based on verification statistics, 
including probability of detection and false alarm ratio (Bowden et al., 2015).  Under 
the current paradigm, if a weather event is forecast but not observed, the forecast is 
categorized as a false alarm; however, current observation methods may not be able to 
detect every weather event, leading to false negatives in verification.  Recent calls for a 
renewed look at forecast verification methods have attracted attention, particularly in 
light of improved understanding of the forecast decision making process (Bowden et al., 
2015). An alternative view of forecast goodness holds that a forecast is “good” if it 
closely matches the forecasters’ knowledge and experience, the observed environmental 
state prior to and during the forecast period, and if a forecast end user gains benefit 
from the knowledge conveyed in the forecast (Murphy, 1993).   
 Individual Factors.  Weather forecasting is an inherently human-centered 
activity.  Individual characteristics play a large role in the processes involved in and 
outcomes from forecasting.  Highly skilled forecasters possess a number of technical 
abilities and personal characteristics.  Forecasters should be adaptable to new 
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technologies, be able to translate knowledge into actionable information, be able to 
synthesize numerous information sources, have strong interpersonal skills, and possess 
knowledge of end user requirements (LaDue, 2011; Stuart et al., 2006).  Forecasting 
ability is also affected by background knowledge, including local geographic and 
climatological knowledge, and prior experiences with the weather phenomenon in 
question (Morss & Ralph, 2007). 
In terms of background experience, professional forecasters typically hold a 
Bachelor’s degree or higher (Daipha, 2010); however, LaDue (2011) found that few 
forecasters learn their trade in formal educational settings.  Using a grounded theory 
approach, LaDue (2011) hypothesized that instead of through formal instruction, 
forecasters learn their skills in interactive environments in which other forecasters 
essentially mentor less experienced forecasters.  Interviews revealed that strong social 
relationships, regular exposure to weather phenomena, and maintaining a professional 
identity played a large role in development of forecasting expertise.   
Expertise is a key factor that affects decision-making, and technology usage has 
been suggested as a means to distinguish between non-experts and experts.  Using the 
Critical Decision Method, Pliske et al. (2004) interviewed professional forecasters, 
finding that non-experts often based decisions solely on numerical models and a set of 
assessment procedures.  Conversely, experts took a more adaptive approach and were 
more able to integrate personal background knowledge with the model predictions, 
which may indicate more accurate mental models, a better use of forecaster mental 
models, or perhaps both.  Trafton (2004) defined mental models as a dynamic collection 
of visual and textual information that allows the subject to draw inferences about spatial 
	58 
and qualitative relationships.  Mental models may affect the way in which a forecaster 
understands the environmental situation.  Forecasting errors may occur when a 
mismatch exists between what the forecaster perceives in the environment and what 
their mental model would lead them to expect to perceive. 
Mental model formation may be affected by visual memory and spatial 
cognition, two factors that have been associated with effective performance in weather 
forecasting (Pliske et al., 2004; Smallman & Hegarty, 2007; Trickett & Trafton, 2006).  
Visual memory and spatial cognition may affect pattern recognition ability.  Daipha 
(2010) suggests that a good visual memory may improve forecast timeliness and spatial 
accuracy, citing a forecaster’s comment that displaying several visualizations on the 
workstation monitor made the information difficult to distinguish and interpret.  The 
importance of spatial cognition is further supported by Smallman and Hegarty (2007), 
who identified differences between expert and non-expert forecasters in terms of spatial 
ability.  Forecasters created information displays that they then used to create a forecast 
for a local airfield.  Measures of spatial ability, forecasting background, and feedback 
on information displays were also taken.  From these findings, Smallman and Hegarty 
(2007) identified an inverse relationship between expertise and complexity of the 
forecaster-generated information displays.  The authors posit that this could be due to 
novice forecasters expecting to need more context to the situation, whereas experts 
exhibited stronger performance due to more developed mental models. 
Finally, while spatial cognition and forecasting experience are instrumental in 
the forecasting process, it is important to note that forecasters often require specialized 
expertise.  Forecasters have different SA requirements for different types of weather 
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phenomena.  While pattern recognition is an important skill for forecasters, 
environmental events exhibit different behaviors, and forecasters sometimes train to 
specialize in forecasting events, such as flooding (Daipha, 2010).  A forecaster 
responsible for flash flood forecasting in the northeastern United States will be trained 
to recognize a different set of environmental behaviors than the patterns a fire weather 
forecaster in the southwestern United States would evaluate.  Thus, in order to discuss 
decision-making in weather forecasting, it is highly relevant to discuss the context in 
which the forecaster is situated.  
Environmental Information.  Forecasters access a substantial collection of 
computational models for environmental prediction, which not only provide direct 
estimates of environmental variables, but also indirect information.  When evaluating 
model predictions, forecasters assess model accuracy and bias, which can result in 
different information sources being preferred across different geographic locations and 
under certain environmental conditions (Morss & Ralph, 2007).  Individual 
meteorological and environmental phenomena have corresponding numerical prediction 
models, though some models can be useful for gaining SA in more than one type of 
weather event.  Meteorological ensemble frameworks, a type of model that generates 
multiple outputs based on permutations of the input variables, time-lagging predictions, 
or contrasting independent modeling systems, have been the focus of much research in 
recent years, and have been shown to improve forecaster confidence in operations 
(Evans, Van Dyke, & Lericos, 2014).  Information needs and tool use may also differ 
depending on forecast timeframe.  Morss and Ralph (2007) observed that forecasters 
reviewed environmental observations and personal experience more often in forecasts 
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of events occurring in fewer than six hours, but used computational models more often 
when forecasting events twelve hours to one day in advance. 
In flash flood forecasting, prediction methods are often based on rainfall 
estimates and basin scale.  With development beginning in the 1970s, one of the first 
models for flash flood prediction is flash flood guidance (FFG), a tool based on the 
amount of rainfall needed to produce flash flooding over a specified land area and 
timespan (Clark, Gourley, Flamig, Hong, & Clark, 2014).  For a more detailed 
discussion of the history and development of FFG, see Clark et al. (2014).  Due to its 
longstanding use within the National Weather Service, forecasters are accustomed to 
using FFG, which may affect willingness to adopt more modern methods of flash flood 
prediction. 
 Recent efforts to leverage modern data collection technology and crowdsourcing 
techniques have produced several alternative datasets that have shown early success in 
terms of forecaster use.  Gourley et al. (2013) created a database of flash flood 
measurements and impacts in an attempt to use the dataset to expand knowledge on 
societal impacts of flash flooding.  The database is comprised of three datasets: an 
archive of U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) stream gauge measurements across the 
United States, a record of verified NWS Local Storm Reports (LSRs) related to flash 
flooding events between 2006 and 2011 and their locations, and finally, a set of flash 
flood reports collected from members of the U.S. public through the Severe Hazards 
Analysis and Verification Experiment (SHAVE) between 2008 and 2010 (Gourley et 
al., 2013).  In an extension of this work, Barthold et al. (2015) developed an additional 
dataset for hydrologic event verification; this set merged NWS LSRs, USGS stream 
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gauge measurements across the United States, and reports of flash flooding collected 
through a citizen science crowdsourcing mobile application.  Together, these datasets 
are some of the earliest attempts to develop verification and feedback methods for 
hydrometeorological forecasting (Barthold et al., 2015). 
Forecasting Decisions and Feedback.  After integrating background 
knowledge, expertise, meteorological and environmental information sources, and 
historical datasets, forecasters may then be able to predict a future state of the 
environment; this may be realized in the issuance of a forecast product, such as a watch 
or a warning.  Bowden et al. (2015) proposed that this is a compound warning decision 
process, which involves a cycle of threat detection, threat identification, and 
reidentification.  Throughout this process, forecasters update threat predictions as the 
situation changes over time and space.  This framework conceptually aligns with 
Endsley’s (1995c) Model of SA; errors may occur in detection, influencing 
identification, or even if a forecaster correctly detects patterns associated with severe 
weather, an insufficient mental model could lead to a misidentification of the threat. 
Following issuance of a forecast product, local forecast offices might be able to 
assess whether or not the predicted event actually occurred, which can then be reported 
in a collection of verification statistics.  Verification datasets can help forecasters to 
manage uncertainty in the decision making process by providing feedback about the 
adequacy of past forecasts.  Morss and Ralph (2007) found that discussions with end 
users, including emergency managers, provided valuable information to forecasters, in 
turn helping them to modify future forecasts to suit user needs and improve forecast 
accuracy.  Similarly, in a survey of NWS forecast offices, Novak, Bright, and Brennan 
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(2008) found that end users frequently request information related to forecast 
uncertainty and forecaster confidence; as the forecasting field moves towards a more 
probabilistic paradigm, communication between actors in the weather domain and 
comprehensive verification datasets may facilitate situation assessment and awareness. 
In a study where participants issued wind speed and visibility forecasts, forecast 
skill improved not only with a higher experience level, but also as feedback on 
performance increased (Murphy & Daan, 1984).  Likewise, Morss and Ralph (2007) 
observed that end user feedback affected future products issued by forecasters, and 
information about forecast quality and value was the most influential, which 
corresponds to the proposition that feedback is a prerequisite for SA (Sarter & Woods, 
1991).  It is possible that this feedback loop serves to update forecaster dynamic mental 
models, as suggested by Trafton (2004). 
Situation Awareness in Weather Forecasting 
  Understanding the weather forecasting decision making process is necessary in 
order to improve information display technology and decision aids, which in turn 
should improve forecasting outcomes.  A robust integration of human agents into the 
forecasting system should lead to more timely and accurate forecasts as well as lower 
workloads placed on forecasters themselves.  As an aspect of decision making, much of 
the existing literature that intersects SA and weather has been situated within the 
domains of air traffic control (Moore & Gugerty, 2010) and pilot awareness 
(Bustamante, Fallon, Bliss, Bailey, & Anderson, 2005).  A deeper study of SA in the 
context of weather forecasting can have real and meaningful implications for the design 
of future forecasting systems and technology. 
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Imagine a scenario in which a forecaster’s goal is to monitor information 
sources from a geographic region in order to predict flash flooding.  From the 
perspective of Endsley’s (1995c) Model of SA, in the perception stage (Level 1), the 
forecaster must recognize elements in the forecast environment that are relevant to his 
or her goals.  In the case of flash flood forecasting, elements could include model 
forecasts of anomalous conditions, reports of flooding from verifiable sources, 
developing weather systems in the surrounding area, environmental conditions 
conducive to flash flooding, or geographic features specific to an area, such as burn 
scars.  Once key elements are perceived, the forecaster may be able comprehend a 
deeper meaning from the elements in combination (Level 2); the forecaster may 
recognize that heavy rainfall over a burn scar is a risk factor for flash flooding.  The 
projection component of SA occurs when the forecaster is able to extend the current 
state of the environment to a potential future state (Level 3).  In this example, the 
perception of elements and the comprehension that the trend is associated with high risk 
could lead the forecaster to identify a future timeframe for flash flooding to begin.  
Extending past the situation assessment process and into the decision and performance 
stage may include the forecaster choosing to issue a flash flood warning to alert local 
officials and residents of the impending threat. 
Much of the weather forecasting within the United States National Weather 
Service requires interaction between several levels of the weather enterprise, and thus 
could also be studied with a team SA framework.  In a scenario involving a developing 
severe weather threat, forecasters not only work cooperatively, but they often work in 
tandem with emergency management and public agencies to maintain SA throughout 
	64 
the system.  Despite disagreement between proponents of individual and team versus 
systems-level (Stanton et al., 2006) and Situated SA (Chiappe, Rorie, et al., 2012; 
Chiappe, Strybel, et al., 2012) frameworks, analyzing SA at multiple levels within the 
weather enterprise may generate meaningful information that could improve 
understanding of SA in weather decision-making.  Each of the four SA theories 
employs a variety of assessment methods and each evaluates SA at different units of 
analysis. 
Few studies have empirically assessed the SA of weather forecasters, but several 
have addressed the overall forecast decision-making process.  The sensemaking 
perspective has gained traction in the research community, having been used to explain 
the information comparison, integration, and problem detection activities used in 
weather prediction (Klein, Pliske, Crandall, & Woods, 2005; Pliske et al., 2004).  Using 
Comparative Cognitive Task Analysis (C2TA), Kirschenbaum (2004) found that 
professional forecasters regularly engage in activities related to extraction of 
information, comparison of information sources, and comparison of the perceived 
environment to mental models. 
Interestingly, studies of weather forecasters have revealed behaviors that throw 
the widespread acceptance of previous assumptions of expert sensemaking into 
question.  Sensemaking theories often accept that information seekers are swayed by a 
confirmation bias, but observational research has found that professional forecasters 
often try to disprove their initial assumptions (Hoffman, Trafton, and Roebber (2006), 
cited in Klein et al. (2006b)).  Forecasters have been observed seeking information in a 
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goal-directed manner, which may be one means of obtaining actionable information 
from large quantities of complex datasets and displays (Trafton et al., 2000). 
In a field work study to assess how forecasters build mental models, Hoffman 
and Coffey (2004) found that forecasters use a recognition-primed decision-making 
strategy.  Given the importance of pattern recognition in forecaster training, this is a 
logical finding.  In the resulting model of forecaster sensemaking, situation assessment 
is affected by mental model strength as well as pattern recognition, and in turn, it affects 
the way in which the forecaster interprets the data at hand (Hoffman & Coffey, 2004). 
Design for SA in Weather Forecasting Decision Support Systems 
 Human factors research has produced a number of design guidelines to improve 
user performance and human-systems integration.  Furthermore, assessment of SA often 
provides system developers with insight into the design of work systems to match users’ 
decision-making processes (Jones, 2015).  Critics of highly automated systems have 
warned that without integrating knowledge of cognition into the designs of forecasting 
technology, the human component of forecasting will be lost to the detriment of society 
(Murphy, 1993).  Within the last decade, studies in graph comprehension and 
information visualization have produced new knowledge that can be applied to the user-
centered design of forecasting decision-aiding technology (Hegarty, Smallman, & Stull, 
2012; Trafton & Hoffman, 2007; Trickett & Trafton, 2006). 
With respect to designing for SA in sociotechnical systems, Endsley (2001) has 
provided the Situation Awareness-Oriented Design (SAOD) cycle.  This three-pronged 
approach involves an initial evaluation of SA requirements, followed by an iterative 
process of system design and evaluation. The SA requirements analysis, often 
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conducted as a cognitive task analysis, serves to identify key operator goals and the 
information needed to accomplish them.  In the next stage, SA-oriented design, design 
guidelines and SA requirement information are used to develop systems from a user-
centered perspective.  SA-oriented design is a process in which design guidelines are 
centered on supporting user cognition, SA, and goal accomplishment.  After an initial 
design has been developed, evaluation occurs in the third stage.  Any of the assessment 
methods discussed in the previous section can be used to evaluate the adequacy of the 
second-stage design; however, Endsley (2001) recommends the use of SAGAT as it 
provides a quantitative estimate of SA that conceptually links SA to decision choice. 
Design Challenges.  The complexities of many sociotechnical systems demand 
a unique approach in order to accommodate the diverse goals and requirements of 
system actors.  Scholars like Endsley (2001), Hoffman and Coffey (2004), and Trafton 
and Hoffman (2007) have advocated addressing complex system design in terms of 
challenges as opposed to design-by-rule.  Challenges purposefully avoid reliance on 
rules.  For example, a design guideline might state that meteorological decision aids 
designers should consider that “pastels might work well in certain applications for both 
backgrounds and target symbols” (Hoffman, Detweiler, Conway, & Lipton, 1993).  
When designing a system with many users and many goals, a challenge might instead 
be phrased as, “Support for parallel processing, such as multi-modal displays should be 
provided in data rich environments” (Endsley, 2001).  This transition towards a 
systems-perspective promotes technology that is adaptable to users; adaptability is 
critical in systems where users may have conflicting goals and need to use the same 
decision aids for a number of purposes.  
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In this way, design for SA in complex systems becomes less about successful 
task completion and more about adequate information transfer and integration (which 
should theoretically lead to successful task completion).  Principles discussed in the 
literature that are relevant to decision aid design are numerous, and include the 
following: 
• The Sacagawea Principle:  “Human-centered computational tools need to 
support active organization of information, active search for information, active 
exploration of information, reflection on the meaning of information, and 
evaluation and choice among action sequence.” (Endsley & Hoffman, 2002) 
• The Lewis and Clark Principle: “The human user of the guidance needs to be 
shown the guidance in a way that is organized in terms of their major goals.  
Information needed for each particular way should be shown in a meaningful 
form, and show allow the human to directly comprehend the major decisions 
associated with each goal.” (Endsley & Hoffman, 2002) 
• “Direct presentation of higher level SA needs (comprehension and projection) 
is recommended, rather than supplying only low level data that operators must 
integrate and interpret manually.” (Endsley, 2001) 
• “Support for global SA is critical, providing an overview of the situation across 
the operator’s goals at all times… and enabling efficient and timely goal 
switching and projection.” (Endsley, 2001) 
In practice, principles such as these may manifest themselves in different ways in 
different sociotechnical systems.  In the weather forecasting domain, consideration of 
the Sacagawea Principle would promote the development of goal-centric displays and 
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interfaces that facilitate easy exploration of the data.  Similarly, the Lewis and Clark 
Principle encourages design through focusing on users’ cognitive processes.  
Challenges support user-centered design when incorporated into early design stages.  
Considering SA during the design stage ensures that the resulting support systems align 
with users expectations, as well as those of the system developers’ (Endsley & 
Hoffman, 2002). 
Mental Models, SA, and Decision Support Design.  Addressing these 
challenges may be difficult due to the information-dense nature of many meteorological 
datasets; however, research into the role of mental models, sensemaking, and workload 
on SA and decision making help to shed light on ways to accomplish these goals 
(Trafton & Hoffman, 2007).  Extensive work into understanding mental models has 
revealed that forecasters create and apply mental models when trying to comprehend the 
weather and project potential threats in the future (Pliske et al., 2004; Smallman & 
Hegarty, 2007; Trafton, 2004; Trafton et al., 2000).  The need for weather forecast 
decision aids that support SA and decision making is well-recognized.  Trafton and 
Hoffman (2007) call for “innovation and revolutionary redesign, especially in the 
creation of systems that support the forecaster in creating a graphical depiction of their 
own mental model.”   
A central question in decision support design is how to create visual displays 
that convey highly detailed data to users in a way that allows them to make inferences 
and make sense of the situation (Trafton & Hoffman, 2007).  While much 
meteorological data is quantitative, Trafton et al. (2000) observed that forecasters 
primarily communicated their understanding of the data in qualitative means.  
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Questioning how expert forecasters comprehend and understand meteorological 
visualizations, Trafton et al. (2000) found that forecasters went through a process 
involving situational initialization, mental model building, and verification and altering 
of the original mental model.  During initialization, forecasters primarily gathered 
information from discrete visualizations; the authors believed this revealed that 
forecasters were situating themselves with respect to the environmental context.  
Establishing the context did not involve a high degree of information integration and 
comparison; in fact, comparison characterized the mental model building phase.  While 
building their qualitative mental models, forecasters assessed data displayed in a variety 
of meteorological visualizations, often comparing between datasets in a goal-oriented 
manner.   
Comparison among information sources in order to extract information is a core 
activity that forecasters engage in while developing an awareness of the situation; this 
behavior is governed primarily by a forecaster’s goals (Kirschenbaum, 2004; Trafton et 
al., 2000).  In practice, this suggests that forecasters might benefit from decision aids 
that facilitate comparison and making inferences from the data (Trafton, 2004).  Trafton 
et al. (2000) recommend that meteorological decision support systems are developed to 
enable comparison and integration through means such as data overlays or multi-panel 
displays.  Additionally, Kirschenbaum (2004) found that forecasters using dual-monitor 
displays made more comparisons between visualizations than forecasters using a single-
monitor workstation; while both groups used comparison activities to make sense of the 
situation, it is possible that single-monitor workstations increased the time required to 
understand the data, resulting in fewer total comparisons.  
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Minimizing Decision Bias Through Design.  Facilitating data comparison is 
important in decision support design not only because of its frequency in the mental 
model building phase, but also because of its role in allowing forecasters to validate and 
change their mental models (Kirschenbaum, 2004).  Whereas the initialization phase 
may create an anchor for the qualitative mental model, comparisons are then used to 
assess the level of fit between the anchor and additional data sources (Trafton et al., 
2000).  This complements the anchoring-and-adjustment model of belief updating, first 
proposed by Hogarth and Einhorn (1992).  The anchoring-and-adjustment model posits 
that over time, an individual first develops a belief about a situation based on initial 
exposure to information.  Through exposure to new data, this initial anchor may be 
adjusted or confirmed through a variety of processing mechanisms (Hogarth & Einhorn, 
1992).  Wickens et al. (2008) suggest that attentional capacity plays a large role in 
belief updating and situation assessment; when a user is able to devote adequate 
attention to data, he or she may be able to achieve a higher level of SA.  In terms of 
meteorological decision support design, this implies that systems that direct attention to 
important components of the data may allow forecasters to develop high SA. 
While this behavior is a critical part of the situation assessment process, 
heuristics such as anchoring and representativeness may bias a forecaster’s judgment 
(Doswell, 2004).  Representativeness refers to the level of similarity between two 
situations, whereas anchoring refers to the action of locking into a base state of 
knowledge (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).  In weather forecasting, representativeness 
bias displays itself when a forecaster misidentifies a weather event based on a perceived 
similarity between the event in question and a prototypical event (Doswell, 2004).  
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Particularly in situations with great uncertainty, anchoring bias may diminish a 
forecaster’s ability to develop and maintain SA if an appropriate update to SA has not 
occurred (Nadav-Greenberg, Joslyn, & Taing, 2008).   
Fortunately, certain design characteristics of visualizations may reduce the 
effects of these decision biases.  Nadav-Greenberg et al. (2008) evaluated professional 
forecaster performance when using three types of uncertainty visualizations to 
determine wind speed forecasts: a box plot chart, a margin-of-error chart, and upper 
bound visualization.  While a box plot chart was the most readable of the three—
subjects were able to interpret the range of possible wind speeds quickly—a margin-of-
error chart provided the most effective in situation assessment of uncertainty.  
Furthermore, Nadav-Greenberg et al. (2008) found that as forecasters became more 
aware of the uncertainty in the data, the lower their confidence was in their forecasts.  
This finding has implications for the design of decision aids that support the situation 
assessment cycle in uncertain situations such as weather forecasting.  Interpretation of 
meteorological data and uncertainty information can also be conveyed by incorporating 
knowledge from the vast collection of color scale research (Hoffman et al., 1993).  
Appropriate color usage in meteorological visualizations can support decision making 
by drawing the user’s attention to critical areas of the data and may improve task 
completion time (Trafton & Hoffman, 2007). 
Based on the findings of Stewart, Heideman, Moninger, and Reagan-Cirincione 
(1992), it can be argued that weather forecasting decision support systems should 
adequately balance information quality with quantity.  In a series of studies to assess the 
effects of information quality and quantity on forecast skill, forecasters produced short-
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term severe weather forecasts while exposed to a variety of information conditions.  
Stewart et al. (1992) found that as information quantity increased, disagreement 
between forecasters also occurred more frequently.  In addition, forecast accuracy 
improved as the quality of the provided information improved, though accuracy did not 
significantly improve as quantity increased.  This was especially observed in scenarios 
where the provided data contained great uncertainty, and in combination with the 
findings of Nadav-Greenberg et al. (2008) supports the notion of designing decision 
support that incorporates uncertainty estimates. 
Automated Decision Support for Forecasting.  Trafton (2004) argues that 
meteorological visualizations should focus on qualitative aspects of the data, opposed to 
only displaying quantitative information, in order to facilitate mental model building 
and decision making.  Likewise, Hoffman and Coffey (2004) suggest that decision 
support design should be concerned with assisting forecasters with “generating, 
manipulating, and verifying a graphical 4-D representation of their mental models of 
atmospheric dynamics.”  Automation has shown promise as a means to accomplish this, 
and can potentially be used to facilitate SA development (Dao et al., 2009), workload 
reduction (Karstens et al., 2015), and comparison between data sources (Trafton et al., 
2000). 
In the weather forecasting domain, automation could assist forecasters in 
verifying and updating their SA by presenting users with pre-selected collections of 
visualizations (Trafton et al., 2000).  Hypothetically, this may reduce workload and lead 
time as it would lessen the effort and time required in order to select and display 
visualizations.  Decision support systems could be automated to display different 
	73 
visualizations at the most relevant points in the forecast process (Trafton et al., 2000).  
It is well established that forecasters consult different types of visualizations at different 
points along the forecast timeline (Morss & Ralph, 2007; Trafton et al., 2000), so an 
automated display mechanism could be an effective means of streamlining the situation 
assessment process.  
Empirical evidence exists in support of using animation to expedite situation 
assessment in novice forecasters.  Lowe (2004) found that among novice users of 
meteorological visualizations, animating changes in the geospatial data over time did 
not result in improved comparisons or forecasting performance.  Thus, it is 
recommended that in order to improve novice user performance, dynamic visualizations 
ought to contain supplemental information to guide users to areas most relevant to the 
user’s goals (Lowe, 2004, 2008).  Although these findings were observed in novice 
meteorologists, such supplements could perhaps aid expert forecasters building mental 
models when unfamiliar situations are encountered.   
 In the context of river flood forecasting, Pagano et al. (2014) points out that 
although some scholars advocate fully automated decision support systems, keeping the 
operator in-the-loop with interactive automations adds value to forecasts.  Recent 
developments in meteorological decision aiding automation have had generally positive 
outcomes. A particular type of automated guide, the recommender, synthesizes 
information from multiple sources and generates a suggestion to the user regarding 
locations at risk for a particular type of environmental threat.  Although their purpose is 
to reduce forecaster workload while increasing lead time and forecast accuracy, 
Karstens et al. (2015) failed to find a significant difference in forecast creation time 
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based on presence and absence of a recommender for severe hail.  However, 
recommenders may have a greater effect on SA.  In an evaluation of an automated 
decision aid for air traffic management, Dao et al. (2009) found that level of automation 
produced a significant effect on SA as measured by response time.  Subjects performed 
a conflict resolution task with varying levels of interaction with the decision support 
automation.  Subjects exhibited higher SA when under the interactive decision support 
condition than when under the fully automated condition, in which decisions had to 
align with the automated recommendation.  This aligns with Endsley and Kiris (1995), 
who also found that decision makers experienced diminished SA and performance after 
exposure to a fully automated decision task.  However, an appropriate balance between 
human analysis and automation use may lead to improved SA. 
Summary of the Weather Forecasting Literature 
 Despite incorporating many technological systems for data analysis, forecasting 
is an inherently human activity.  As a complex sociotechnical system, the weather 
forecasting domain involves a vast number of information transfers between human 
operators and non-human information sources, such as visualizations representing 
numerical weather prediction models and environmental observations. Recommenders 
and other automated decision support systems have the potential to revolutionize the 
situation assessment process, while understanding forecaster mental model development 
reveals connections between cognition and decision support technology.  Furthermore, 
designing systems to support SA and decision making should lead to improved forecast 
accuracy and lead time while reducing forecaster workload.  Though many advances 
have been made to decision support systems for weather forecasting, there remain many 
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questions related to the relationship between human cognition, SA, and human-system 
integration. 
 In the broader picture of SA and decision making, a number of gaps exist in 
knowledge related to the role of cognitive processes, uncertainty, and human 
performance in weather forecasting emerge.  Although models of sensemaking like the 
Data/Frame Theory in part explain aspects of uncertainty management in decision 
making (Klein et al., 2007), the widely-accepted models of individual SA fail to explain 
the role of imperfect information in situation assessment.  According to the Endsley 
1995 Model of SA, errors occur due to misperception, incorrect mental model choice, 
working memory limitations, and attentional capacity limitations (Endsley, 1995c).  
However, these types of errors assume that the subject has a low level of SA, and does 
not explore errors that occur when a subject is highly aware but immersed in an 
uncertain situation.  This scenario may occur in weather forecasting when there is high 
uncertainty involved in predicting environmental conditions.  Weather forecasters often 
consult specialized guidance products aimed at developing their awareness of 
uncertainty within relevant data sources, and such information can even assist with the 
forecast verification process, a critical component of situation assessment (Novak et al., 
2008). 
 Doswell (2004) calls for increased collaboration between decision-making 
scholars and weather forecasting scholars; such interdisciplinary work is necessary to 
synthesize methods and theories from multiple fields with the ultimate goal of creating 
a forecasting system that complements human decision making processes.  Theories of 
SA and sensemaking processes may illuminate less understood areas of cognition in 
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weather forecasting, such as how weather forecasters use mental models to manage 
uncertainty at different points along the forecast timeline (Pliske et al., 2004).  
Furthermore, human factors research can be used to explore the relationship between 
complex visualization design and expert decision making under uncertainty.  The 
weather forecasting domain offers a unique application for exploring the role of 
uncertainty in situation assessment, and such research has great potential to result in real 
and meaningful societal impacts. 
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Chapter 3: The Effect of Display Design on Situation Awareness in Flash Flood 
Detection 
 
Submitted to the International Journal of Human-Computer Studies (Under Review) 
Introduction 
In the field of weather forecasting, computational modelers are under pressure to 
provide actionable information to forecast consumers at increasingly local levels, 
pushing gridded forecasting systems to hyper-resolution scales (Wood, et al., 2011; 
Beven, Cloke, Pappenberger, Lamb, & Hunter, 2015).  Although the capability to 
predict weather phenomena at small scales continues to develop, operational technology 
often limits display capacity.  Tools such as large high-resolution displays have been 
shown to overcome the data abstraction limits while enabling users to engage in 
exploratory data analysis (Lehmann, Schumann, Staadt, & Tominski, 2011); however, 
current operational forecasting displays are based on the multi-screen desktop setup, 
and meteorological visualization environments are constrained to comparatively low 
resolution displays. 
One such set of gridded forecasting product is the Flooded Locations and 
Simulated Hydrographs (FLASH) project for flash flooding prediction.  In July 2013, 
the Hydrometeorological Testbed at the Weather Prediction Center (HMT-WPC) hosted 
the first Flash Flooding and Intense Rainfall (FFaIR) experiment (Barthold et al., 2015).  
The purpose of the experiment was to evaluate the utility of a set of experimental 
forecast models, including the FLASH Return Period visualization, on a sample of 
professional forecasters and weather researchers.  Over the three-week period, 
forecasters assessed operational and experimental computational models to create 
probabilistic forecasts of heavy rainfall and flash flooding events in the United States.  
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As part of the experiment, the researchers observed forecaster behavior when creating 
the forecasts and identified patterns of information processing.  Through daily 
observations of three independently acting forecasters, the researchers observed that the 
design of the information display affected how well forecasters were able to interpret 
the data modeled in FLASH. 
Of particular interest was a forecaster belief that the sampling and aggregation 
methods employed in the FLASH Return Period visualization led to an increased 
number of false alarm forecasts.  The underlying grid for all FLASH visualizations 
covers a spatial extent of the continental United States at a horizontal resolution of 1 
km.  In the Return Period visualization, the experimental model calculates a measure of 
flash flood risk, the return period1, for every cell within the grid; this calculation is 
based on a hydrologic model.  However, when fully zoomed out to show the map of the 
entire continental United States, desktop-based display systems are not able to display 
each individual grid cell.  This issue was overcome by developing an aggregation 
algorithm to sample the maximum grid cell value out of a collection of at least 112 grid 
cells contained within one pixel, and the map of all the maximum values displays at the 
national level.  In practice, this means that while the true predicted return period values 
are displayed when a viewer zooms in to a local level, the national view displays an 
adjusted value of the data by displaying the maximum value.  An example of this 
phenomenon is shown in Figure 7.  At the national level, this resulted in an occlusion 
effect, where lower return period values were occluded by the maximum values. 
																																																								
1 A return period is a measure of likelihood of some event occurring.  In hydrologic 
terms, a return period is the average length of time for a certain threshold of flooding to 
be reached (Mays, 2010). 
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 In terms of cognition and geospatial data, the field of cartographic 
communication has done much to inform the field of meteorological visualization	and 
decision-making.   Cartographic researchers have long studied issues related to 
visualizing spatial data, and have addressed such issues in terms of design and user-
centered evaluation (Dobson, 1979; Hegarty, Smallman, & Stull, 2012; Montello & 
Freundschuh, 2005).  One challenge encountered in designing geospatial visualizations 
is that of reducing selection occlusion (Shrestha, Zhu, & Miller, 2014).  In designing 
visualizations that include data aggregates, Elmqvist and Fekete (2010) recommend 
following the principles of visual summary and awareness of fidelity.  The principle of 
visual summary states that the visual properties of the data aggregate should be 
representative of the individual data point members; however, certain aggregation 
methods can lead to loss of fidelity and misinterpretations of the visualization.  
Elmqvist and Fekete (2010) point to inadequacies involved in using average-based 
aggregation methods, due to the loss of knowledge about the variance within the 
aggregate; to overcome issues related to fidelity, they recommend the use of interactive 
visualization overviews.  The concept of overview in information visualization has been 
  
Figure 7. National view component of a stimulus sequence in the maximum 
sampling algorithm condition (on left) and the corresponding local view, selected 
within the white box (on right) 
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discussed extensively in the literature, with a now well-known keystone in 
Shneiderman’s (1996)  Visual Information Seeking Mantra: “overview first, zoom and 
filter, then details on demand.”  Hornbæk and Hertzum (2011) pose two alternate views 
on the meaning of “overview” based on a comprehensive literature review. 
The core contribution from this research relates to understanding the relationship 
between visual data aggregation and weather forecasters’ situation awareness.  As 
defined by Endsley (1995c), situation awareness is the ability to perceive elements 
within a system, comprehend their significance, and project their meaning into the 
future in order to make a decision.  In theory, strong SA should translate into the ability 
to make informed decisions (Adams, Tenney, & Pew, 1995).  However, acquisition of 
SA is not discrete, but develops over time as decision-makers gain experience with and 
exposure to their operating environment (Endsley, 2015b).  Underlying the concept of 
SA are a variety of personal factors and cognitive mechanisms, including, but not 
limited to, visual information processing, cue detection, working memory, goals, 
preconceptions, background training, and system design (Endsley, 1995c, 2015; 
Hoffman, 2015). 
The Research Question 
Forecaster comments from FFaIR led the researchers to hypothesize that a 
display algorithm that takes the average of sampled grid cells (henceforth called the 
average-based display) would produce different task performance than the maximum-
based display.  Using an empirical approach, the present study identified differences in 
terms of error rate and task completion time when comparing two different display 
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algorithms on the national-scale maps.  The research question addressed in the 
following chapter is: 
RQ1:  How does data aggregation in a FLASH visualization affect user performance in 
terms of signal detection, task completion time, and congruence in decisions for a flash 
flood prediction task? 
Hypotheses 
It was hypothesized that the aggregation method would affect false alarm rates 
(i.e. the event was forecast but not observed) and hit rates (i.e. the event was correctly 
forecast and observed).  In terms of task completion time, it was hypothesized that the 
aggregation method would also affect the time it took participants to evaluate the 
displays.  It was thought that due to the color scheme and the larger area of represented 
regions, the design of the maximum-based display would draw attention to events more 
rapidly than the average-based display would.  Formally, the hypotheses made in the 
following chapter are: 
H1.1:  Hit Rate (HR) and False Alarm Rate (FAR) 
 H0 : HRavg = HRmax,          FARavg = FARmax 
 H1:  HRavg ≠ HRmax,               FARavg ≠ FARmax 
H1.2:  Task Completion Time (t) 
H0: tavg = tmax   H1: tavg ≠ tmax 
H1.3: Congruence between views (C) 
H0: Cavg = Cmax  H1: Cavg ≠ Cmax 
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Method 
Experimental Design 
As a between-subjects independent variable, the display algorithm differed 
across two levels—participants viewed either the maximum-based display or the 
average-based display.  Though property damage was used as a measure of severity to 
select the images, it was not an independent variable itself—within the study 
framework, participants had to detect which images represented severe events.  
Likewise, while participants viewed images at the two spatial scales, the local images 
were identical no matter which display algorithm each participant viewed at the national 
level.  The purpose of viewing identical local images was to identify whether or not 
there was any bias in detection based on which level of national image a participant 
viewed first. 
Using a Signal Detection Theory framework, error rates were calculated from 
the response data from the detection task (McNicol, 2005).  In traditional explanations 
of error rate analysis in weather forecasting, signal detection metrics are based on 
comparisons between the predictions and the actual outcomes.  For example, a hit 
would occur when a flash flood was forecast and then actually occurred.  A false alarm 
refers to an event in which a flash flood was forecast but then did not occur.  Translated 
into the present study’s framework and shown in Table 1, in which all stimuli visualized 
Table 1. Interpretation of error rates in the property damage detection task 
  Reports of Property Damage 
  High Value Low Value 
Forecast of 
Property Damage 
High Value Hit False Alarm 
Low Value Miss Correct Rejection 
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flash floods that received reports, the explanations of error rates is instead based on 
correct identification of property damage level for NWS-verified flash floods. 
Materials and Equipment  
A set of 40 image sequences was created by taking screen captures of FLASH.  
Each sequence consisted of one image of FLASH at a national, full-view level, and a 
second image of the same date and time, but zoomed in to a local level covering several 
counties.  It is important to note that while participants in the two display groups viewed 
different representations of the weather event at the national scale, the local images that 
participants viewed were identical between groups.  An example of an image sequence 
using both display conditions is shown in Figure 8. 
The dates and times were selected based on flash flooding events that were 
reported between April and July 2013 in the National Climatic Data Center Storm 
 
Figure 8. Examples of image sequences in both aggregation conditions, with the 
corresponding local-level image 
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Events Database (National Climatic Data Center, 2014).  When selecting the events 
from the database, the researcher categorized events into “severe” (high value) and “not 
severe” (low value) flash flooding.  Unlike tornado events and the Fujita scale, there is 
not yet a standardized scale for flash flooding severity, so the research team defined 
severe flash flooding to be those that caused $500,000 or more of property and crop 
damage (n = 20, µ = $9.86M; σ = $22.33M).  Events that were placed in the “not 
severe” category had less than $500,000 of property and crop damage (n = 20, µ = 
$38.75K; σ = $84.59K).  This distinction was explained to participants prior to 
beginning the study. 
It is important to note that all stimuli contained models of rainfall events that 
were associated with NWS-verified reports of flash flooding. Although selecting stimuli 
based on presence and absence of flash flooding was considered, this design was 
determined to be too subjective.  Particularly in rural, unpopulated regions, lack of an 
NWS-verified flash flooding report is not evidence that a flood did not occur; if it is 
deemed unlikely that any people or property were affected, a report is not always made 
to an official record.  Thus, the scope of this research extends only to events connected 
to NWS reports. 
Images were randomly presented to participants using PsychoPy, an open-source 
software that allows researchers to present stimuli and collect response data from 
participants (Peirce, 2007).  Each evaluation was conducted on an Asus A53U laptop 
with a 15-inch screen; each image was displayed at a size of 869x680 pixels. 
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Participants 
The sample consisted of 30 participants recruited from the student and post-
doctoral population at the University of Oklahoma.  Participants were required to either 
be pursuing a degree in meteorology or atmospheric science or to already possess one. 
This expectation ensured that they had adequate experience with reading weather 
prediction visualizations.  However, participants had little experience working with the 
FLASH system.  In terms of gender and age, the participant pool included 19 males and 
11 females between the ages of 21-41 years old, with a mean age of 25.0 years and 
median age of 23 years.  Participants were randomly assigned to one of the between-
subjects display conditions (the maximum-based algorithm or the average-based 
algorithm).  	
Procedure 
Initially, participants were informed about the study’s purpose and tasks. After 
completing an informed consent form, participants received an excerpt from the FLASH 
training manual that explained how to read and interpret the FLASH display with 
pictorial examples.  During the instruction stage, participants were given the 
opportunity to ask questions about FLASH, how to interpret the display, and what the 
study would involve. 
Once participants stated that they felt comfortable with the FLASH interface, 
they answered a series of demographic questions (age, gender, and academic 
classification).  Following this, participants viewed the image pairs presented in a 
randomized order.  In terms of signal detection theory, the goal was to detect a high 
threat level (the signal) from the noise (a low threat level).  In each sequence, the first 
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image showed an event in FLASH on the national-level.  Participants were asked, 
“Based on the information that is modeled in this image, would you expect for this 
event to produce flash flooding with severe levels of property damage? (>$500,000).”  
Participants reviewed the image, and then pressed “y” for yes or “n” for no after making 
their decision.  The following image always represented the same weather event, but 
visualized at the local scale.  The participants answered the same question about 
severity based on the new presentation.  The forty image pairs were presented in a 
randomized order.  When participants finished with the final pair, they were debriefed. 
Results 
Error Rates 
After collecting the participants’ responses, the error rates in terms of the Signal 
Detection Theory framework were calculated for the severity judgment associated with 
the average-based and maximum-based display styles and for the national and local 
images (McNicol, 2005).  The data were compared using t-tests.  A summary of the 
results is shown in Table 2.  The results show that there is a significant difference 
between the display methods.  The maximum display produced a higher hit rate than the 
average display (p < 0.0001), but the average display minimized false alarms (p < 
0.0001). 
A similar analysis of participant judgments was done for the local-level images. 
Though all subjects saw the same images in this category, responses were compared 
between the maximum-based and the average-based participant groups in order to 
ensure parity. As expected, a t-test found no significant difference between how 
participants in either test group when judging the local-level images.  Still, as shown in 
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Table 3, participants did not make perfect judgments, which may in part be due to lack 
of participant experience with flash flood forecasting. 
Bias and Sensitivity 
A sensitivity index (d’) was calculated for both the average-based display and 
the maximum-based display.  The d’ scores for the average-based display and 
maximum-based display were 1.00 and 0.93, respectively.  This indicates that there is 
little difference between the discriminability of a severe flood signal between the two 
display types.  In addition, a significant difference was found in the biases associated 
with the two display algorithms (p < 0.001): for the maximum-based display algorithm, 
a liberal bias of -0.74 was found, and a conservative bias of 0.24 was found for the 
average-based display algorithm.  This can be interpreted to mean that participants in 
the maximum-based display condition were more likely to say that any stimulus 
contained a significant flood, while the participants in the average-based display 
condition were more likely to say the opposite. 
	
Table 2. Comparison of average-based and maximum-based display types in terms 
error rates 
  Hit Rate False Alarm Rate Sensitivity (d' ) Bias 
Average 
Algorithm 0.57 0.25 0.93 0.24 
Maximum 
Algorithm 0.85 0.50 1.00 -0.74 
p-value <0.0001 <0.0001   
 
Table 3.   Error rates for viewing the local-level events (n = 30) 
 Hit Rate False Alarm Rate 
Local 0.50 0.24 
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Task Completion Time  
Task time was recorded from the time the national display was shown to the 
participant until they made a severity judgment on the national image.  A summary of 
results is shown in Table 4.  Though the original hypothesis was that aggregation 
method would affect response times, no significant differences were found between the 
two.  A further analysis of task completion time for the time taken during hits, misses, 
false alarms, and correct rejections also failed to find any statistically significant 
differences (hit: p = 0.58; miss: p = 0.81; correct rejection: p = 0.12; false alarm: p = 
0.57).  
Effect of Display Design on Congruent Decisions 
 Congruent decisions, or those in which the response for the national image was 
identical to the response for the corresponding local image, were measured between 
display conditions.  Congruent decisions were deemed either congruent-correct (a 
“yes/yes” response to an image sequence that represented a significant flood or a  
“no/no” response to an sequence that represented an insignificant flood), congruent-
incorrect (a “no/no” response to a sequence that represented a significant flood or a 
 
Table 4. Average time (in seconds) taken to produce a hit, miss, correct rejection, or 
false alarm, analyzed with a t-test. 
 Hit Miss Correct Rejection 
False 
Alarm 
Average 
Algorithm 4.02 4.49 4.34 4.12 
Maximum 
Algorithm 4.63 5.23 5.81 5.45 
p-value 0.58 0.81 0.12 0.57 
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“yes/yes” response to an image sequence that represented an insignificant flood), or 
incongruent (a “yes/no” or “no/yes” response, which by definition was always partially 
correct).  Counts of congruent and incongruent decisions by display condition are 
shown in Tables 5 and 6. 
 A Chi-squared test of decision counts against display condition revealed a 
significant difference between the maximum sampling display algorithm and the 
average sampling display algorithm for judgment congruence; however, these 
differences were observed when assessing judgment congruence in relation to threat 
level.  When judging images representing low property damage event, participants in 
Table 5. Counts of congruent and incongruent decisions by display condition for 
high-level threats 
 High Property Damage (Threat Level) 
 
 Hit/Hit Miss/Miss 
Hit/Miss or 
Miss/Hit Row Totals 
Max. Display 148 (52.0%) 40 (14.0%) 97 (34.0%) 285 (100.0%) 
Avg. Display 99 (33.0%) 84 (28.0%) 117 (39.0%) 300 (100.0%) 
p-value < 0.0001  
  
Table 6.  Counts of congruent and incongruent decisions by display condition for 
low-level threats 
 
 Low Property Damage (Threat Level)  
 Hit/Hit Miss/Miss Hit/Miss or Miss/Hit Row Totals 
Max. Display 139 (46.3%) 66 (22.0%) 95 (31.7%) 300 (100.0%) 
Avg. Display 204 (68.0%) 48 (16.0%) 48 (16.0%) 300 (100.0%) 
p-value < 0.0001  
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the average display condition produced more congruent judgments (hits on both images 
within a given image sequence) than participants in the maximum display condition, χ2 
(2, N = 600) = 31.16, p < 0.0001.  Conversely, when judging an image representing a 
high property damage event, participants in the maximum-based display condition 
produced more congruent hits and fewer congruent misses than those in the average-
based display condition, χ2 (2, N = 585) = 36.15, p < 0.0001. 
 A closer look at the data indicates that the threat level factor may have also 
affected congruent choices.  As shown in Table 7, regardless of the display condition, 
participants made significantly more correct congruent hit judgments when viewing low 
property damage events and were more likely to congruently miss an event that was a 
high threat level, χ2 (2, N = 1185) = 29.98, p < 0.0001.     
The Relationship Between Event Size and Response 
As the findings from the aforementioned analyses suggest that display condition 
and threat level did impact decision accuracy, a random-intercept logistic regression 
was selected to estimate the likelihood of producing a correct response given certain 
conditions.  Due to the binary nature of the responses (0 = incorrect, 1 = correct), a 
logistic regression was chosen as the appropriate method to determine the relationship 
Table 7. Counts of congruent choices by threat level, independent of display type 
 Hit/Hit Miss/Miss Hit/Miss or Miss/Hit Row Totals 
High Threat Level 247 (42.2%) 214 (36.6%) 124 (21.2%) 585 (100.0%) 
Low Threat Level 343 (57.2%) 143 (23.8%) 114 (19.0%) 600 (100.0%) 
p-value < 0.0001  
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between event size and response.  The random-intercept logistic regression accounts for 
interdependencies among repeated observations within subjects and adds a subject-
specific random intercept to the regression equation (Rabe-Hesketh & Skrondal, 2008).  
Using this type of regression, we were able to draw conclusions about odds ratios 
adjusted for individual differences; these are sometimes called subject-specific 
probabilities.  The resulting logistic regression equation is shown in Equation 1. 
 
Initially, the model included two main effects, display type (d) and threat level 
(t).  However, prior work has suggested that task-irrelevant features on geospatial 
displays may negatively impact task performance (Hegarty et al., 2012).  Although 
participants were instructed to judge only the area within the white selection box on 
each stimulus, many of the stimuli contained visually distracting imagery of flood 
predictions outside the box.  Thus, after the data collection phase, each stimulus 
received a code to designate the amount of visual distraction as determined by 
geographic scale of the area mapped with return period values; the new explanatory 
variable, size (s), was created with two levels: small and large.  An example of a small-
scale stimulus and a large-scale stimulus are shown in Figures 9 and 10, respectively.   
Interestingly, the random-intercept logistic regression produced an estimated variance 
between subjects of zero (ψ ≈ 0), which led the random-intercept model’s explanatory 
variable coefficients to converge with those of the ordinary logistic regression model.  
 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡!𝑝(𝑥)! = log! 𝑝(𝑥)1 − 𝑝(𝑥)!= 1.87 − 4.51𝑥!"#$ − 1.93𝑥!!!"#$ − 1.23𝑥!"#$%&'+ 5.33𝑥!"#$𝑥!!!"#$ + 2.86𝑥!"#$𝑥!"#$%&'+ 2.48𝑥!!!"#$𝑥!"#$%&' − 3.15𝑥!"#$𝑥!!!"#$𝑥!"#$%&'      (1) 	
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Figure 9. National-scale stimulus where size = small, threat level = insignificant (< 
$500,000) 	
		
Figure 10. National-scale stimulus where size = large, threat level = significant (> 
$500,000) 
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A comparison of the ordinary logistic regression and random-intercept logistic 
regression is presented in Appendix A.  
In logistic regression, the odds ratio for each term reflects the ratio of the odds 
between giving a correct response at the x=1 level and the x=0 level.  For example, the 
odds ratio for the size variable is 0.011 (with a 95% confidence interval of 0.003 – 
0.032); this is interpreted to mean that the odds of a participant giving a correct 
response to a stimulus the contained a large-scale event were 0.0110 times the odds of 
giving a correct response when viewing a stimulus that contained a small-scale event.  
In reverse, the odds of participant being correct when viewing a small-scale event were 
approximately 90.909 times the odds of correctly judging a large-scale image.  
Likewise, the odds of a participant correctly judging a stimulus image that contained a 
significant threat of property damage were 0.145 times the odds of correctly judging an 
image with insignificant levels of property damage (with a 95% confidence interval of 
0.089 – 0.230).  Finally, the odds of a participant correctly judging a stimulus when 
visualized with the maximum-based display algorithm were 0.293 times the odds of 
correctly judging a stimulus displayed with the average-based algorithm.  All two-way 
and the three-way interaction between explanatory variables were significant, and the 
associated odds ratios are shown in Appendix A. 
The Likelihood Ratio Test was used to evaluate model fit between the full and 
the intercept-only model (𝐻!: 𝛽!,!"## !"#$% = 𝛽!,!"#$%"# !"#$% ), which produced a 
significant p-value (p < 0.0001).  Thus, the full model was selected as the model with 
better fit to the data.  Further analyses which compared the full model to single-term 
models had statistically significant p-values from the Likelihood Ratio Tests, so the 
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single term models were deemed to be too simplistic to adequately characterize the 
relationship.  
The Hosmer-Lemeshow test was used to assess the model’s goodness of fit.  The 
Hosmer-Lemeshow test is a significance test, similar to the Chi-Square test, and 
compares the variance of the specified model to the variance of the null model.  Some 
limitations to consider involve sample size: the larger the sample size, the poorer the 
test’s performance.  Another limitation is common to other significance-based goodness 
of fit tests: it only indicates whether or not the model fits better than the null model, and 
includes no indicator of how well it fits the data.  In the present study’s case, the 
Hosmer-Lemeshow test’s p-value was approximately 1, which fails to reject the null 
hypothesis.  This indicates that full model and the null model have equal variances, and 
that the full model adequately fit the dataset.  However, we must consult alternative 
measures to determine the level of fit, as the test does not reveal the degree of the 
model’s fit. 
For a logistic regression, two variations of Pseudo R2 terms are used to assess a 
model’s goodness of fit.  The first category of Pseudo R2 assesses model fit in terms of 
a specified model’s improvement over a null model; this is similar to the approach taken 
by the Hosmer-Lemeshow test.  The Cox and Snell Pseudo R2 as well as Nagelkerke’s 
Pseudo R2 take this approach, using null and specified model log likelihood values to 
calculate Pseudo R2.  Nagelkerke’s Pseudo R2 tends to be more intuitive to interpret 
than Cox and Snell’s value; the Nagelkerke Pseudo R2 value is essentially a 
standardized version of Cox and Snell’s value and is measured between 0 and 1 (unlike 
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Cox and Snell).  In terms of the full model in this test, Nagelkerke’s Pseudo R2 value 
was 0.275. 
The second type of Pseudo R2 estimate interprets R2 as a metric to explain 
variance within a model using residuals to measure variability.  Examples of Pseudo R2s 
that take this approach include McFadden’s Pseudo R2, Effron’s Pseudo R2, and 
McKelvey and Zavoina’s Pseudo R2.   In terms of McFadden’s Pseudo R2, a value 
between 0.20-0.40 is considered to fit the model exceptionally well (Louviere, Hensher, 
& Swait, 2000). 
In the context of the present tests, McFadden’s Pseudo R2 was 0.173.  While the 
Pseudo R2 values indicate that the specified model is only a moderate improvement 
over the null model, the Hosmer-Lemeshow test affirms that the model fits the data set.  
However, while the sample is not extraordinarily large (n=1185), the Hosmer-
Lemeshow test is sensitive to large sample sizes, so it is possible that the sample size 
has affected the outcome of the test. 
Discussion 
 The results show that choice of display method did influence probability of 
detection and false alarm rate.  Furthermore, the hypothesis that the aggregation method 
would affect the hit rates and false alarm rates was supported.  However, no difference 
in task time was found between display methods.  The logistic regression analysis 
revealed that while the display condition did affect the likelihood of a correct response, 
the predictors of threat level and visual size, as well as all interactions, were also 
significant explanatory variables for judgments of the national-level stimuli.  When 
evaluating the likelihood of producing a correct response on the local-level stimuli, the 
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logistic regression analysis also showed that correctness on a national-level stimulus 
was a significant predictor on producing a correct response for the corresponding local-
level stimulus.  Likewise, this relationship was explored in the congruent-choice 
analysis, which indicated that threat level and display condition were likely to affect 
congruence in decision-making between the national- and local-level stimuli. 
Data Aggregation in Visual Decision Aids 
The analysis of congruent-correct and incongruent decisions for threat level and 
display condition showed that the average-based sampling display algorithm was a poor 
aggregation technique: when visualizing a significant threat, the average-based display 
led to a divergence in judgments between the national- and local-scale stimuli.  The 
average-based display was only connected to a significant increase in congruent 
decisions when the stimulus contained an insignificant threat.  This may be due in part 
to latent participant factors such as poor understanding of the return period metric.  It is 
also possible that when a threat is minimal, the variability among data points is smaller 
than the variability among grid cell values for a significant threat; thus the value 
produced by the average-based algorithm to represent the data aggregate at the national 
level more closely represented the individual members within the collection.  While it is 
debatable whether or not a correct congruent response is more desirable than an 
incorrect congruent response, the results show that the display condition did affect 
fidelity.  
When speaking of visualization that incorporates data aggregation, Elmqvist and 
Fekete (2010) recommend that designers keep the principles of visual summary and 
fidelity in mind; visualizations of aggregated data ought to represent the underlying 
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individual data points accurately and consistently.  The present study’s findings suggest 
that the average sampling display algorithm led to participants making significantly 
more congruent decisions than the maximum sampling display algorithm.  This would 
indicate that the average sampling display algorithm provided a stronger representation 
between the aggregated, national view and the individual data points visualized in the 
local view.  However, several visualization studies have discussed the poor ability of an 
average-based aggregation method to satisfy the fidelity principle.  Elmqvist and Fekete 
(2010) point to a caution given by Andrienko and Andrienko (2006); they warn against 
using average-based aggregation methods due to the nature of averages flattening out 
variation.  In the words of Andrienko and Andrienko (2006): “the mean weight of a fruit 
in a basket filled with apricots and one watermelon is also not a very useful aggregate 
characteristic.”  
A visual inspection of the stimuli shed light upon the connection between design 
and individual task performance.  Unsurprisingly, an examination of the maps that were 
most often identified correctly and incorrectly showed that participants tended to 
correctly identify maps that represented the extremes of the stimuli (either huge swaths 
of floods or none at all) but had more difficulty when the maps were somewhere in the 
middle.  Misidentification of stimuli was observed in both display conditions when the 
stimuli sets had striking differences in visual representation between the national and 
local levels.  For example, one stimulus contained an event that looked like a very small 
storm when visualized with the national-level average-based algorithm, but actually had 
a very severe gradient after zooming closer—an indicator of flash flooding that 
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participants were trained to seek.  Participants often judged the national image to be 
insignificant, but changed their minds after viewing the local level. 
A closer evaluation of congruent decisions by display type and threat level 
supports recommendations by Andrienko and Andrienko (2006) and Elmqvist and 
Fekete (2010).  From a design perspective, decisions that are congruent between levels 
of geographic scale (national versus local) are highly desirable.  The researcher 
hypothesizes that congruence indicates an adequate level of fidelity in the aggregated 
data visualization.  While it is debatable whether or not a correct congruent response is 
more desirable than an incorrect congruent response, the results show that the display 
condition did affect fidelity.  The analysis of congruent-correct and incongruent 
decisions for threat level and display condition showed that the average sampling 
display algorithm was indeed not the ideal aggregation technique: when visualizing a 
significant threat, the average-based display led to a divergence in judgments between 
the national- and local-scale stimuli.  The average-based display was only connected to 
a significant increase in congruent decisions when the stimulus contained an 
insignificant threat.  This may be due in part to latent participant factors such as poor 
understanding of the return period metric.  It is also possible that when a threat is 
minimal, the variability in the individual data points is smaller than the variability 
amongst grid cell values for a significant threat, and thus the value produced by the 
average-based algorithm to represent the data aggregate at the national level more 
closely represents the individual members within the collection. 
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Signal Detection and Weather Forecast Decision Making 
 In the experimental task, participants viewed a series of stimuli and were asked 
to determine whether or not each displayed a significant flood threat.  Although framed 
with Signal Detection Theory, the task involved a combination of detection and 
identification activities.  These are fast processes, as evidenced by the task time results, 
and they are governed by cognitive structures such as long term memory, working 
memory, schema, mental models, attention, feature identification, and monitoring, 
among others (Adams et al., 1995; Endsley, 1995c, 2015; Hoffman, 2015; Wickens, 
2015).  Detection, a function of factors including but not limited to top-down processes, 
expectations, and background knowledge, can be mapped to Level 1 of Endsley’s 1995 
Model of SA, perception.  Identification involves taking a detected item and evaluating 
its fit into a categorical grouping, and it is also affected by experience and top-down 
processes (Endsley, 1995c; Wickens & Carswell, 1997).  Identification can be mapped 
to Level 2 of Endsley’s 1995 Model of SA, comprehension.  The third level of 
Endsley’s 1995 Model of SA, projection, was determined to be outside the scope of the 
present study’s goals; however, future work could extend the present study’s method 
from a detection and identification task to a projection task in which participants would 
have to choose whether or not a flash flood warning would be appropriate. 
Detection and Comprehension of Flash Flood Threats.  The study’s primary 
aim was to compare two data aggregation-based display methods and evaluate their 
effects on novice participants’ forecasting speed and accuracy for a flash flood 
prediction task; a broader goal was to relate FLASH display design to forecasters’ SA, 
at least in terms of detection and comprehension of signals in the visualization.  In a 
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weather forecasting-specific model reminiscent of Endsley’s 1995 Model of SA, 
Bowden, Heinselman, Kingfield, and Thomas (2015) proposed a model of the 
compound warning decision process.  The three-stage cyclical process involves an 
initial detection phase, followed by an identification phase, and completed by a 
reidentification phase.  In a study of the effects of variable update frequency from 
phased-array radar data, forecasters’ probability of detection (measured in terms of hits, 
false alarms, and misses during a simulated forecasting task) for severe hail and wind 
threats differed between the detection and identification phases of the compound 
warning decision process.  Additionally, case studies of professional forecasters have 
also shown that the warning decision process is affected by forecaster experience and 
task-relevant knowledge, risk tolerance, perceptions and beliefs about environmental 
states, confidence, software issues, and spatial ability (Heinselman, LaDue, & Lazrus, 
2012; Smallman & Hegarty, 2007).  In combination with the error rate results of the 
present study, this indicates that in addition to display design and information 
bandwidth, SA in weather forecasting is governed by a variety of cognitive, individual, 
and technical factors. 
 The detection and identification tasks in the present study can be categorized 
within the family of cognitive integration processes.  Studies of graph comprehension 
distinguish specific information extraction, or processes in which a user has a goal to 
search and find some specific attribute in a visualization, from information integration, 
processes in which a user may combine multiple attributes from a visualization in order 
to comprehend broader meanings such as trends in the data (Ratwani, Trafton, & 
Boehm-Davis, 2008).  Due to the map-based format of many decision aids used in 
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weather forecasting, information integration is a fundamental activity for a forecaster to 
be able to develop SA.  Using the FLASH return period maps as an example, examining 
the return period value assigned to a single grid cell provides much less meaning than 
evaluating the overall trends and gradients over broader geographic scales.  Some 
models of information integration for graph comprehension are represented as an 
iterative process consisting of pattern recognition and interpretation, in which features 
are detected and, ideally, understood; as graph complexity increases, more iterations of 
the integration process are required (Ratwani et al., 2008).  Out of a vast collection of 
design recommendations for visual displays, several guidelines and challenges exist that 
may improve weather forecasting displays including improving visual discriminability 
(Dobson, 1979; Wickens & Carswell, 1997), highlighting meaningful information 
clusters to facilitate integration (Ratwani et al., 2008), and structuring the information 
landscape in a way that assists the user to achieve their goals in a hierarchical needs-
based order (Hoffman & Woods, 2005; Trafton & Hoffman, 2007).  However, while a 
user-centered display design can often help to overcome performance issues, 
performance may still suffer when users of complex displays lack appropriate 
background knowledge and skill (Hegarty, 2011; Shah & Freedman, 2011).  While 
participants in the present study were not expert forecasters, their background in 
atmospheric and environmental science positioned them as novice system users.  It is 
likely that a future study extending this work to expert forecasters would reveal 
different patterns of threat detection.  
Spatial Visualizations and Response Time.  In practice, the FLASH tools 
update dynamically, but in the experimental context, participants viewed static 
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representations of the return period model at a single timestamp.  Task times were lower 
than anticipated, however, this may be explained by the static nature of the stimuli in 
addition to experience level of the participants.  Studies of cartographic interpretation 
have indicated that a user’s background experience can affect response time during map 
comprehension tasks (Ooms, De Maeyer, & Fack, 2013; Ooms, De Maeyer, Fack, Van 
Assche, & Witlox, 2012).  In an eye-tracking analysis of map-based visual search tasks, 
novice map users spent more time searching for specific features than expert users 
(Ooms et al., 2012).  When map complexity was increased to include color coding and 
topographical detail, color codes for certain geographic features tended to attract 
attention away from more relevant map elements (Ooms et al., 2013).  While weather 
forecasting typically requires more integrative processing than specific information 
extractions, it is possible that these findings could be extended to the present work.  In 
the present study, participants were novices in terms of exposure to the FLASH 
visualization, but the requirement to be a current student or graduate of a meteorology 
program ensured that each participant had at least one year of exposure to weather and 
environmental concepts. 
 “Crying Wolf” in Weather Forecasting.  Although the FLASH tools are 
intended for use by a population of professional forecasters and not members of the 
general public, display methods that influence false alarm rate may lead to unnecessary 
warnings and the “cry-wolf” effect.  In the weather domain, the cry-wolf effect refers to 
the phenomenon wherein consumers of a weather warning fail to respond adequately 
after a series of false alarms, decreasing their likelihood of responding appropriately to 
a future true threat (LeClerc & Joslyn, 2015).  In response to the concern that certain 
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display algorithms may increase the false alarm rate, one must remember that selecting 
an appropriate response criterion is a function of signal probability and the costs of 
correct and incorrect responses (Wickens & Carswell, 1997).  Thus, it is important to 
consider the cost/benefit relationship associated with response accuracy in weather 
forecasting.  In weather forecasting, response criterions for warning on a severe threat 
are not only shaped by individual information processing of uncertain information, but 
also by governmental policy.  As discussed by Doswell (2004), from a policy 
perspective, false alarms are often preferred over misses, which are traditionally held in 
unfavorable regard.  Whereas false alarms incur costs from allocating emergency 
response resources and may also add to a cry-wolf effect in the long run, total failure to 
predict a true severe weather threat can lead to significant damage and even human 
fatalities when protective actions are not taken.  Though the present study focused on a 
dichotomous choice (significant versus insignificant flooding as reflected through 
property damage), an extension of the work could include probabilistic forecasting.  If a 
shift in response criterion is not a viable policy option, empirical evidence is available 
that suggests probabilistic risk estimates attached to severe weather warnings may 
reduce the cry-wolf effect (LeClerc & Joslyn, 2015). 
Limitations 
 Several factors limit the impact of this study’s results.  As evidenced by the 
possible design biases, participant judgments may have been mislead by map 
appearances.  Like many weather forecasting decision aids, FLASH is a simulation 
model and not a mapping of verified observations.  However, in each experimental 
stimulus, we showed participants FLASH maps where flooding was confirmed after the 
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fact and then asked participants to judge whether or not they would have expected high-
impact flash flooding.  Therefore, participant judgments can only be accurate as the 
modeling.  While we attempted to filter out FLASH models of flooding events that did 
not appear to be accurate representations, as with any simulation model, a degree of 
error between the model and reality is to be expected. 
 In addition to modeling errors, some participants had difficulty gauging flash 
flooding severity.  Participants were instructed to produce a yes or no judgment on 
whether or not they believed each of the displayed models could contain a severe flash 
flood.  The definition of severe flash flooding as corresponding to greater than $500,000 
worth of property damage was chosen arbitrarily in lieu of any other metric.  A 
limitation of using property damage as a measure of severity was that it was difficult to 
estimate without a general knowledge about geographic features; for example, when 
unfamiliar with a certain region of the United States, participants occasionally asked 
whether or not there were any sizeable cities located nearby.  Although we encouraged 
participants to use any background knowledge they might have had of weather 
forecasting, we also pushed them to make a decision ultimately based on how the 
FLASH stimuli appeared.  In this regard, we tested the capability of the visualization to 
convey threat information and essentially tried to minimize the need for extensive 
meteorological or geographic knowledge.  It is still possible that considering property 
damage level increased mental workload in some participants, but it is not apparent 
from the time-based results; however, while response time does sometimes reveal issues 
with mental workload, this is not necessarily always the case.  It is also possible that 
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participants evaluated the stimuli based on a surrogate criterion as opposed to property 
damage. 
 Finally, in the experimental design, a sample size issue may limit the 
generalizability of the logistic regression.  In the original design, the variable of 
geographic scale was not included, but was assigned after the error rate analysis.  Thus, 
sample sizes were uneven between the levels of the geographic scale. 
Summary 
The results of this study show that there is a significant difference between 
display styles in terms of error rates, but not in terms of task completion time. Though 
the original hypothesis was that the average display would cause participants to review 
the image for a longer period of time, this in fact was not observed. When examining 
the images that participants commonly had trouble judging correctly, common causes of 
confusion occurred for events that had particularly different visual representations 
between the national and local level. For example, one event looked like a very small 
storm when visualized with the national-level average-based algorithm, but appeared to 
be very severe when zoomed closer. Participants often judged the national image to be 
insignificant, but changed their minds after viewing the local level. 
Design recommendations based on these results for future weather information 
displays must rely on the risk management values of the system designers. While the 
maximum display style maximized hits, it also produced many more false alarms than 
the average display. In weather forecasting, excess numbers of false alarms can 
consume valuable time that forecasters could be using to analyze true threats. However, 
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while the average display style produced fewer false alarms, participants were much 
more likely to miss an event; this could also result in critical consequences. 
In the case of a flash flooding prediction system such as FLASH, the 
recommendation from these results would be to use the maximum display algorithm. 
Flash flooding is by nature a rapidly occurring event that can have life-threatening 
consequences if not predicted with enough lead time. For such a system, having a 
design that promotes more hits, even at the expense of producing false alarms, would 
ensure that forecasters’ attentions would be drawn to severe events in a timely manner. 
A future study based on Naturalistic Decision Making framework (Klein, 2008) 
would provide knowledge on how display design using data aggregation affects the 
acquisition of situation awareness in real-time.  Whereas the present study focused on 
perception and comprehension, a real-time evaluation of the display methods could help 
to identify connections between display design and a forecaster’s ability to develop SA 
in a dynamic manner.  Additionally, future work could address limitations of the present 
study.  While participants all had some background in meteorology and forecasting, few 
had specifically studied flash flood forecasting.  A similar study to the present work, but 
run with a sample of professional flood forecasters may supplement the present study 
by identifying the effects of expertise on signal detection. 
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Chapter 4: A Mixed Methods Approach To Understanding Situation Awareness and 
Uncertainty in Weather Forecasting 
 
Introduction 
In order to predict environmental threats, forecasters synthesize massive 
amounts of data to evaluate trends over space and time (Daipha, 2015).  During this 
process, challenges arise from uncertainties in meteorological states (initial conditions), 
imperfect computational models, and individual factors (Doswell, 2004).  Lipshitz and 
Strauss (1997) conceptualize uncertainty in decision making as “a sense of doubt that 
blocks or delays action.”  They also distinguish uncertain issues (“outcomes, situations, 
and alternatives”) from sources of uncertainty (“incomplete information, inadequate 
understanding, and undifferentiated alternatives”).  These classifications describe 
weather forecasting issues, where forecasters can misinterpret or even fail to recognize 
uncertainty in forecasting contexts.  These assessment errors may lead to improper or 
inadequate use of information sources, which in turn could impact the accuracy and 
timeliness of a weather forecast.  Such forecasting challenges may even have a negative 
effect on the quality of communications to forecast end users (Doswell, 2004; Novak, 
Bright, & Brennan, 2008).   
Through surveys, National Weather Service (NWS) forecasters have indicated 
that receiving guidance about levels and sources of uncertainty not only adds value to 
forecast communications, but may also complement the situation assessment process 
(Novak et al., 2008).  Indeed, some studies have shown that the presentation style of 
uncertainty information can affect a user’s comprehension and performance level in a 
weather prediction task (Nadav-Greenberg, Joslyn, & Taing, 2008).  At the decision 
choice stage, failure to comprehend situation-based uncertainties can lead to negative 
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outcomes, such as forecaster hedging, defined by Murphy (1978) as “the difference 
between a forecaster’s judgment and his forecast.”  It is possible that forecast guidance 
promoting decision making under uncertainty might reduce risk while increasing 
forecast accuracy or timeliness. 
The current work explored the situation assessment process under uncertainty in 
weather forecasting.  Prior explanations of situation assessment under uncertainty 
provide limited evidence to support application to complex decision making tasks such 
as weather forecasting.  However, uncertainty management and SA have also been 
considered a form of macrocognition, a science that considers certain cognitive 
processes from a naturalistic decision making perspective (Klein et al., 2003; Trafton & 
Hoffman, 2007).  Sensemaking, situation awareness, uncertainty management, problem 
detection, and naturalistic decision making have all been classified as forms of 
macrocognition (Klein et al., 2003).  These approaches have led to new theories of 
uncertainty management, but NDM proponents suggest that empirical studies can 
further advance decision making research (Lipshitz, Klein, Orasanu, & Salas, 2001).  In 
line with these macrocognitive approaches, the present study described situation 
assessment under uncertainty in terms of management techniques and information 
seeking behavior during forecasting activities.  
The following chapter discusses the two-stage, mixed methods analysis of 
forecaster decision making and uncertainty management practices.  Following a 
presentation of background studies, an explanation is given of the context in which the 
two studies occurred.  The first study presents findings from a quantitative analysis of 
information seeking behavior during real-time forecasting exercises.  The second 
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section discusses findings from focus groups in which forecasters discussed individual 
strategies for managing uncertainty.  Additionally, focus groups produced findings with 
regard to the utility of a set of proposed attributes for communicating forecast 
uncertainty.  The chapter concludes with a general discussion of practical and 
theoretical implications as well as with recommendations for future research. 
Uncertainty and SA in Weather Forecasting 
 Within the literature, several explanations of decision making under uncertainty 
can be found.  Endsley’s 1995 Model of SA included uncertainty management only in 
the contexts of mental model building and individual confidence (Endsley, 1995c). 
Endsley’s (1995c) model frames situation awareness (SA) as a function of cognitive 
processes that include attention, perception, working memory, long term memory, 
automaticity, and goals.  In relation to long term memory, Endsley (1995c) argues that 
uncertainty plays an important role in situation assessment and decision making.  At the 
individual level, Endsley (1995c) states that uncertainty may be a source of stress, 
which can produce a negative effect on SA.  However, these arguments were made in 
relation to an individual’s confidence level.  In weather forecasting, while confidence is 
a large part of the decision process, it is not the only component. 
Endsley and Jones (2001) found that mental models allow decision makers to 
synthesize and make use of data sources.  Despite contrary claims presented within the 
literature (Endsley, 2015b), we concur with Klein’s (2015) assessment that the 
Data/Frame theory of sensemaking complements accounts of SA.  Whereas Endsley’s 
1995 Model of SA incorporated situational uncertainty to a small degree, 
macrocognitive sensemaking studies have illuminated specific components of coping 
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with uncertainty (Klein, Moon, & Hoffman, 2006).  Endsley (2015a) identified the need 
for a better understanding of uncertainty management and SA, suggesting that 
macrocognitive approaches may improve knowledge about the relationship between SA 
and uncertainty in complex decision scenarios. 
 Due to the dynamic, uncertain conditions found in many complex sociotechnical 
systems, Minotra and Burns (2015) have called for research into uncertainty 
management tactics in such decision making settings. Naturalistic decision making 
studies may shed some light upon specific coping tactics; Lipshitz and Strauss (1997) 
identified heuristics used by decision makers in a military defense decision making 
study.  Previous accounts of uncertainty management supported a set of techniques 
referred to as the R.Q.P. heuristic: in this position, decision makers cope with 
uncertainty through reduction, quantification of remaining uncertainty, and making 
decisions based upon the remainder.  Lipshitz and Strauss (1997) found that decision 
makers concurrently engaged in situation assessment and evaluation of alternatives, 
adapt strategies dynamically to suit the situation.  Further study challenged the 
generalizability of the R.Q.P. heuristic to multiple domains, which led Lipshitz and 
Strauss (1997) to propose a tactical framework for uncertainty management based on 
behavioral research; they identify reduction, acknowledgement, and suppression as 
primary uncertainty management methods in decision making.  From their findings, 
Lipshitz and Strauss (1997) illustrated the R.A.W.F.S. heuristic, in which decision 
makers manage uncertainty through reduction techniques, assumption-based reasoning, 
weighing pros and cons of alternate choices, forestalling the decision, and suppressing 
uncertainty.  These methods may also apply to decisions made in non-military contexts, 
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and the authors recommended additional research into how tactics change across 
domains (Lipshitz & Strauss, 1997). 
Several scholars have examined uncertainty management and decision making 
in weather forecasting (Daipha, 2010, 2015; Doswell, 2004; Novak et al., 2008; 
Stewart, Heideman, Moninger, & Reagan-Cirincione, 1992).  Bowden, Heinselman, 
Kingfield, and Thomas (2015) framed the portion of forecasting that precedes a warning 
as the compound warning decision process, which consists of threat detection, threat 
identification, and reidentification as the situation dynamically changes.  In practice, 
forecasting is a goal-directed process (Trafton et al., 2000), and comparison between 
data sources plays a large role in situation assessment (Kirschenbaum, 2004).  Doswell 
(2004) suggested that forecast decisions are based on logical analysis and more flexible 
intuitive processes; in this account, these two processes are used to perceive and 
comprehend uncertainty.  Likewise, in a comprehensive analysis of five years of 
observations in a National Weather Service Weather Forecasting Office, Daipha (2015) 
framed this sensemaking process with a “collage” metaphor, referring to the process of 
integrating numerous information sources and extracting a greater meaning.  In terms of 
weather forecasting, Daipha (2010, 2015) posited that a collage represented “a process 
of assembling, appropriating, superimposing, juxtaposing, and blurring disparate pieces 
of information.”  Daipha’s (2015) account aligns with Doswell’s (2004) discussion of 
logical versus intuitive forecast decision making.  It is clear that coping with uncertainty 
during weather forecasting involves a number of cognitive processes, and it also skirts 
the line between art and science. 
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In reference to forecasters’ interpretations of weather visualizations, Trafton and 
Hoffman (2007) suggest that weather forecasters maintain an action cue, employ 
recognition-primed decision making, and engage in iterative mental model building.  In 
their macrocognitive model of forecast decision making, SA complements mental 
model building, and both are products of the sensemaking cycle.  Nevertheless, an 
understanding of how uncertainty propagates over time through the weather decision 
making system is still lacking.  Forecasters not only incorporate uncertainty information 
into their mental models when assessing an evolving weather situation, but they also use 
their mental models to convey risk to consumers such as emergency management 
(Morss, Demuth, Bostrom, Lazo, & Lazrus, 2015).  Decision support systems may 
assist weather forecasters with comprehending and using uncertainty information 
effectively, as well as in terms of communicating environmental threats effectively.   
In order to convey uncertainty in the data, decision support systems must not 
only leverage visualization and interface design, but system designers must also ensure 
that such tools are capable of presenting the correct information to users at the moments 
it is needed.  Trafton and Hoffman (2007) echo this sentiment and suggest incorporating 
automation to display visualizations at relevant moments along the forecasting timeline.  
One component of developing user-centered decision support systems involves 
identification of situation awareness requirements.  SA requirements refer to 
information attributes and sources that are necessary for a user to accomplish his or her 
goals; identifying SA requirements allows system designers to satisfy user needs in 
order to facilitate perception, comprehension, projection, and finally decision selection; 
(Endsley, 1994).  SA requirements are dynamic and can be ascertained through a 
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variety of methods, including Cognitive Task Analysis (Endsley, 2001), goal-directed 
task analysis (Endsley, 1994; Endsley & Hoffman, 2002), Cognitive Decision Method 
(Hoffman, Crandall, & Shadbolt, 1998; Klein, Calderwood, & MacGregor, 1989), and 
Cognitive Work Analysis (McIlroy & Stanton, 2011). 
SA requirements analysis and SA measurement can provide actionable feedback 
in the initial phases of system design (Endsley, 1995a; Endsley & Hoffman, 2002).  
Such methods may have utility for the design of weather forecasting decision support 
systems.  The situation awareness-oriented design (SAOD) process incorporates 
findings from SA requirements analysis with interface and system design guidelines, 
followed by an evaluation/redesign cycle (Endsley & Hoffman, 2002).  A deeper 
understanding of SA requirements for flash flood forecasting, as well as the cognitive 
processes involved with situation assessment under uncertainty, will add value to 
decision support systems and guidance products used during the forecast decision 
process. 
Jones, Quoetone, Ferree, Magsig, and Bunting (2003) investigated mental 
simulation and pattern matching during flash flood forecast decision making.  Their 
analysis revealed that forecasters used different information sources to guide their threat 
level assessments at different points in time; this difference was attributed to participant 
experience level, regional knowledge, and mental model and schema availability (Jones 
et al., 2003).  Jones et al. (2003) found that forecasters based flash flood threat 
assessments on variables including reflectivity, rainfall rates, rainfall totals, storm 
motion speed, hail contamination, and storm spotter observations.  However, in the 
thirteen years since their study appeared, advances have been made in flash flood 
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prediction and modeling, introducing forecasters to previously-unfamiliar ways of 
predicting this phenomenon.  Although we do not debate that mental simulation and 
pattern recognition are still effective situation assessment mechanisms, we hypothesize 
that SA requirements may have adapted with the increasing availability of hydrologic-
based flash flood forecasting decision support. 
The Research Questions 
 Forecasters make sense of environmental situations by using computer-based 
decision support tools (also referred to as forecast guidance products) to compare 
between data sets continuously (Daipha, 2010; Kirschenbaum, 2004).  Qualitative 
studies have established that forecasters’ SA requirements vary throughout the forecast 
decision making timeline (Jones et al., 2003; Morss & Ralph, 2007).  However, the 
practical implications regarding information use during flash flood forecasting are less 
understood; the same is true with respect to how SA requirements are affected by 
situational uncertainty.  In the present study, we build upon Jones et al. (2003) and 
Lipshitz and Strauss (1997), using a mixed methods framework to assess SA 
requirements and cognitive processes in light of recent technological forecasting 
decision support tools.  The first aim of this research was to explore the role of 
uncertainty in the weather forecasting decision making process (RQ2).  
RQ2:  How do forecasters build and maintain situation awareness while 
working under the constraints imposed by uncertainty leading up to a flash 
flooding event? 
 In addition to aforementioned research question, we also explored the forecast 
decision making process including several proposed means of communicating forecast 
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uncertainty.  We aimed to develop a better understanding of the relationship between 
situation assessment and decision making under uncertainty by evaluating changes to 
SA requirements over time (RQ3).  In this study, we assumed that the use of a forecast 
guidance product corresponded to an individual information requirement.  This 
assumption was based on observations of forecasters using certain decision aids to gain 
particular types of information, as well as the knowledge that forecast information 
seeking is goal-directed (Hoffman & Coffey, 2004).  Furthermore, we evaluated SA 
requirements not only at different time scales, but also at different levels of 
environmental activity; we anticipated that the amount of meteorological phenomena 
occurring on any given day would impact a forecaster’s use of decision aids. 
RQ3:  Which tools do forecasters use, in combination and individually, to build 
situation awareness?  How do their SA requirements change at different points 
along the forecasting compound warning decision process and at different 
environmental activity levels? 
Hypotheses 
  In relation to the aforementioned research questions, we expected to identify 
differences in SA requirements over varying time and environmental activity scales. 
Morss and Ralph (2007) observed forecast guidance use changing over time, and 
likewise, we hypothesized that flash flood forecasters would use different decision 
support tools at different times throughout the forecast decision making timeline.  In an 
extension of this, we also hypothesized that SA requirements, as represented by the 
amount of time spent and frequency of decision aid use, would differ based on the 
environmental activity level.  Finally, we predicted that the sensemaking process would 
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not only involve a large degree of comparison, but it would also be a function of 
interpersonal communication, trust in decision aids, and personal background 
experience.  The focus group study was exploratory in nature, so no testable hypotheses 
were developed.  We expected that focus group discussions would produce insight into 
the comparative sensemaking processes forecasters use to assess an uncertain situation. 
The Hazardous Weather Testbed Hydrology Experiment 2014 
For decades, the testbed research framework has provided insight into forecaster 
decision making as well as forecast guidance efficacy (Clark et al., 2011; Heideman, 
Stewart, Moninger, & Reagan-Cirincione, 1993; Murphy & Daan, 1984).  The method 
traditionally brings participants together to spend periods of time using forecast 
decision aids in mock-operational settings.  A testbed’s purpose is often to test new 
technological developments (Barthold et al., 2015; Clark et al., 2011), but some have 
the additional goal of addressing the role of technology and design in the decision 
making process (Heinselman, LaDue, & Lazrus, 2012; Karstens et al., 2015; Murphy & 
Daan, 1984).  Testbed research has produced knowledge that encourages a research to 
operations (R2O) framework for technology development (Clark et al., 2011). 
Motivated by its own impending transition from research to operations, a test of 
the FLASH system was conducted in July 2014.  The Hazardous Weather Testbed 
Hydrology Experiment (HWT-Hydro) sought to evaluate a suite of hydrologic flash 
flood forecasting models while gathering knowledge about forecaster decision making 
processes.  Using the suite of 30+ products, collectively known as MRMS-FLASH tools 
(Multi-Radar/Multi-Sensor, and Flooded Locations and Simulated Hydrographs, 
respectively), forecasters issued experimental watch and warning polygons throughout 
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each of the four weeks during the experiment.  In addition, HWT-Hydro occurred in 
coordination another experiment hosted by the Weather Prediction Center, the second 
Flash Flooding and Intense Rainfall Experiment (FFaIR; Barthold et al. (2015)). 
HWT-Hydro occurred in four weekly cycles.  Forecasters participated in 
weeklong shifts, and in each shift, a unique set of participants took part in the study.  
Upon arrival, participants received training on the use of the AWIPS-II weather 
forecasting display platform and the MRMS-FLASH tools, as well as an explanation of 
the general purpose of the experiment and research methods used throughout the week.  
The majority of the week was spent in real-time experimental forecasting operations.  
Each participant worked at an individual workstation, but usually partnered with a 
participant at a workstation near them in order to forecast over a shared geographic 
region.  Due to the nature of the evaluation, participants were encouraged to rely 
primarily on the experimental tools, but they were allowed to consult external guidance 
tools online if the tools were not available on the testbed workstations.  During the 
experimental operations, forecasters issued experimental watches and warnings across 
the continental United States.  Participants in the WPC’s FFaIR experiment provided a 
weather briefing to the HWT-Hydro forecasters in the form of a webinar at the 
beginning of each day. 
Evaluation was addressed in a two-fold approach: (1) tool performance and 
forecast adequacy as well as (2) aspects of the forecaster decision making process.  
Tools and forecasts were evaluated in a subjective manner.  Each day, participants 
completed a survey in which they evaluated flash flood events from the prior day’s 
forecasts.  The survey assessed how well the experimental tools predicted the actual 
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threat, as represented by flash flood reports and other observations.  The survey also 
analyzed experimental watch and warning spatial coverage, accuracy, and lead time in 
comparison to operational watches and warnings. 
Participants also took part in a human factors-based, mixed methods analysis of 
warning decision making behavior.  During forecasting operations, participants used 
desktop recording software to audio- and video-record their forecasting activities; the 
recordings were used for a time-based analysis of tool usage during the watch/warning 
issuance timeline.  At the end of each week, participants took part in a focus group in 
which they gave feedback on the tools, discussed challenges in flash flood forecasting, 
and provided information about how experimental uncertainty attributes allowed them 
to communicate threat levels in their forecasts. 
Study I: Quantitative Analysis Of Information Seeking Behavior 
Method 
Participants.  Fifteen professional forecasters employed by the National 
Weather Service (NWS) participated in the 2014 Hazardous Weather Testbed 
Hydrology (HWT-Hydro) experiment.  Out of the fifteen participants, eleven were male 
and four were female.  While this is not as gender-balanced as might be desired, it may 
reflect the larger weather forecasting community, a field not known for its gender 
diversity (Daipha, 2010).  Forecasters were from locations around the United States and 
worked for either a Weather Forecast Office (WFO; n=13) or a River Forecast Center 
(RFC; n=2). 
Participants were selected one of two ways.  In the first case, several participants 
were selected based on recommendations by supervisors within their home office.  
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However, most participants were selected through an application process and were 
selected based on background knowledge and interest in hydrology.  As part of the 
application, potential participants wrote a short essay explaining their motivation for 
wishing to participate and their relevant qualifications.  From those applications, the 
majority of the testbed participant pool was sampled based on their statements of 
interest and qualifications, such as professional role and education.  Although not 
always listed in the essays, nine of the fifteen participants listed their professional role.  
Six participants were professional hydrologists, three held positions with the title of 
meteorologist, and the remaining six participants did not list their current job title. 
Equipment, Materials, and Environment.  The study took place in a 
controlled-access room located in the National Weather Center in Norman, Oklahoma.  
The testbed environment consisted of multiple dual-monitor computer workstations that 
were set up within the room.  Each computer ran on a LINUX operating system and 
contained the Advanced Weather Interactive Processing System II (AWIPS-II) weather 
forecasting software in the Computer-Aided Visualization Environment (CAVE).  Each 
computer also had the desktop recording software, RecordMyDesktop.gtk, installed 
upon it to facilitate data collection.  Within AWIPS-II, forecasters had access to many 
forecast guidance products that served as decision aids.  Though one of the testbed’s 
purposes was to evaluate the performance of experimental guidance products, 
forecasters also had access to a nearly full set of operationally available products.  A list 
of experimental products available in AWIPS-II during the HWT-Hydro testbed is 
shown in Table 8, and a full list of experimental and operational products used in the 
testbed can be found in Appendix B. 
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Procedure.  At the beginning of each day during the experiment, forecasters 
began by reviewing the weather conditions to establish situation awareness. Forecasters 
first received instructions to identify regions of the contiguous United States that may 
have had a threat level equal to a watch; severe weather watches are generally 
associated with long-term time frames, whereas severe weather warnings are short-term 
predictions that refer to impending threats.  After issuing any watches, forecasters were 
then instructed to narrow their focus within a prescribed region to issue warnings, if 
necessary.  For four to five hours a day, Monday through Thursday, forecasters used a 
set of operationally available forecasting tools along with the set of experimental tools 
to guide their decisions (in-development and therefore not available in operational NWS 
offices).  Forecasters accessed operational tools in a number of ways, ranging from 
Table 8. Experimental (in development) flash flood decision support products 
Decision Support Family Decision Tool 
 
Experimental Models CREST Maximum Return Period 
HRRR-Forced CREST 
CREST Soil Moisture 
CREST Streamflow 
SAC-SMA Soil Moisture 
SAC-SMA Streamflow 
Precipitable Water (PW) Precipitable Water Analysis (RAOBs) 
Precipitable Water Percentile 
(RAOBs) 
Precipitable Water Analysis (RAP) 
Precipitable Water Percentile (RAP) 
Quantitative Precipitation Estimate (QPE) 
& Quantitative Precipitation Forecast (QPF) 
MRMS QPE 
MRMS QPF 
Flash Flood Guidance Ratio (FFG) QPE to Flash Flood Guidance Ratio 
QPF to Flash Flood Guidance Ratio 
Average Recurrence Interval (ARI) Precipitation Return Period (QPE) 
Precipitation Return Period (QPF) 
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within the AWIPS-II platform to internet browsers.  During all forecasting activities, 
participants’ actions were recorded using the recordMyDesktop screen recording 
software.  The software recorded forecaster interactions with the decision aids 
throughout the forecasting timeline; an example of a screen capture is shown in Figure 
11. 
The desktop recording software captured data related to decision aid use during 
situation assessment and decision making.  Recordings totaled 186 hours and 36 
minutes, but not all videos were of sufficient visual quality to distinguish participant 
interactions.  Recording quality was poor at times, so blurred or choppy recordings were 
removed from the sampling population.  Samples were taken from within thirty minutes 
to an hour prior to a participant issuing a watch or a warning.  Sampling intervals within 
each recording varied on a case-by-case basis; this was because the sample start points 
were chosen to occur either at the beginning of a recording (only for those sampled 
 
Figure 11. Example of an AWIPS-II workstation display with multiple decision 
aiding visualizations present 
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during the watch phase) or at a breakpoint in the decision process.  Breakpoints were 
identified as either (1) the start of a new string of interactions following a prolonged 
break, or (2) the start of a new watch or warning product issuance following a prior 
product issuance.  From the recordings that were of a sufficient quality, the sample 
consisted of 12 hours, 17 minutes, and 31 seconds (7% of the total recording duration).    
Separate analyses were conducted to assess SA requirements over time (watch issuance 
phase versus warning issuance phase) and environmental activity level. 
Results and Analysis 
Environmental activity level was based on flash flood, flood, and heavy rain 
local storm reports (LSRs) published in the Storm Events Database (National Climatic 
Data Center, 2014).  Due to the situated nature of weather forecasting, using three types 
of weather events to represent environmental activity level was determined to be more  
appropriate than only looking at the number of flash flood reports.  While the 
participants were only tasked with issuing forecast products for flash floods, floods and 
heavy rain can occur concurrently with flash flooding.  Thus, a portion of the 
forecasting task would have involved detecting meteorological and hydrological 
patterns associated with flash flooding amidst heavy rainfall events.  From the Storm 
Events Database, the number of water-related LSRs was calculated for each day in the 
experimental period.  Percentiles were calculated from the LSRs, allowing for a three-
level environmental activity scale (see Figure 12).  Based on the July 2014 LSRs, the 
boundary between low and moderate activity was assigned to the 40th percentile, while 
the boundary between moderate and high activity was assigned to the 90th percentile. 
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It is important to note that the scale measures environmental activity relative to 
the forecasts only in July 2014.  Meteorological activity fluctuates in frequency and 
severity throughout the year and by geographic location, so what would be considered a 
“high activity day” in January is not the same as a “high activity day” in August.  
Likewise, what forecasters in Houston, Texas would view as a “busy” day is likely not 
the same as what a forecaster in Akron, Ohio would consider one to be.  Due to the 
nature of meteorological phenomena, environmental activity level was not a 
controllable factor, as one can see in Figure 12.  However, this was addressed through 
balanced sampling methods when selecting segments from the screen recordings. 
  The recordings produced several conclusions related to SA requirements during 
the watch and warning issuance timeframes through an analysis of the time and 
frequency of forecast guidance usage.  During the analysis, the video samples were 
Figure 12. Number of Local Storm Reports (LSRs) for floods, flash floods, and 
heavy rain across the continental United States during the forecast period in July 
2014.  Gaps in the data show the days that experimental forecasting did not occur. 
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transcribed, which involved watching the samples and recording the start time and end 
time associated with each tool’s use.  For example, in Figure 11, the participant had just 
chosen to display the FLASH Surface HRRR-Forced CREST model.  In the 
transcription process, the product’s name and the timestamp at which it was first 
displayed (t = 1:30:47) was transcribed.  Then, when the participant chose to remove the 
FLASH Surface HRRR-Forced CREST model from the central panel, the timestamp at 
which the removal occurred was transcribed.  Should the same product have been 
displayed a second time later during the forecasting process, a new entry with start and 
end time would have been recorded.  An example of one of the video transcripts is 
included in Appendix C. 
Watch Issuance.  In the videos sampled during the watch issuance forecasting 
activities, participants used a mean of 20.1 forecast guidance products (σ = 9.4).  As 
shown in Table 9, ten samples were taken from the population of recordings.  These 
samples represent 6 hours, 5 minutes, and 43 seconds worth of data. 
  In order to assess “big-picture” SA requirements, a measure of cumulative time 
was determined for each guidance type; for a full list of individual products and their 
respective guidance type.  While analyzing forecaster behavior with regard to tool 
usage, several things become apparent. Figure 14 represents the cumulative time the 
participants spent using groups of forecast guidance products.  For example, the “radar” 
category is the sum of the times spent by all participants using both available radar tools 
(the FLASH Surface MRMS Seamless Hybrid-Scan Reflectivity as well as the FLASH 
Surface MRMS Quality-Controlled Composite Reflectivity).  As a result, this leads to 
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the measure reflecting the total time that all products within each guidance family were 
on the screen in any combination. 
In Figure 13, one can see the cumulative time that each guidance product was 
visible on a participant’s screen.  Although the sample contained just over six hours 
worth of forecasting, the combined screen time of products in the “FFA/FFW/LSRs” 
category was more than eight hours; this indicates that the products in the 
“FFA/FFW/LSRs” category were used for extended, overlapping periods of time, and 
so when taken in combination, the total time exceeds the sample time.  Looking at 
Figure 14, the total screen time given to products in the “FFA/FFW/LSRs” category 
grossly outweighed any of the other guidance product categories.  However, it is 
important to note that the “FFA/FFW/LSRs” products were not predictive tools; they 
instead provided general SA in terms of existing flash flood warnings, both 
operationally and as issued by other study participants.  These tools were often overlaid 
on top of prediction models and radar imagery. 
Apart from the “FFA/FFW/LSRs” products, radar imagery, hydrologic data (in 
the experimental models), and flash flood guidance (FFG)-based models ranked in the 
top three most-used guidance tools.  In terms of SA requirements for watch-phase 
decision making, the data show that participants placed heavy focus on these decision 
Table 9. Number and duration of sampled desktop recordings for flash flood watch 
forecasts 
 
 n Duration (min.) 
Low 3 97.53 
Moderate 3 150.78 
High 4 117.40 
Total 10 365.72 
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aids.  The radar products and FFG-based models may have received a larger amount of 
screen time due to their prominence in operational forecasting; traditional methods of 
flash flood forecasting encourage forecasters to assess radar products for heavy rainfall 
signatures, and FFG-based decision aids have been used across the NWS for several 
decades.  Thus, it is not entirely surprising that study participants relied heavily on 
familiar tools that they trusted.  Nevertheless, the experimental hydrologic models—
forecast guidance that participants did not have prior experience using—received a 
relatively large amount of screen time compared to the other guidance categories.  
While it is possible that this measure was affected by HWT goals (to evaluate 
experimental guidance products), we believe that the effect was not significant.  
Accordingly, other experimental products, such as the average recurrence interval 
models (ARI) or quantitative precipitation forecasts (QPF), did not receive the same 
	
Figure 13. Cumulative time spent using forecast guidance products available in 
AWIPS-II (for issuing watches)		
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amount of attention.  Instead, we conclude that the experimental hydrologic models 
provided new and useful information in the watch decision making process. 
The data also confirmed that during watch-phase decision making, SA 
requirements differed as environmental activity level changed.  Figure 14 represents the 
proportion of time participants spent using forecast guidance products relative to 
environmental activity level.  Although the x-axis is ordered in line with the temporal 
order in Figure 13, time has been normalized in Figure 14 in order to reflect differences 
between environmental activity levels.  As a result, several variances appear in forecast 
guidance usage.  During moderately active days, participants spent more time 
evaluating experimental models, FFG ratio guidance products, and ensemble models 
than they did during high or low activity days.  With respect to usage of experimental 
models, it is hypothesized that this is due to a more balanced workload during 	
	
Figure 14. Proportion of time spent using forecast guidance products relative to 
environmental activity level 	
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moderately busy days than during either high or low activity days.  During highly active 
days, participants had many claims upon their attention, and so they may have relied 
more on familiar guidance products in order to reduce workload and stress.  However, it 
is less clear why experimental models received less usage during low activity days.  It is 
possible that the lower screen time was due to lack of modeling; by definition, little 
environmental activity occurred on “low activity” days, and as such, the hydrologic 
models would have been less likely to predict events.  This may explain the spike in 
usage for observations on low-activity days; although observations did not receive as 
much screen time as the experimental models, participants may have found observation 
maps more informative than blank-map models.  Interestingly, we see that during the 
sample, participants only used customized geographic overlays (such as adding river 
maps to the background display) during the moderate activity level days.  However, in 
Figure 13 one can see that the geographic overlays had the lowest cumulative time, and 
as the data came from only one participant in the sample, it is hypothesized that using 
geographic overlays is a personal choice that can be attributed to individual differences. 
 Conversely, usage of several products declined during moderately active days 
with respect to their application during high- and low-activity days.  Precipitable water 
(PW) products, quantitative precipitation estimate (QPE), and quantitative precipitation 
forecast (QPF) products received much less screen time during average days than 
during the extremes.  However, the nature of these products and the watch forecasting 
process may shed some light on these differences. 
Watches and warnings differ in timeframe.  A watch refers to a general threat 
that may or may not occur usually 6 to 24+ hours past the point of issuance, whereas a 
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warning refers to a specific threat that is likely to occur within 6 hours or less of the 
point of issuance.   PW is a measure of the mass of water held within a column of the 
atmosphere (American Meteorological Society, 2015), and it is based on atmospheric 
soundings (rawinsonde observations; RAOBs) and the Rapid Refresh (RAP) numerical 
forecast model.  It is updated on an hourly basis, and as such, gives short-term 
atmospheric information to users.  During the watch issuance timeframe, forecasters are 
trained to assess whether atmospheric and environmental conditions are consistent with 
specific threats.  As such, SA requirements for a watch will include information about 
such conditions; in terms of decision aids, this translates into guidance products that 
provide users with data about ground-based observations and atmospheric conditions, 
such as the PW-based decision aids. 
In addition to interactions with forecast guidance products, the recordings 
revealed that participants engaged in several other types of activity during the forecast 
process.  A large portion of time was spent transitioning between display screens, 
setting up new layouts, and reviewing geographic locations on blank maps.  The total 
time spent doing these types of activities was 57 minutes.  Participants were able to 
view operationally issued watches and warnings in the AWIPS-II display; this 
capability not only allowed participants to display the watch and warning polygons 
alongside the other visualizations, but it also gave them access to official operational 
text products.  The text products contained professional discussions regarding 
justifications for the forecast, and it is possible that this information was beneficial to 
testbed participants in that it contributed to their situation assessment process.  However 
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in the sampled videos, the total time spent reading these discussions was just over two 
minutes (t = 2.47 minutes). 
Warning Issuance.  As with the watch phase analysis, approximately six hours 
of screen recordings were sampled across 8 videos within the total data set, as shown in 
Table 10.  Likewise, samples were selected from the subgroups of environmental 
activity level.  Participants consulted slightly more unique forecast guidance products in 
minutes leading up to issuing a warning than prior to issuing a watch (µ = 25.8 guidance 
products per day, σ = 6.3).  As hypothesized, SA requirements in the warning decision 
making process differed from those required for watch decision making.  Figure 15 
presents the temporal analysis results from the recordings sampled.	 
Similar to the watch decision making process, the “FFA/FFW/LSRs” overlays 
were used frequently in combination with each other and with other products, as 
indicated by the cumulative time metric exceeding the total duration of the sample.  The 
large amount of screen time given to the “FFA/FFW/LSRs” category in both watches 
and warnings suggests that the overlays assisted participants in maintaining SA in terms 
of existing operational and experimental forecast issuances.  Apart from the forecast 
overlays, FFG-based guidance products, radar imagery, and QPE-based products 
received the greatest amount of screen time.  FFG products’ high amount of screen time 
Table 10. Number and duration of sampled desktop recordings for flash flood 
warning forecasts 
 n Duration (min.) 
Low 2 116.52 
Moderate 3 124.33 
High 3 130.95 
Total 8 371.80 
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is not unexpected; although several of the FFG-based tools were experimental (the FFG 
ratio guidance products), participants were experienced users of operational FFG   
decision aids.  Thus, familiarity with traditional FFG decision aids may have led 
participants to put greater trust in the testbed’s experimental FFG products.  When used 
in combination with unfamiliar decision aids, participants may have used the FFG-
based products to manage individual uncertainty with regard to the bias and prediction 
outputs of the other experimental models.  
As shown in Figure 16, the relationship between decision aid usage during the 
watch and warning phases did differ.  The forecast guidance categories are ordered from 
greatest to least cumulative screen time, as was previously shown in Figure 15.  Several 
types of guidance were used somewhat equally between watch and warning analysis, 
namely the radar imagery, and the experimental hydrologic models.  However, there 
	
Figure 15. Cumulative time spent using forecast guidance products available in 
AWIPS-II (for issuing warnings) 	
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were some observable differences in usage between the two phases along the decision 
timeline.  For some products, usage decreased as the decision lead-time decreased.   
While QPF decision aids were one of the less-viewed categories during the 
watch timeframe, their perceived utility further decreased in the warning timeframe.  
Whether this was due to a lack of adequate training on QPF interpretation or a different 
reason would require further investigation.  In addition, precipitable water (PW) 
guidance products decreased in the warning phase, becoming the category with the least 
screen time prior to warning issuance.  PW is modeled over large spatial scales, and 
outputs change slowly over time; these qualities give PW-based decision aids greater 
utility during the watch timeframe, where watch forecasts are also issued over larger 
temporal and spatial scales than warning forecasts.  This is also a likely explanation for 
the proportional difference in the screen time given to ensembles; ensemble models are 
	
Figure 16. Cumulative time spent using forecast guidance products during watch 
and warning phases, with "FFA/FFW/LSRs" category removed to reveal differences 
in the lower end of the spectrum 	
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visualized as “spaghetti plots,” or mappings of overlapping lines that represent 
atmospheric pressure levels.  Like PW, pressure is an atmospheric condition that 
informs decisions about big-picture risk for meteorological phenomena, and less about 
discrete environmental threats.	
 Conversely, guidance products based on ARI and QPE contributed to warning 
decisions, which is indicated by a greater proportion of screen time during the warning 
phase than in the watch phase.  While they received more screen time in the warning 
phase, however, they were still some of the less-used products overall.  It is logical to 
assume that QPE and ARI information satisfied requirements for building SA.  ARI 
products provide users with information about frequency of floods with a specified size.  
The proportional increase in ARI guidance usage for warning decisions indicates that 
knowledge about risk level is a component of good SA for flash flood warning 
forecasts.  While this would likely be useful for forecasters to know when predicting 
flash floods in the long term, the modeling involved in predicting ARI limits the ability 
to provide such information to forecasters; rainfall estimates are one of the inputs into 
the ARI model, so the ARI products are only able to provide measures of risk after rain 
has already begun.  During the watch phase, the decision making timeframe occurs too 
far in advance of rainfall to create outputs in the ARI guidance; this also is the case for 
QPE outputs, and likely accounts for their low usage during the watch timeframe. 
While QPE received more screen time during the warning timeframe, the 
reverse was true for the quantitative precipitation forecast (QPF) guidance products.   
Indeed, as shown in Figure 16, the actual time that participants used QPE products was 
much greater than that spent with QPF products.  However, proportionally, the screen 
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time given to QPF products indicates that they had more utility as a decision aid in the 
watch timeframe.  This is supported by the guidance product’s design; within HWT-
Hydro, the QPF products provided estimates of precipitation amounts based on QPE, 
and were projected as 15-hour outlooks.  This long-term outlook made QPF a better fit 
for guiding risk assessment in the long-term. 
 In line with the watch phase analysis, forecast guidance usage in the warning 
phase also changed with environmental activity.  In Figure 17, one can see that FFG-
based decision aids received more screen time during low activity days than in either 
the moderately or highly active days.  Likewise, while geographic overlays and 
ensemble products did not receive a majority of the screen time, when they were used, 
they were most often used on low activity days.  This may be due to effects of 
participant boredom.  During less active forecasting periods, participants would have 
	
Figure 17. Proportion of time spent using forecast guidance products during warning 
issuance relative to environmental activity level	
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had fewer threats to monitor, and would in turn have more time become familiar with 
local terrain and geographic features, such as burn scars, that would increase the risk of 
flash flooding within their forecast domain.  Interestingly, the experimental hydrologic 
models received the most screen time on highly active forecasting days.  This may 
suggest that hydrologic data was an important part of the situation assessment process; 
it is possible that they provided a way to distinguish significant threats from noise. 
 Time-Frequency Analysis of Experimental Decision Support.  In addition to 
a temporal analysis of forecast guidance usage, frequency of use was recorded and 
analyzed.  Frequency was measured by counting the number of times a participant 
added a specific decision aid to his or her AWIPS-II display.  An example of product 
frequency can be found in the data transcript (Appendix C).  In order to assess the 
relationship among the experimental decision aids, situation assessment, and the 
forecasting timeline, a time-frequency analysis was conducted; the results are shown in 
Figure 18, where cumulative time (y-axis) is presented as a ratio of screen time to total 
sample time, and frequency (x-axis) is presented as the percentage of product-specific 
interactions to total interactions. 
In line with the temporal analysis, the FFG-based guidance products not only 
received the greatest screen time, but they were also the most frequently selected.  It is 
important to note that a high frequency does not guarantee a high rate of use; 
throughout the testbed, participants were regularly observed engaging in rapid 
comparison activities.  These rapid comparisons involved switching between views, 
toggling between one product and another (or several).  In the frequency analysis, a 
high frequency value more often than not indicates that the product in question was 
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regularly used as a comparative tool alongside others.  Therefore, one could conclude 
that while PW and FFG-based products had roughly equivalent screen time during the 
watch phase, the FFG-based products were used as comparative decision aids more 
often than PW products. 
In the warning phase, the QPE- and ARI-based products had similar frequencies 
of use, but received different amounts of screen time.  This may suggest a difference in 
usability.  QPE products were selected just as frequently as ARI products, but the 
greater screen time indicates that participants either found certain products to be more 
useful or that they required more time to incorporate the information into their situation 
assessment and sensemaking process.  
 
Figure 18. Time-frequency analysis of experimental guidance product usage during 
watch and warning issuance		
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Discussion of Study I 
The time-frequency analysis indicates that guidance usage was dependent upon 
the forecast lead-time and environmental activity level, confirming the original 
hypotheses.  During the long-term watch issuance timeframe, we see several differences 
between activity level and reliance. In a review of the amount of time spent viewing 
each decision aid, we see that the forecasters spent the most time looking at non-
experimental tools.  However, if one disregards the prevalent use of FFA/FFW/LSR 
overlays and the radar imagery, the data suggest that hydrologic models and 
experimental products were used more frequently than operational products.  Indeed, on 
moderate activity days, forecasters spent nearly an hour more with non-experimental 
tools visualized in their displays. 
A different behavioral pattern emerged during the warning timeframe.  Out of 
the experimental decision aids, participants relied on tools they were more familiar 
with, such as FFG ratio maps, QPE products, and ARI outputs.  Likewise, in terms of 
operational decision aids, participants spent more time viewing observation reports 
during the short-term warning phase than in the watch phase, which is consistent with 
the view that flash flood observations contribute to situation awareness.  On the days 
with moderate environmental activity, participants spent about half as much time using 
operational tools as they did during either high or low environmental activity days.  
This is not surprising from a tool development perspective, as the experimental tools 
were designed to aid in the short term forecasting stage. 
The findings confirm those of Morss and Ralph (2007), who also observed that 
forecasters accessed different guidance tools throughout the forecast timeline.  In 
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addition, the present study’s findings strongly suggest that guidance usage also differs 
depending on day-to-day activity level.  From a decision making perspective, guidance 
usage over time is a useful, albeit nontraditional, identifier of SA requirements.  
Differences in usage frequency and screen time reflect changing user needs with regard 
to information sources necessary to predict flash flooding.  However, a high amount of 
screen time does not necessarily translate to more importance as an SA requirement; a 
prime example of this is the relatively low amount of time given to geographic overlays 
compared to other decision aids.  Morss and Ralph (2007) discussed the importance of 
local knowledge when producing weather forecasts, yet in the present study, the 
geographic overlays received the most use during low activity forecasting days.  While 
still an SA requirement for busier forecasting periods, we hypothesize that participants 
prepared during low activity days, consulting geographic and topographic information 
sources to build their local knowledge in advance of the highly active periods.  In this 
way, forecasters shifted some of the workload out of the busier shifts and used 
downtime to build up memory stores for when they were needed.  
One must consider several things that limit our conclusions and generalize the 
data.  In spite of or perhaps because of the training given at the beginning of each week 
during HWT-Hydro, some of the forecast guidance tool usage patterns may have been 
biased.  On the one hand, it was hypothesized that experimental model usage may have 
been higher than it would have otherwise been due to the participants’ awareness of the 
testbed’s goals (to evaluate experimental products).  However, after the temporal 
evaluation, it is clear that while experimental decision aids were used widely, not all 
were given equal screen time; indeed, traditional sources, such as radar imagery, were 
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still used more widely than any of the hydrologic experimental models, ARI guidance, 
or QPF guidance.  On the other hand, though, a reverse explanation may also be 
possible.  Although participants received training about each experimental product prior 
to the first forecasting session, it is possible that participants were still uncertain 
regarding appropriate usage of the experimental tools.  If this were the case, potentially 
inadequate training may have led to the lesser screen time given to products like QPF- 
and PW-based decision aids. 
Study II: Forecasters’ Management of Uncertainty and the Forecast Decision 
Making Process in HWT-Hydro 2014 
The qualitative component of the mixed methods study sought to identify 
processes involved with maintaining situation awareness under uncertainty during flash 
flood forecasting (RQ2).  A focus group was used to collect open-ended responses 
regarding participants’ uncertainty management techniques, forecast guidance usage, 
and feedback on a set of experimental risk communication methods for flash flood 
forecasting.  The following section presents a discussion of the method, followed by 
findings from the focus group discussions. 
Method 
Participants.  Fifteen participants took part in the focus groups during HWT-
Hydro 2014; these were the same participants that took part in Study I.  Participants 
were all National Weather Service forecasters, with either primary job roles in 
hydrologic or meteorological forecasting.  They primarily worked at Weather Forecast 
Offices (n = 13), though a few were based out of River Forecast Centers (n = 2).  
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Forecasters were selected from offices and centers around the continental United States, 
so a wide variety of geographic regions were represented in the sample. 
Each focus group consisted of three to four individuals.  Although the 
recommended minimum number of participants per group is six due to concerns of 
reduced conversation (Caplan, 1990), discussions lasted about one hour and responses 
flowed naturally.  In terms of background, participants’ forecasting backgrounds 
qualified them to discuss the group themes related to coping with uncertainty.  While 
the groups were homogenous in terms of forecasting qualifications, participants 
represented Weather Forecast Offices and River Forecast Centers across the continental 
United States.  Differences between office cultures, regional forecasting policies, and 
responsibilities within the National Weather Service were all anticipated.  These 
differences stimulated discussion and participant interaction during the group meetings. 
Focus Group Design.  Focus groups are often used in human factors research 
because of their ability to provide highly detailed, qualitative data about a central 
theme.  In a focus group, individuals explore perspectives on an idea or product, guided 
through the discussion by a moderator.  Moderators must have subject matter 
experience and the ability to facilitate discussions while minimizing experimenter bias 
(Caplan, 1990).  The focus group methodology is particularly suited to capture 
information about participant beliefs and attitudes through analysis of individual 
responses and group interactions (Freeman, 2006).  Philosophical perspectives differ in 
the importance of group homogeneity and the importance of interpersonal interactions 
during discussions.  As discussed by Freeman (2006),  the contextual constructionist 
perspective cautions against homogenous groups due to the assumption that group 
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member similarities constrains discussions (Kitzinger (1994) as cited in Freeman 
(2006)).  Conversely, the realist perspective recommends group homogeneity, in that 
within-group similarities allow for intra-group comparisons and in turn, promotes 
external validity (Kreuger and Casey (1994) as cited in Freeman (2006)).  Both 
perspectives recognize the face validity of interaction analysis; interaction promotes 
discussion in the realist philosophy and is the source of meaning from the 
constructionist perspective (Belzile & Öberg, 2012; Freeman, 2006) 
 From a practice-oriented perspective, focus group design can impact the validity 
of the results.  Specifically, personal attributes of the moderator can affect discussion 
outcomes in terms of how group members perceive and relate to the discussion leader 
(Belzile & Öberg, 2012).  For ergonomics-related focus groups, Caplan (1990) 
recommends that moderators have a background relevant to the focus group’s subject 
matter, facilitation experience, and neutrality about the topic to minimize bias.  
In the present study, three different individuals moderated the focus groups: 
moderator M1 facilitated discussions with group 1 and 4, moderator M2 facilitated 
discussions with group 2, and moderator M3 facilitated discussions with group 3.  All 
moderators were graduate students in their mid-twenties, but M1 was female while M2 
and M3 were male.  The majority of the group participants were male, so theoretically 
some gender bias to the responses may have existed; however, this was not observed 
and any potential effects were subtle. 
Focus groups met at the end of each week during the testbed study.  During the 
discussions, participants and the moderator sat around an oval conference table to 
encourage interaction between members.  The focus group addressed a range of topics 
	142 
related to the general forecasting process as well as the participants’ views on 
uncertainty, probability, and confidence in flash flood forecasting.  The questions of 
interest to the present study were those that sought to elicit feedback on the role of the 
uncertainty attributes in communicating threat information to end users.  During the 
group discussions, the questions were posed as: 
• General forecasting background and experience (2 questions) 
• Decision making under uncertainty (5 questions) 
• Using impact characterizations in forecasting communications (5 questions) 
A full list of focus group questions can be found in Appendix C.  Questions were 
designed to elicit open-ended responses and follow-up questions or comments by 
participants were encouraged to stimulate discussion.  In addition, questions were 
piloted with a test group of subject matter experts prior to the formal group meetings.  
The general forecasting background questions were designed to engage and introduce 
participants to the discussion topic.  Nine of the questions related to decision making 
and the impact characterizations were designed to explore the central theme of coping 
with and communicating uncertainty.  At the conclusion of each group, the final query 
acted as an exit question to capture anything that may have been missed in earlier 
discussions. 
Thematic Analysis Protocol.  Focus group discussions were audio-recorded 
and then transcribed.  The transcripts were then analyzed using thematic analysis.  
Thematic analysis, a form of qualitative content analysis (QCA), is a flexible, 
systematic methodology used for capturing themes and patterns within a qualitative 
dataset (Schreier, 2012).  Themes represent elements of the central organizing concept 
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for the analysis, and are often identified as prevalent patterns of responses (Braun & 
Clarke, 2006).  Themes are derived from categories of codes, defined by Saldana (2015) 
as “a short word or phrase that symbolically assigns a summative, salient, essence-
capturing, and/or evocative attribute for a portion of language-based or visual data.”  In 
practice, codes are words or statements that briefly paraphrase ideas, emotions, or 
behaviors expressed in the data.  In thematic analysis and other QCA methods, analysis 
is an iterative process involving an initial coding stage, code refinement, refinement of 
codes into themes, and structural verification (Braun, Clarke, & Terry, 2014).  The 
present study draws upon the methodological framework outlined by Braun and Clarke 
(2006), who present a highly detailed guide to conducting a thematic analysis.  A 
summary of the steps involved in this type of research is presented in Table 11. 
In thematic analysis, the researcher takes an active role in identifying and 
interpreting meaning in the information; as such, it is important to acknowledge the 
research epistemology prior to and during analysis as it impacts the types of conclusions 
that can be drawn (Braun & Clarke, 2006).  In the present study, the author identified 
with the realist perspective and employed a theoretical and semantic analytical 
approach.  In a semantic approach, the researcher summarizes themes, interpreting 
patterns and identifying relationships between themes, particularly in relation to 
existing theoretical frameworks relevant to the research question; in this approach, 
meaning is drawn strictly from the researcher’s interpretation of participant responses 
(Braun & Clarke, 2006).  The semantic approach contrasts to the alternative latent-level 
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thematic approach, in which the researcher attempts to interpret the underlying 
motivations for participants’ use of particular semantics. 
Complementing the semantic approach, the author also assumed a theoretical 
approach to coding.  The theoretical approach, which is grounded in an existing 
theoretical framework, allows the researcher to explore the data through a predefined 
lens.  This produces highly detailed findings related to the core research question 
(Braun & Clarke, 2006).  The theoretical approach facilitated a top-down analysis of 
how forecasters cope with uncertainty, driven by the tactical framework discussed by 
Lipshitz and Strauss (1997) and by the macrocognitive model of forecast decision 
making presented by Trafton and Hoffman (2007). 
Findings from the Thematic Analysis 
 In thematic analysis, themes are often associated with measures of prevalence, 
which can be assessed in terms of a theme’s presence across the entire dataset, presence 
in individual sources within the dataset, or as a reference frequency measure, which 
captures the number of times a topic was mentioned in the course of the dataset (Braun 
Table 11. Steps for conducting a thematic analysis, summarized from Braun and 
Clarke (2006) 
Phase Activities 
(1) Familiarization Transcribe and review data (transcripts, media, etc.) 
(2) Initial Coding Identify codes and patterns in the data 
(3) Search for Themes Collapse codes into themes, create initial thematic hierarchy 
(4) Review Themes Test thematic hierarchy, review and refine themes to create thematic map 
(5) Define Themes Finalize inclusion rules for themes, select representative names for each theme 
(6) Report Illustrate thematic structure with examples from the data that relate to research question 
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& Clarke, 2006).  In the present study, the researcher analyzed the data both in terms of 
presence of themes by focus group and in terms of thematic frequency.  The frequency 
measures, similar to those used in other QCA methods, allowed the researcher to draw 
conclusions related to the relative importance of themes.  However, Braun and Clarke 
(2006) express the concern that frequency measures can be difficult to apply due to 
issues created by the size of units of analysis.  For this reason, the analysis also 
discusses themes with a presence/absence variable between focus groups. 
General Forecasting Background.  Several questions probed participants 
about their individual experience with flash flood forecasting.  These questions were 
designed to elicit information regarding how participants operationally use forecasting 
decision aids in the warning decision making process.  Discussions not only revealed 
general situation assessment procedures, but they also reflected participant perceptions 
of the importance of the role of the forecaster in the weather domain.  In one particular 
focus group, this theme of forecaster self-image emerged particularly strongly: 
participants agreed that as forecasters, their roles involved acting as a “weather 
authority” and as “communicators.”  These viewpoints demonstrate the importance of 
not only having meteorological knowledge and the ability to create a forecast, but also 
the value in being able to provide information to forecast end users.  As one participant 
noted, the forecaster’s role increasingly overlaps with the role of a decision support 
service.  
Decision Making Under Uncertainty.  After using the background experience 
questions to establish an environment conducive to holding open discussion, the 
conversation turned towards more specific aspects of the warning decision making 
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process.  Participants discussed their own methods for making sense of forecast 
information, and they were encouraged to give specific examples from the testbed and 
from their home offices.  Analysis of the discussions produced a number of themes 
relating to situation assessment and action choice during the watch and warning 
decision making process. 
Establishing the Big Picture.  At the beginning of any forecasting shift, 
participants agreed that the decision space was often a “blank slate.”  The decision 
making process begins by attempting to establish the big picture in relation to the 
environmental and atmospheric states.  In order to transition from a blank slate to 
understanding the big picture, forecasters assess environmental parameters between and 
within information sources.  Preferred information sources differed from forecaster to 
forecaster, but several guidance products that were frequently mentioned for flash flood 
forecasting were radar imagery, precipitable water (PW) estimates, vapor imagery, and 
atmospheric soundings.  Such sources provided a coarse level of detail, but they also 
allowed the forecaster to form a baseline for flash flood risk assessment. 
Participants pointed out the importance of maintaining an awareness of the big 
picture throughout the entire forecast decision making process.  Although participants 
did not use such wording, this baseline understanding may in fact relate to situation 
awareness.  One participant spoke of the importance of maintaining awareness of the 
environmental baseline conditions, stating that in the testbed, he “always felt like [he] 
had enough time to pull back and look at the big picture.”  Using a cyclical process, this 
forecaster used his SA of baseline conditions to develop SA more focused on specific 
flash flood threats.   
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Focusing Attention.  The second stage of forecast decision making involved 
source comparison and parameter assessment to focus attention on specific threats. 
Similar to the “big picture” stage, SA was built through assessment of environmental 
parameters.  However, when discussing this stage, participants largely agreed that 
assessment occurred in two contexts.  In the first context, assessment occurred within 
individual guidance product; forecasters sought specific guidance products and 
evaluated predictions in terms of thresholds (e.g. flash flooding may occur when the 
QPE exceeds a certain amount in a certain location), societal conditions (e.g. local 
infrastructure or vulnerable populations), and model bias estimates. 
The second context was more comparative in nature.  Participants discussed 
building SA by comparing between guidance products; it is possible that this process 
served to refine the forecasters’ mental models.  One participant stated that she “would 
look at the flash flood guidance and kind of switch between [that and rainfall return 
periods], but a lot of times they were both showing about the same story, and the 
rainfall return periods were better at providing an estimate of magnitude and scope.”  If 
the within-product assessment could be likened to Endsley’s Level 1 SA (perception), 
between-product assessments could be seen as similar to Level 2 SA (comprehension). 
While parameter assessment was one of the most frequently discussed elements 
of developing SA, group participants also acknowledged the role of interpersonal 
communication in the situation assessment process.  Particularly during the testbed, 
participants relied heavily on the briefings from the associated testbed to direct their 
attention to certain regions across the country.  Operationally, forecasters are 
accustomed to seeking advice from colleagues; during the focus groups, one participant 
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gave the example that, “there’s always going to be different opinions… on model 
solutions, so there’s…. there’s a lot of discussion that happens to get to [an 
agreement].”  In addition, negotiation and discussions between offices may occur in 
order to issue a forecast product over a large geographic region.  Discussions revealed 
that such processes allowed forecasters to identify patterns over time and space, which 
in turn created the confidence needed to proceed to the action stage. 
Action Selection.  In the final decision making stage, forecasters activate the 
knowledge developed in the earlier stages as part of the action selection process.  This 
stage involved a number of interrelated processes.  After assessing the situation and 
identifying a specific threat, there are often two alternative decision making outcomes.  
In the active approach, the forecaster may determine that the threat is significant, and as 
such, they may decide to issue a product, such as a watch or a warning for a particular 
threat type.  In the second type of approach, the forecaster may determine that the threat 
is not significant at that point in time, and the action would be to wait for more 
information or to turn his attention elsewhere. 
 Focus group participants discussed the importance of threshold-based 
assessment, or as those in the human factors profession might refer to it, recognition-
primed decision making.  Recognition-primed decisions are those decisions made in 
response to uncertain and often short time-frame situations, and decision makers select 
the first functional decision, even if it is not the optimal solution (Klein, 1989).  
Hoffman and Coffey (2004) had found that pattern recognition and mental modeling 
were deeply ingrained into the weather forecast process.  Likewise, focus group 
participants frequently mentioned pattern recognition and threshold detection during 
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situation assessment.  Thresholds were often discussed in terms of time (e.g. deciding 
whether a flash flood would occur within six hours of the present time or not) or in 
terms of modeled parameters (e.g. detecting if the flash flood guidance exceeded the 
amount needed for flash flooding in a specific region).  However, some participants 
recognized problems with basing forecasts solely on threshold detection.  While basing 
decisions on recommended thresholds led to a sense of certainty, such decisions could 
lead to tradeoffs with respect to forecast verification scores, which may affect mental 
models used in future forecasts. 
 Uncertainty management also influenced the action selection stage.  Here, 
themes related to background experience and training and risk tolerance.  Risk 
tolerance refers to the degree of risk that a decision maker is willing to accept, and has 
been discussed as a major factor in decision making in the literature.  Participants 
shared examples of times when their or a colleague’s forecasting practices changed as a 
result of a previous negative outcome.  False alarms (issuing a forecast for a weather 
event that fails to materialize) and misses (failing to issue a forecast for a weather event 
that does materialize) were described as influential events that sometimes led to 
readjustment of risk tolerance.  One participant discussed the case of a coworker who 
had been “burned” by a missed event, and afterwards issued warnings more liberally in 
order to minimize the odds of missing another event.  Situations like this appeared to 
develop forecasters’ mental models, cultivating the information source held within 
background experience and training. 
When speaking about making judgments about the need for a warning, focus 
group participants discussed the connection between their background knowledge and 
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their ability to recognize patterns and detect environmental anomalies.  Experience was 
discussed in terms of experiential learning as well as professional training.  Comments 
related to training focused on formal education, often aimed at developing forecasting 
skill through practice and putting institutional policy into practice.  Comments related to 
background experience were similar, but instead referred to knowledge developed at an 
individual level; an example of this was local knowledge built up over a period of time 
at a specific forecast office.  Underlying the experience discussion was the concept of 
technology transfer—the handoff of technology from a developer to an end user.  
Participants revealed that their acceptance of new information sources (e.g. new 
decision support tools or models) not only influenced how they arrived at a decision, 
but their action choice, as well.  Discussions suggested that tool acceptance in HWT-
Hydro, specifically, may have been a function of product skill, user calibration, and 
availability of instruction.   
Sources of Uncertainty and Challenges in the Testbed.  Several sources of 
uncertainty posed challenges to testbed participants.  The analysis revealed four primary 
challenges affecting decision making in the testbed: differences in participant 
background, a lack of information, geographic scale complications, and workstation 
setup issues.  Much discussion centered on differences between forecasting policies that 
differ between offices around the country.  In one situation during HWT-Hydro, a 
testbed participant issued a flash flood warning for a particular region, but the local 
WFO did not issue the same type of warning.  The following day, reports of water over 
roads and other flooding-related outcomes were received.  The participant felt justified 
in her original forecast and attributed the difference to variations in office policies: “I 
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have seen where it comes back to the definition of a flash flood… at my office, we have 
our set definitions… we try to quantify it in terms of depth of water, moving water… In 
my mind, flash flood is different to what [the local office was] thinking a flash flood is.” 
 Forecasters also identified uncertainty associated with information sources, 
reflecting issues with technology comprehension.  Specifically, forecasters were 
challenged on three fronts: they lacked several traditional decision support tools, they 
lacked relevant local knowledge for much of the United States, and despite training, the 
participants were largely novice users of the experimental guidance products.  Due to 
technical limitations imposed by the required systems for displaying the experimental 
guidance products, testbed workstations were unable to provide several types of 
commonly used information sources.  Participants were able to access some of these 
sources through an internet browser, but this limited direct comparison of data types.  In 
addition to this, participants did not have pre-existing mental models related to the 
experimental guidance tools, so it took time each week for many of the participants to 
become accustomed to using the model outputs as decision support in real-time 
forecasts. 
 Lack of local knowledge was a particularly difficult challenge for many 
participants, and was perhaps the leading factor associated with increased uncertainty.  
In the words of one participant, this situation “reinforced to me what local knowledge of 
your forecaster does for you… [we] bounced around different parts of the country, and 
the way things respond, changed quite a bit.  So, the local knowledge is key.”  
Participants attempted to improve local knowledge when possible, often by reviewing 
maps and by searching for images of the local terrain on the internet.  However, this 
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was only nominally able to resolve uncertainty.  A similar challenge related to the 
expansive geographic scales of forecasts and resulted from the experimental design.  
Not only were participants asked to forecast over unfamiliar regions, but also the size of 
the geographic domain was much larger than the typical areal extent that a WFO 
forecaster would have responsibility over.  This was a challenge both from a workload 
perspective and from a situation assessment perspective. 
 The final type of challenge related to workstation customization.  Although 
participants were able to set up their workstations and displays according to their 
preferences, one participant stated, “I felt like I was borrowing someone else’s tools,” a 
sentiment that was echoed by others.  While this may have not been a direct source of 
uncertainty, rapidly adjusting to a new display set up likely did not help to facilitate the 
uncertainty management process.  
Coping Tactics.  Several of the focus group questions probed participants for 
individual and group experiences related to coping with uncertainty.  Confirming 
Lipshitz and Strauss’s (1997) R.A.W.F.S. heuristic, focus group members largely 
agreed with regard to management tactics.  The R.A.W.F.S. heuristic presumes that 
situation assessment is an adaptive, iterative process involving recognition-priming, 
assumption-based reasoning, and action choice evaluation.  During the focus groups, 
conversations revealed that when faced with uncertainty, forecasters did attempt to use 
reduction methods to diminish its effects.  Reduction techniques were the most 
frequently cited coping tactic, as shown in Figure 19.  Participants also identified 
techniques that acknowledged uncertainty when further reduction was not possible; 
these techniques were often policy-oriented from an office- or NWS-wide context.  
	153 
Finally, suppression was discussed as a technique that was typically undesirable.  Many 
of the identified tactics aligned with those discussed by Lipshitz and Strauss (1997) but 
with several differences that reveal management practices specific to the flash flood 
forecasting domain. 
Reducing Uncertainty.  In a forecasting session, uncertainty can arise from 
insufficient information.  In each of the four focus groups, participants discussed 
multiple reduction tactics in the situation assessment process (60.2% of coded 
uncertainty management comments).  Forecasters primarily cited reducing uncertainty 
through information-seeking activities (35.2% of all reduction-oriented comments).  In 
flash flood watch and warning decisions, forecasters stated that they sought two types of 
data in particular: information that reduced uncertainty about the environmental state 
and information that reduced uncertainty about interpreting guidance tools.  Lack of 
	
Figure 19. Count per code per week demonstrating tactics for coping with 
uncertainty during HWT-Hydro, shown in the R.A.W.F.S. framework proposed by 
Lipshitz and Strauss (1997) 	
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information, one of the greatest sources of uncertainty, was often exacerbated by lack of 
local knowledge.  As one participant in the first focus group explained:  
“That was what I struggled most with… especially out west, just my 
unfamiliarity, as in, where’s this water going to go?  I looked at the, called [the 
town] up on Google Earth, zoomed in… this kind of looks like it could be, oh, 
you know, affected by this flooding up on the hilltop there, and most of the time 
it turned out we were wrong.” 
As evidenced by this forecaster’s experience, reducing uncertainty by seeking 
additional information did not always result in a successful forecast.  However, focus 
group participants cited a number of information sources that helped to reduce 
uncertainty by filling in pieces of the puzzle.  Apart from geographic and topographic 
data, participants actively sought information about model bias adjustments 
(mathematical corrections to align simulated predictions with real-world observations), 
environmental observations (e.g. rain gauge measures and warm cloud depths), and 
temporal measures (e.g. mean storm motion), among others.  In addition, many of the 
experimental tools introduced uncertainty into the decision process, and during the 
testbed, forecasters found themselves seeking information about the new decision aids.  
Furthermore, information was acquired through communication with other forecasters 
in the testbed as well as in briefings given by participants in a separate testbed, a 
behavior also discussed by Morss and Ralph (2007).  Each day, HWT-Hydro 
participants would participate in a conference call with the other testbed participants, 
and the discussions would help to identify areas of concern for flash flooding across the 
country. 
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While actively searching for new information to construct and update mental 
models during situation assessment, forecasters also attempted to use their mental 
models to simulate possible outcomes, referred to as assumption-based reasoning by 
Lipshitz and Strauss (1997).  One forecaster illustrated this tactic in a story from a 
testbed forecasting session, in which he issued an experimental warning for flash floods 
in his hometown which failed to verify.  He had a mental model in place that included 
detailed local knowledge.  He had been exceptionally confident while creating the 
forecast.  When asked about his high level of confidence, he replied: 
“Well, the weather didn’t do what I thought it was going to!  No, I was looking 
at a downstream precipitation with the return periods on in an area and it was 
going to reach a flash flood guidance, which in my mind was lower than what 
the [River Forecast Center] had, and, uh, apparently, well, it caught the south 
side of town, but it didn’t cause a problem.  But, if it would have continued 
along the path it had been before it died out… it hit the county border and 
diminished as it got into the town… or otherwise I think it would have worked 
out fine.” 
Despite knowledge of the local region and mental models refined through years of 
experience, unverified forecasts do occur.  Although this introduces questions related to 
forecast “goodness,” it also exemplifies the assumption-based reasoning tactics for 
uncertainty reduction. 
Lastly, focus groups touched on two of Lipshitz and Strauss’s (1997) remaining 
reduction tactics: waiting (9.86% of reduction comments) and following norms of 
practice (11.3% of reduction comments).  Although not mentioned as frequently as 
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practices related to information acquisition or assumption-based reasoning, it appeared 
that several participants relied on operational standards of practice to guide decisions.  
This is not at all surprising; in operational settings, forecasters operate under strict 
directives on how and why weather products may be issued.  Participants referenced 
organizational policies issued by the NWS, and they also mentioned office-to-office 
policies that affect their decision processes.  In one instance, a participant stated that if 
they ever saw a flash flood guidance ratio reach 150%, they would immediately put out 
a flash flood warning, even if other information sources disagreed.  In the case where 
the other reduction tactics were not sufficient to improve an individual’s confidence 
past the threshold for action, several participants stated that they would wait for the 
situation to unfold further. 
Acknowledging Uncertainty.  In the taxonomy presented by Lipshitz and Strauss 
(1997), decision makers use acknowledgement tactics to cope with uncertainty when 
reduction is not possible.  Out of all focus group comments coded into uncertainty 
management categories, 30.5% captured behaviors or beliefs related to 
acknowledgement tactics.  Acknowledgement codes captured tactics that were typically 
organizational-level and policy-oriented, occurring outside the immediate forecasting 
timeframe.  These tactics often complemented reduction tactics that were often used by 
individuals in the timeframe immediately surrounding the weather event in question.  
During the thematic analysis, coded comments aligned with tactics observed by Lipshitz 
and Strauss (1997): preemption (36.1% of acknowledgement-oriented comments), 
improving readiness (47.2% of all acknowledgement-oriented comments), preparing 
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contingencies (8.33% of all acknowledgement-oriented comments), and consideration 
of action pros and cons (8.33% of all acknowledgement-oriented comments). 
In the weather enterprise, preemptive action and improving readiness to negative 
outcomes initially appear similar, but the focus group discussions revealed several 
distinctions.  Preempting uncertainty was defined in terms of preparing responses to 
anticipated events, whereas improving readiness was inherently associated with 
unanticipated events.  Improving readiness, which Lipshitz and Strauss (1997) define as 
developing “a general capability to respond to unanticipated negative developments,” 
was interpreted to refer to development of organizational policies to support uncertainty 
management and minimize negative outcomes.  Elements of readiness included regular 
forecaster training, allowing individuals to customize workstations, development of new 
decision support tools to overcome regional uncertainties, and setting policies in place 
to minimize risk. 
Participants discussed several degrees of preemption, ranging from testbed-
specific behaviors and operational practices at the individual and organizational levels.  
Only able to partially reduce uncertainty associated with unfamiliar guidance product 
interpretation, several forecasters recognized that they adjusted their warning thresholds 
to reduce missing flash flood events.  In the words of one participant, “I lowered my 
threshold.  So, I was issuing more products than I normally would back home.”  When 
asked about uncertain situations in an operational setting, discussions revealed the 
influence of socio-geographic factors on forecasting thresholds.  Despite the 
overarching mission to forecast weather regardless of location or anticipated impact, 
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infrastructure and sociological factors appeared to affect some decisions.  Summarized 
well by one participant: 
“As that level of severity increases, especially over an area where you know is, 
is a wilderness area, you kind of hit that threshold and say, “boom, I’m [going 
to] issue at this point.”  Whereas, like, that threshold is [going to] be a lot lower 
over a metropolitan area.  You’re [going to] be jumping on it right away.  There 
are a lot of other factors that are going into effect.” 
In this example of preemption, the forecaster adjusted her threshold to cope with the 
situational uncertainty.  While anticipating some type of negative outcome, the 
forecaster still recognized uncertainty surrounding the level of environmental response.  
This type of response was similar to policy-centered discussions; one participant 
discussed a forecasting policy unique to her home office that differed philosophically to 
other forecast offices.  According to the forecaster, her home office was not willing to 
accept uncertainties associated with local infrastructure, such as clogged drainage 
systems causing localized flooding.  Her office had developed a policy to issue a 
specialized statement to advise residents to expect heavy rainfall and localized ground-
based effects, but avoided issuing location-specific warnings about flooding.  This 
policy, leading to forecasts based heavily on rainfall observations, removed some 
situational uncertainty while providing the public with actionable information. 
Suppressing Uncertainty.  Although mentioned infrequently during focus group 
discussions, suppression did surface as a management tactic (9.32% of all uncertainty 
management comments).  Suppression tactics are characterized as activities that involve 
denial or unfounded rationalization in order to overcome stalled decision making 
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(Lipshitz & Strauss, 1997).  It is not uncommon to hear forecasters discussing decisions 
based upon “intuition.”  While challenging, distinguishing unfounded “intuition” from 
assumption-based mental simulations has implications on understanding uncertainty 
management; the distinction may lie in whether or not a forecaster possesses an 
adequate mental model for the situation at hand.  Three participants relayed stories 
about intuition-based forecasts made during the testbed.  In each case, it was understood 
that the uncertainty associated with the experimental guidance products and unfamiliar 
geographic domains overwhelmed the forecasters, leading them to base decisions on an 
insufficient level of situation awareness. 
Likewise, some participants acknowledged ignoring situational uncertainty on 
occasion.  Ignoring uncertainty was discussed particularly in the context of testbed 
forecasting activities.  When uncertainty was high, especially when it arose from lack of 
local knowledge, some participants built confidence from insufficient situational 
assessments.  While these decisions were partially informed, such comments revealed 
the occasional instance of acting with certainty without seeking additional data.  In one 
such case, one forecaster stated that they weren’t familiar with weather patterns in the 
eastern United States, so when they were asked to forecast there during HWT-Hydro, 
she used QPE guidance “as sort of gospel truth.”  Similarly, several participants 
acknowledged that gambles have a role in uncertainty management.  A different 
forecaster, citing geographic unfamiliarity, stated that when decision aids presented 
guidance values near a threshold, he “tended to side with the lower [values].  Just 
‘cause.”  Without being able to find information to reduce uncertainty and support a 
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deeper analysis of guidance products, forecasters risk increasing negative outcomes, 
such as misses and false alarm forecasts. 
Impact Characterizations in Forecasting Communications.  During the 
testbed, participants were instructed to include a new type of uncertainty estimate in 
their experimental forecasts.  With each experimental watch and warning, participants 
assigned a probability of a particular magnitude to their forecasts.  One aim of these 
impact characterizations was to communicate uncertainty to forecast end users.  In 
addition to exploring tactics for managing uncertainty, several focus group questions 
probed participants for feedback on positive and negative aspects of shifting towards 
such a paradigm. 
Findings on Magnitude Attributes.  Several themes emerged from the focus 
group responses regarding the inclusion of a magnitude estimate.  Overall, the 
experimental requirement to include a magnitude estimate was seen as a positive 
addition to forecast products.  Participants generally expressed a desire to have the 
ability to issue products with standardized text reflecting threat level in their operational 
office settings. 
Some forecasters discussed their wishes to be able to communicate their mental 
model to forecast end users.  Including an impact-based uncertainty statement was 
viewed as a means to such an end.  In regard to including the magnitude and uncertainty 
attributes in the experimental products, one forecaster stated: 
“We kind of do that in our head.  I think that’s very valuable information 
for the public, and having this nuisance or major, we’re in effect giving 
them that information that they would have never gotten before.” 
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Participants also identified the need for data-driven decision support systems in 
operational environments.  Including a magnitude estimate in a watch or warning was 
seen as a value-adding attribute that would help to provide actionable information that 
would help consumers like emergency managers to make informed decisions.  In the 
words of one participant:  
“It gives you the ability to quantify the anecdotal information.  If we’re 
doing a decision support service brief to emergency managers, you 
know, on that phone call, we’ll say… ‘this will be a widespread, minor 
flood event, or… it’s not going to happen everywhere, but if it does, it’s 
going to be really bad.’” 
While participants generally adopted a positive affect towards the magnitude 
uncertainty attributes, they did have some concerns about their design.  Themes related 
to professional interpretation challenges, concern for members of the general public, 
and training issues emerged from the discussions.  Some participants expressed concern 
that members of the public would have trouble interpreting both the probabilistic and 
magnitude components of the threat attributes.  Furthermore, participants repeatedly 
commented that they would expect to see disagreement at a professional level regarding 
interpretation of a nuisance versus a major flood.  The categorization was seen as 
subjective.  A commonly heard comment was that what may seem like a nuisance flood 
from a forecasting perspective may feel like a major impact to an individual affected by 
it.  As put by one forecaster, 
“If I get a foot of water in my basement and I’m the only one in 500 
miles that did… that’s a nuisance, but to me that’s major.” 
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Additional concerns tended to revolve around the lack of background experience in 
issuing magnitude uncertainty attributes.  Although some participants stated that they 
regularly considered threat levels and uncertainty when issuing forecasts, comments 
from other participants revealed that issuing the experimental attributes created a 
substantial challenge for some.  This may be due to a lack of probabilistic flash flood 
forecasting in operations and only a short training session on issuing products with the 
experimental attributes prior to the testbed. 
Findings on Probabilistic Information.  When asked specifically about the role 
of probabilities and factors that influence them in flash flood forecasting, positive-affect 
themes included mental model building, decision support services, and improved 
forecaster behavior.  Almost as a whole, participants commented that they often 
considered probabilistic information during operational forecasting.  While flash flood 
forecasting is not currently issued probabilistically, some participants suggested that 
they regularly consider the probability of a threat when before deciding to issue a watch 
or warning.  This is in line with the National Weather Service’s Directive 10-922, which 
creates thresholds for uncertainty that a forecaster must reach before issuing a watch or 
warning (National Weather Service, 2011).  The Directive, which requires that there 
must be a 50-80% chance of flash flooding before issuing a flash flood watch, among 
other requirements before issuing a flash flood warning, may have led to some bias in 
the experimental watch and warning products.  When asked to give an example of how 
a forecaster considered probabilistic information in forecasting, one participant 
responded: 
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“In issuing a product, [I] will always consider probabilities, because 
innately in the directive… you must have an eighty percent confidence 
for something in a warning, or a fifty percent confidence in it happening 
for a watch.  So that’s something you’re always considering.” 
Another recurring theme focused on how the experimental threat attributes 
assisted the participants in making fewer hedged forecasts.  Hedging, defined by 
Murphy (1978) as a forecast in which there is a “difference between a forecaster’s 
judgment and his forecast.”  Some HWT-Hydro participants felt that by being forced to 
consider the uncertainty and assign a magnitude uncertainty attribute to each watch and 
warning, their ability to hedge was reduced; generally, this was a desirable outcome. 
Study II Discussion and Recommendations 
The testbed study was the first to incorporate uncertainty attributes into the 
forecast decision making process. While requiring further research to determine 
appropriately designed experimental threat attributes, they show promise in their ability 
to communicate forecaster SA to end users.  When asked whether or not the magnitude 
and probabilistic categories were appropriate, participants felt that the probabilistic 
levels were fine for their current forecasting skill level when using the experimental 
FLASH tools, but it could be useful to have a scale with smaller intervals for 
operational forecasting.  To address this concern, future iterations of the hydrology 
testbed experiment will allow forecasters to select probabilities at thresholds spaced one 
percentage point apart. 
From an evaluation standpoint, it was very difficult to separate probability from 
magnitude in the discussion.  Both were so closely linked that it was difficult to get a 
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clear picture of how probability and magnitude were chosen separately.  In addition, 
probability thresholds for major and nuisance flooding changed based on environment 
and socio-geographic constructs.  Participants discussed differences in probabilistic 
thresholds that they needed to reach in order to issue warnings over rural and urban 
areas. 
Based on responses from the focus groups, three recommendations were 
developed for the future of flash flood forecasting and decision making research.  With 
regard to the development of impact- and uncertainty-based forecast products, 
participants expressed the need for consistent, actionable terminology, and a 
standardized scale for flood threat level.  Participants pointed out that terminology often 
varies when forecasting for river floods, areal floods, and flash floods.  Although the 
HWT-Hydro focused entirely on flash floods, the participants generally worked in 
professional roles that required them to issue warnings for other types of flood threats as 
well.  A unified flood forecasting system requires consistent terminology to facilitate 
communication between actors in the weather response system. 
Testbed participants also indicated that the term “nuisance flooding” was 
difficult to define from a scientific and a social perspective.  There is a great need for 
future research to address best practices with regard to what type and quantity of 
information should be shared with different types of forecast consumers.  For example, 
an emergency manager may be able to make a more informed decision after receiving a 
magnitude uncertainty attribute issued alongside a warning polygon, but an individual 
in a different role may interpret this type of information differently.  
	165 
Although some forecasters stated that they do discuss potential impacts with 
forecast end users, there is currently no standardized method of communicating such 
risks to forecast end users.  Initiatives such as Impact-Based Warnings (IBW) have 
experimented with the design of text-based forecast products that contain information 
related to potential impacts.  An evaluation of IBWs for tornado threats revealed that up 
to a certain threshold, including possible impacts in the text product increased the 
likelihood that an individual would take protective action (Ripberger, Silva, Jenkins-
Smith, & James, 2014).  Furthermore, following a severe thunderstorm in Abilene, 
Texas in which an IBW was issued operationally, Guerrero, Myers, Lyons, Dunn, and 
Johnson (2015) found that the additional impacts-oriented text gave members of the 
public actionable information that lessened confusion and clarified the level of risk. 
Lastly, future work is needed to develop a scale for flash flood forecasting 
impacts.  Unlike the Enhanced Fujita Scale for tornado threats, there is no scale 
available for use by National Weather Service forecasters for communicating flash 
flood threat level.  The nuisance and major flood categorizations used in the magnitude 
attributes in HWT-Hydro attempted to provide a basic structure for flood threat.  
However, additional research into scientifically and socially appropriate threat levels 
would be of great benefit to the forecasting community and society at large. 
General Discussion 
 The purpose of this study was twofold.  First, we aimed to identify SA 
requirements for flash flood forecasting and their evolution over temporal and 
environmental activity scales.  Second, we used the mixed methods approach to explore 
situation assessment during flash flood forecasting.  In the first study, we used a 
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quantitative approach to assess SA requirements for flash flood warning decisions.  In 
the second study, we employed a qualitative, focus group approach in order to 
categorize tactics regularly used for managing uncertainty.  Originally, we hypothesized 
that SA requirements would differ between the watch and warning issuance timeframes, 
as measured by the time and frequency of guidance usage.  We also expected to observe 
differences in SA requirements between forecast periods with varying levels of 
environmental activity.  In relation to understanding uncertainty management in 
situation assessment, we hypothesized that tactics used by forecasters would align with 
the R.A.W.F.S. heuristic described by Lipshitz and Strauss (1997). 
The mixed methods approach may have been a novel approach to these research 
questions, but comparing between the two datasets allowed us to make new inferences 
about the relationship among uncertainty, situation assessment, and decision making in 
weather forecasting.  Alone, the focus groups and thematic analysis add to existing 
knowledge about decision making, situation assessment, and uncertainty management.  
In combination with the quantitative SA requirements analysis, though, the qualitative 
data is enhanced with empirical evidence.  Viewed together, we are able to draw 
conclusions about the role of technology in uncertainty management and situation 
assessment. 
Situation Assessment in Weather Forecasting 
 Situation assessment in weather forecasting is a dynamic process that is 
influenced by individual, organizational, and technological factors.  The thematic 
analysis grounded the SA requirements analysis by contextualizing situation assessment 
in the broader scope of the entire forecast decision making process.  Focus group 
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participants described weather prediction as a process in which forecasters attempt to 
understand the environmental situation by assessing information sources, initially in 
order to understand the broad context and then through focused attention on at-risk 
geographic areas.  These activities can be viewed as part of the situation assessment 
process that precedes the action selection and implementation process.  Action selection 
and situation assessment shared several aspects in common; both processes involved 
recognition-primed decision making and were influenced by individual factors such as 
background experience and risk tolerance. 
 This description of the forecast decision making process aligned with accounts 
found elsewhere in the literature.  Although not framed in terms of situation awareness, 
Morss and Ralph (2007) presented a procedural model of forecaster decision making 
and suggested that forecasters assimilate information gained from individual 
knowledge, model guidance, observational data, and interpersonal communication as 
inputs into the forecast decision.  Similarly, Doswell (2004) framed forecasting as a 
cycle of diagnosis and prognosis.  In relation to Endsley’s (1995c) model of situation 
awareness, diagnosis may be equivalent to Level 1 (perception) and Level 2 
(comprehension) SA, while prognosis may be similar to Level 3 SA (projection).  From 
a macrocognitive perspective, Trafton and Hoffman (2007) suggested that forecasting 
begins with an action queue, using iterative situation assessment and recognition-
primed decision making to build mental models and situation awareness, culminating in 
action selection. 
The thematic analysis findings not only corresponded with these representations, 
but they also provided evidence that bridged procedural and macrocognitive models of 
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weather forecasting.  In addition to gathering qualitative descriptions of the forecasting 
process, one of the study’s main contributions was the identification of situation 
awareness requirements for dynamic comprehension and projection of flash flooding 
situations.  During the testbed, we observed that forecasters relied on different guidance 
products between watch and warning issuance stages, which confirmed the timeframe 
hypothesis.  More surprisingly, the observations confirmed differences in SA 
requirements as environmental activity level increased.  This deferral of situation 
assessment from high-activity days to low-activity days suggests that SA requirements 
may be satisfied over a long-term forecasting period, such as several days or even 
weeks. 
Testbed participants did not possess local knowledge for all the geographic 
locations they issued forecasts over during the study, and the time study results 
indicated that they consulted more products related to understanding geography and 
initial conditions on low-activity days.  It is possible that SA requirements, such as 
information on local geography, can be deferred to low-activity days.  Going forward, 
this may inform the design of additional forecast decision making studies that are 
involved in studying guidance usage. 
Uncertainty Management Techniques 
Despite being a useful construct in many domains, some accounts of situation 
awareness and situation assessment are limited when they are applied to complex 
decision making domains that involve uncertainty (Minotra & Burns, 2015).  In the 
weather forecasting domain, understanding forecaster techniques for coping with 
uncertainty may have theoretical implications for understanding SA, and practical 
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implications in terms of decision support development.  In the present study, we sought 
to identify how forecasters cope with uncertainty in situation assessment, and in turn, 
how such uncertainty affected the whole decision making process.  
Doswell (2004) suggests that forecasters incorporate uncertainty into decision 
making by combining progressive, intentional, and logical analysis with the reverse: 
intuition.  While this framework captures the broader essence of forecast decision 
making, the mixed methods study provided insight into the factors and processes at 
work within Doswell’s (2004) two modes.  In the thematic analysis, we examined the 
focus group discussions through the theoretical lens provided by the R.A.W.F.S. 
heuristic (Lipshitz & Strauss, 1997).  The thematic analysis revealed that forecast 
decision making to be a function of several factors, and that forecasters manage 
situational uncertainty through a number of individual and organizational management 
tactics.  Forecasters discussed employing reduction tactics on an individual and group 
basis, as well as suppression methods, though to a lesser degree.  Organizational policy 
and best practices provided context for individual-level forecasting decisions, and focus 
group participants often framed these policies in a way that aligned with Lipshitz and 
Strauss’s (1997) definition of uncertainty acknowledgement. 
Although Lipshitz and Strauss (1997) originally discussed the R.A.W.F.S. 
heuristic as it related to militaristic decision making, we suggest that the heuristic may 
be generalizable to the complex domain of weather forecasting.  Here, we found that 
forecasters regularly discussed using reduction tactics, including goal-directed 
information collection, decisions based on organizational norms, soliciting guidance 
from colleagues and technology, and forestalling when necessary.  Interestingly, several 
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reduction-oriented tactics align with behaviors observed in naturalistic decision making 
studies of weather forecasters (Kirschenbaum, 2004; Trafton, 2004; Trafton & 
Hoffman, 2007).  In Lipshitz and Strauss’s (1997) tactical framework, assumption-
based reasoning refers to uncertainty reduction via use of a mental model based on 
constrained beliefs and evidence related to the situation.  Following the testbed, focus 
group participants were aware of practicing such behavior while forecasting. 
Several mechanisms and factors may relate to forecaster cognition and 
uncertainty management.  Assumption-based reasoning is linked to the creation and 
implementation of a mental model.  Trafton (2004) suggested that weather forecasters 
develop qualitative mental models that permit the forecaster to draw inferences 
dynamically about the environment.  In the present study, the quantitative results 
reflected the differences in information sources needed to build SA and a mental model 
of the situation.  Trafton and Hoffman (2007) found that forecasters develop their 
mental models by using spatial transformations to synthesize spatial-temporal 
information into a refined understanding of the situation; working with forecasters, they 
identified that the most frequent type of spatial transformation was comparison between 
information sources.  One of the emergent themes from the thematic analysis focused 
on the centrality of comparison in understanding the broader situation and specific 
threats.   
It is also been suggested that expertise plays a large role in uncertainty 
management.  In a study of military tactical commanders, St John, Callan, Proctor, and 
Holste (2000) varied situational uncertainty and found that inexperienced participants 
employed a “wait-and-see” tactic more often than experienced participants.  While 
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focus group discussions did reflect that forestalling a decision was an accepted tactic for 
forecasters, it was less frequently mentioned that other tactics.  Participants in the 
present study were balanced in terms of expertise, but naturalistic decision making 
accounts may provide insight into situation assessment through explanations of 
recognition-primed decision making.  In its basic form, pattern recognition and 
recognition-primed decisions are closely aligned, but as situational uncertainty 
increases, decision makers must rely upon mental models and mental simulations.  
Expertise governs a decision maker’s ability to perform successfully in these activities 
(Lipshitz et al., 2001).  Participants in the present study possessed relatively equal levels 
of forecasting experience and exposure to the experimental decision aids, which may 
explain infrequent references to forestalling tactics. 
Theoretical Contributions to Understanding Uncertainty and SA 
 The mixed methods study produced several findings that extend Endsley’s 
(1995c) Model of SA to decision making under uncertainty.  Some findings directly 
align with several components of the model, whereas other findings provide insight into 
less-explained aspects of situation assessment. 
The focus group discussions reflected the influences of background experience, 
system design, and risk tolerance on forecasting.  Endsley (1995c) proposed that SA 
consists of three levels (perception, comprehension, and projection) and that SA is 
influenced by task/system factors (e.g. interface design, stress, workload, and 
automation) and individual factors (e.g. goals and preconceptions, expertise, and long 
term memory).  Forecasters described their assessment and prediction process in 
alignment with the three levels of SA.  Perception occurred as forecasters sought 
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information and consulted guidance products, while comparing between and within 
guidance products developed comprehension.  Confidence in projections increased as 
situational uncertainty decreased. 
Endsley (1995c) framed SA as an in-the-head model of the current situation, 
which when compared to a global mental model, can facilitate recognition-primed 
decision making.  Endsley (1995c) also suggested that, over time, operators build and 
refine new mental models as SA is developed in new contexts, and that decision makers 
actively partake in goal-directed information assessment.  During the experimental 
watch and warning issuance activity, forecaster behavior not only reflected SA 
requirements, but also provided additional evidence to support the role of goals in SA.  
Operator goals, such as “determine if risk is high enough for a warning,” are part of top-
down processing, in which goals and preconceptions direct the forecaster’s attention 
when searching for information to reduce uncertainty and build SA.  Bottom-up 
processing was also discussed in the focus groups; as forecasters detected anomalies in 
the environmental activity, such observations would in turn guide information seeking.  
The quantitative results also support this; guidance products were often used in 
comparison activities, one of the most common spatial transformations (Kirschenbaum, 
2004; Trafton & Hoffman, 2007).  For example, a forecaster may have observed that the 
QPE-to-FFG ratio levels exceeded 150% in a certain region, which then prompted them 
to assess other guidance products over that same region.   
 While many of the present study’s findings concurred with existing theory, they 
also extend current explanations of SA and the forecasting process under uncertainty.  
In the original model, Endsley (1995c) conceptually acknowledged that uncertainty 
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affected decision maker confidence, which in turn could affect decision outcomes.  
Based on the mixed methods findings, we suggest that forecasters cope with uncertainty 
through reduction, acknowledgement, and suppression techniques, as framed in the 
R.A.W.F.S. heuristic by Lipshitz and Strauss (1997).  When time permitted, forecasters 
actively sought additional information to reduce their uncertainty.  Furthermore, 
discussions revealed that organizational policies were often in place within operational 
offices to reduce the effects of potentially negative outcomes related to decisions made 
under uncertainty.  However, when uncertainty existed even after reduction and 
acknowledgement, discussions revealed that suppression did occur.  Such tactics 
allowed forecasters to build a dynamic situational model that accounted for potential 
alternative scenarios as well as the most likely outcome.  Indeed, forecasters appeared 
to be most concerned with the effects of uncertainty on their projections (Level 3 SA) 
and their ability to comprehend the environmental and atmospheric situation (Level 2 
SA).   
Limitations 
This work resulted in several insights into SA and decision making under 
uncertainty in flash flood forecasting.  Nevertheless, a number of limitations exist that 
must be considered when drawing conclusions from the data.  The focus group sample 
size was smaller than has been recommended in the literature (Caplan, 1990), with only 
four participants at most per group.  One of the main concerns with a small sample is 
group proclivity towards a single, dominant opinion, leading to difficulties in 
stimulating new discussion.  As it were, conversational themes identified in the thematic 
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analysis aligned with theoretical accounts of uncertainty management and forecast 
decision making, so we believe that the sample size was sufficient. 
In a departure from other studies related to SA and decision making, we did not 
look at each participant’s level of SA, but instead at their information requirements on 
the assumption that they were building SA.  While we did not assess decision making 
using traditional Naturalistic Decision Making methods, we were concerned with 
observing forecasters “in situ” and understanding forecaster behavior in their own 
words.  In Study I, we assumed that the presence of a guidance product on the computer 
screen equated to it being used by the forecaster.  This assumption meant that guidance 
products were recorded even if the forecaster did not consciously extract information 
from them.  However, we hypothesized that a tool’s presence in the periphery may have 
subtly affected judgment.  While the method did not produce the same degree of 
accuracy as a method like eye tracking would have, this was tempered by measuring the 
time each participant spent viewing each of the products.  
More critically, the Study I analysis was limited in that the several of the 
sampled videos had visual quality issues.  In the majority of the screen recordings taken 
by participants working at the dual-monitor workstations, the software only produced 
interpretable recordings of one of the two monitors.  As a result, although participants 
viewed guidance products on both monitors, we intentionally sampled recordings in 
which information was not only legible, but in which most of the interaction occurred on 
the visible portion of the screen.  A similar issue that we were not able to work around 
was that participants regularly brought in tablet computers and personal laptops, which 
they used to consult unofficial forecasting guidance products over the internet. 
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Summary 
The primary goal of this study was to explore the relationship among situation 
assessment, uncertainty management, and decision support tool usage in weather 
forecasting.  Through the mixed methods analysis, we were able to provide examples of 
certain links between theoretical accounts of SA and of uncertainty management.  The 
quantitative results supported the hypothesis that SA requirements differ for decisions 
in the watch and warning timeframes as well as at increasing levels of environmental 
activity.  Adding to previous explanations of forecast guidance usage in flash flood 
forecasting, the present findings indicate that hydrology-based guidance products may 
provide information, that when used in combination with other decision support tools, 
can improve forecaster SA.  Focus group discussions with professional forecasters 
revealed that uncertainty management techniques identified by NDM studies in other 
domains are also practiced in weather forecasting. 
Uncertainty management and risk reduction in the weather domain has 
previously been attributed to emergency managers’ actions (Morss et al. 2015).  This 
study demonstrates that risk reduction is part of the weather forecaster’s purview as 
well.  It is evident that uncertainty management is an integral part of situation 
assessment, and that comprehension of uncertainty in the forecast process can improve 
overall SA.  In order to further assess the relationship between forecast uncertainty and 
SA, future work should assess SA levels of forecasters while using guidance products.  
Understanding the effects of uncertainty on SA and forecast decision outcomes will not 
only illuminate how uncertainty propagates throughout the weather enterprise, but it 
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will also contribute increased knowledge into SA development among individuals in 
complex systems. 
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Chapter 5: Automation and Situation Awareness in Flash Flood Forecasting 
Introduction 
During weather prediction activities, forecasters actively seek information 
through top-down and bottom-up processes in order to establish situation awareness 
(SA) (Hoffman & Coffey, 2004; Trafton & Hoffman, 2007).  As decision support tools 
become more complex, it will be important to consider their ability to combat 
information overload while improving forecast lead-time and decision making.  Recent 
efforts have studied algorithms to automate part of the forecasting process; some 
researchers have proposed the development of weather forecasting recommender 
systems, a guidance product that would create an initial threat polygon based on 
predictions from a collection of weather prediction models (Karstens et al., 2015). 
Until recently, recommender systems have had relatively little attention in 
weather prediction.  However, they have had more traction in commercial domains, 
such as e-commerce and tourism (Braunhofer, Elahi, Ricci, & Schievenin, 2013; Burke, 
2002).  In these settings, recommender systems use prediction algorithms to classify 
items then “recommend” them to potential consumers.  These algorithms can be based 
on attributes including user demographics, preferences, or through collaborative 
filtering between the system and the user (Burke, 2002).  Recommender systems reduce 
a large amount of data based on user preferences or contextual information, which may 
help to improve information overload during the decision making process.  In weather 
forecasting recommender systems, the intention is that the system would essentially 
automate the situation assessment process.  The model-based algorithm would automate 
a “first pass” through situation assessment.  Like recommender systems in commercial 
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applications, forecast recommenders are intended to reduce forecaster workload while 
improving lead time and situation awareness (Karstens et al., 2015).  Although Karstens 
et al. (2015) found that early designs of severe hail recommenders did not significantly 
reduce the amount of time it took to issue a warning, it was hypothesized that 
recommenders played a role in the decision making process. 
Previous research has found that an appropriate level of automation for the 
context in question may improve operator workload, confidence, SA, and performance 
(Endsley & Kiris, 1995; Parasuraman & Riley, 1997; Parasuraman & Wickens, 2008; 
Wickens, 2008).  However, some studies have shown that a high degree of automation 
can lead to out-of-the-loop decision making, which can reduce an operator’s situation 
awareness (Dao et al., 2009; Endsley & Kiris, 1995).  Out-of-the-loop situations occur 
when an operator is removed from the decision process and must rely on external actors 
to make decisions, which can lead to decrements in overall awareness as well as task 
performance (Endsley & Kiris, 1995; Kaber & Endsley, 1997).  Furthermore, 
Parasuraman and Riley (1997) cautioned against improper use of automation, citing 
instances in which performance suffered from overuse, underuse, or inappropriate use 
of automated systems.  
The previous chapters of this dissertation have established that developing 
situation awareness can be affected by display attributes and uncertainty ingrained in 
decision support systems.  In the present chapter, we extend our understanding of SA in 
weather forecasting further by exploring the relationship between automated decision 
aids and SA.  The recommender algorithm design for weather forecasting was outside 
the scope of this study; instead, we focused on understanding how their presence acted 
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as a mechanism for directing forecaster attention during weather prediction tasks.  In the 
following chapter, we discuss the results from an experiment that assessed the effects of 
recommender use on forecaster SA in a flash flood prediction task. 
The Research Questions 
 Automation in the workplace affects task performance and decision-making 
within a variety of domains (Dao et al., 2009; Endsley & Kiris, 1995).  Recommender 
systems, a newcomer in the weather forecasting domain, may have potential to reduce 
time-consuming situation assessment activities within the forecasting process.  While 
some evidence exists to suggest that early versions of recommender systems may not 
significantly reduce forecaster workload, we hypothesized that recommenders would 
affect situation assessment and forecasters’ levels of SA during a flash flood forecasting 
task.  In line with this hypothesis, the primary objective of this research was to explore 
the relationship between recommender usage and SA (RQ3.1). 
RQ3.1:  How is SA influenced by recommender automation at different 
processing levels during a weather forecasting task? 
 In order to assess SA during recommender use, we employed an eye tracking 
system to capture data related to participants’ information-seeking behaviors.  To date, 
the literature contains only a small number of studies that intersect eye tracking, 
weather forecasting, and situation awareness.  As such, the secondary research aim was 
to evaluate the relationship between eye tracking measures and SA.  In what we believe 
is the first reported case study that employed eye tracking to assess a weather forecaster, 
Bowden, Heinselman, and Kang (2016) established that eye tracking provided insight 
into the forecast decision process.  Eye tracking has only recently been identified as a 
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feasible method for SA assessment; existing work suggests a positive relationship 
between eye tracking measures, SA, and decision making (Moore & Gugerty, 2010; 
Sturre, Chiappe, Vu, & Strybel, 2015; van de Merwe, van Dijk, & Zon, 2012; Yu, 
Wang, Li, & Braithwaite, 2014).  In a study of air traffic controllers, Moore and 
Gugerty (2010) found that participants with high levels of SA fixated on relevant areas 
of the information display more frequently than their counterparts with lower SA.  
Likewise, we aim to assess the predictive power of eye tracking measures in relation to 
SA in flash flood forecasting (RQ3.2). 
RQ3.2:  To what degree are eye tracking measures (total fixation duration, 
mean fixation time percentage, time to first fixation, and mean number of 
fixations) able to predict situation awareness? 
Hypotheses 
 The present study assessed situation awareness along five metrics: response 
accuracy to an SA questionnaire, evaluation time (the amount of time spent reviewing 
the display), mean count of eye fixations, total fixation duration per area of interest 
(AOI) within the display, and percentage of total fixation duration per AOI.  We 
evaluated participants’ SA based on responses to probes; from these, we determined 
participants’ SA scores at Endsley’s (1995c) three theoretical levels and as a composite 
score based on the mean of the sublevel scores.  This resulted in four scores: SALevel 1, 
SALevel 2, SALevel 3, and SAcomp.  Based on findings from Moore and Gugerty (2010), we 
hypothesized that decision support automation would affect the dependent variables, as 
listed: 
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H3.1: Situation Awareness Score (SA) 
H0: SAavailable = SAunavailable   H1:  SAavailable ≠ SAunavailable  
H3.2:  Mean task duration (t) 
H0: tavailable = tunavailable    H1: tavailable < tunavailable 
H3.3: Mean number of eye fixations (n) 
H0: navailable = nunavailable   H1: navailable > nunavailable 
H3.4: Total fixation duration by AOI (Fd) 
H0: Fd , available = Fd , unavailable  H1: Fd , available ≠ Fd , unavailable 
We expected to identify a difference between automation conditions in probe 
accuracy.  In line with findings by Endsley and Kiris (1995), it is hypothesized that 
Level 2 SA (comprehension) will be most affected by automation level.  As one 
premise was that recommenders would guide forecaster attention to areas of high risk, 
we also hypothesized that recommenders would lead to higher scores on the Level 3 SA 
(projection) probes in the scenarios where recommenders were available. 
In terms of task duration, we hypothesized that the availability of recommenders 
would lead to a reduction over the condition where recommenders were not available; 
this was expected partially because recommenders are designed to reduce lead-time.  
Karstens et al. (2015) found no significant difference between warning issuance times 
based on recommender presence and absence; however, they based their evaluation on 
polygon creation time, whereas the present study evaluated situation assessment.  The 
present study was concerned only with situation awareness, and so removed the aspect 
of action performance from the experimental equation.  Although current evidence does 
not support the suggestion that recommenders may reduce issuance time, in the present 
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study, it was expected that presence of the recommender polygons would lead to 
forecasters spending less time engaging in situation assessment. 
In terms of eye tracking metrics, we hypothesized that automation level would 
affect the number of eye fixations as well as total fixation duration within the display 
panel containing the recommenders.  While lower task durations were anticipated in the 
recommender-available condition, a higher number of eye fixations were expected in 
the recommender-available condition.  This expectation was due to the recommenders 
providing additional visual stimuli and thus attracting participant attention.  
Additionally, we hypothesized that the greatest number of eye fixations and fixation 
durations would occur in the quadrant of the four-panel information display that 
contained the recommender polygons.  We also assessed first fixation time within an 
AOI and scanning patterns across the display, but lack hypotheses due the descriptive 
nature of the parameters. 
Method 
Participants 
 The sample consisted of eighteen professional forecasters recruited from 
Weather Forecast Offices, River Forecaster Centers, and other National Weather 
Service Centers in the central United States.  Participants had to be 18 years or older as 
well as currently employed by the National Weather Service (NWS).  Furthermore, 
participants must either have held a professional forecasting role at the time of the study 
or prior to it.  Due to the nature of the decision aids, it was preferable, though not 
necessary, for forecasters to work primarily in hydrologic forecasting. 
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Participants represented a diverse set of roles within the National Weather 
Service.  Of the eighteen participants, eleven held roles as active forecasters (six in 
general forecasting and five specifically in hydrological forecasting).  The remaining 
seven participants held current roles as forecasting and research support staff, but had 
held a forecasting position within the NWS prior to the experiment.  Participants had a 
mean of 19.3 years of professional weather forecasting experience (σ = 7.95).  Some 
participants had less experience related to hydrologic forecasting (µ = 14.6 years, σ = 
7.25); however, all but one participant had responsibility for hydrologic forecasts at 
some point throughout their careers.  Finally, participants brought a range of geographic 
knowledge to the experiment; Figure 20 presents the spread of forecaster experience 
across the United States.  Several participants had previously worked in each of the 
 
Figure 20. Map representation of the number of participants with professional 
forecasting experience per River Forecast Center region in the continental United 
States	
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forecast areas selected in the scenarios and so may have had a more detailed mental 
model of the region than other participants.  
Scenario Selection 
The method employed a set of scenarios displayed with and without 
recommenders.  A set of three scenarios were selected from flash floods reported in the 
NOAA Storm Data publication and from cases that occurred during the 2015 
Hydrometeorological Testbed Experiment.  Only flash floods that occurred in May - 
July 2015 were selected.  The following three cases were selected: 
A. 31 May 2015 21:30 UTC – 1 June 2015 01:30 UTC; New Jersey 
B. 12 July 2015 06:00 UTC – 10:00 UTC; Central and Southern Indiana  
C. 14 July 2015 19:00 UTC – 23:00 UTC; West Virginia and Ohio Valley 
Each scenario consisted of a four-hour timespan in which flooding ramped up 
and persisted through the end.  Timeframes were chosen to coincide with the valid 
times of operational flash flood warnings issued by local Weather Forecast Offices.  In 
addition to an operational warning present, historical reports from United States 
Geological Survey (USGS) stream gages were assessed during the scenario timeframes.  
Selecting scenarios that overlapped with gages that reached flood stage provided a more 
objective way to verify existence of a flash flood than selecting timeframes based on 
NWS verified storm reports alone.  Furthermore, while it was required for at least one 
stream gage to reach flood stage in a scenario, not all gages in the region did; this 
allowed for an evaluation of inaccurate risk assessment. 
Scenarios were divided into two-hour halves, shown in 15-minute time steps, 
with the exception of the radar, which updated every 2 minutes.  Recommender 
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presence was assigned randomly to each trial; half of each scenario was visualized with 
recommenders and the other half without.  The guidance products, shown in Figure 21 
and described in Table 12, were presented by running the Advanced Weather 
Interactive Processing System II (AWIPS-II), a computer visualization display 
platform, through a virtual network in order to display it on the eye tracker’s monitor.  
Participants were not permitted to change the arrangement of the decision aids, the type 
of decision aids, or the color palettes of the decision aids.  However, they were allowed 
to zoom and pan across the visualizations. 
Recommender Development 
Eventually, recommenders will be created through an algorithm that combines 
outputs of multiple tools; however, at the time of this study, such strides had not been 
made for flash flood recommenders.  In order to test the effects of a recommender, then, 
a preliminary version of a recommender was created.  The recommender algorithm in 
 
Figure 21. Example of the AWIPS-II four panel interface visualizing Scenario 3 
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the present study is based on a threshold metric: a user can select a forecasting decision 
aid as well as a numerical threshold based on the values the selected aid can predict.  
For this study, the QPE-to-FFG Ratio guidance product provided the underlying model 
because it was the most traditional tool for flash flood prediction used in the 
experiment.  A threshold of 100% was selected, and the algorithm was then applied to 
the forecasting visualization.  Represented on the map as white polygons, the 
recommenders were created by drawing contours around all regions contained within an 
area of at least 10 square kilometers of grid cells modeled at or above the threshold 
value. 
Figure 22 shows an example of the recommenders created for the second 
scenario.  During the experimental trials, the recommenders were always visualized in 
the same quadrant of the AWIPS-II display as the CREST unit streamflow 
Table 12. Description of guidance products used in the present study 
Decision Aid (Abbreviation) Units Description 
CREST Unit Streamflow (USF) m3s-1km-2 Simulated surface water flows 
normalized by drainage area, 
selected from a span of 0.5 – 6 
hours after the valid time 
Precipitation Return Period (RP) Years Generates a return period based 
on precipitation rate and 
historical return periods. Higher 
return periods correspond to 
higher likelihood of flooding. 
QPE-to-FFG Ratio (FFG) N/A Calculates ratio by comparing 
Flash Flood Guidance grid 
values against MRMS radar 
precipitation rates.  Bankfull 
conditions may exist when the 
ratio exceeds 1.0. 
MRMS Composite Reflectivity 
(MRMS) 
dBZ Mosaic of reflectivity values 
measured by MRMS radars 
across the CONUS. 	
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visualization.  This placement allowed for a more meaningful usage of the threshold-
contouring recommender; placing the QPE-to-FFG Ratio recommender over its own 
base product would have merely resulted in a highlighting the regions already 
represented as “at-risk” by the color scale.  Transposing the QPE-to-FFG recommenders 
into the CREST unit streamflow map theoretically would allow participants to assess 
the overlap in risk between the two decision aids. 
Data Collection Systems 
The present study used a Tobii TX300 eye tracking system to collect the 
physiological data.  In addition to eye tracking methods, a set of probes assessed 
situation awareness across the three theoretical levels.  A presentation technique, 
modeled after that used by Dao et al. (2009), was chosen for the present study.  Pointing 
to the limitations of SAGAT in terms of working memory capacity and SPAM in terms 
of recall versus true SA, Dao et al. (2009) presented three probes between short 
 
Figure 22. Recommenders in the Indiana scenario 
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simulations; the present work extended this technique to the weather forecasting 
domain.  Probes assessed SA in alignment with the theoretical definitions proposed in 
the Endsley 1995 Model of SA, which frames SA in terms of perception, 
comprehension, and projection of environmental status into the future.  In line with this 
framework, probes assessed participant awareness of information in the past (the 
information contained within the first 1.5 hours worth of data scans), the present (the 
final frame of data scans), and the future (expectations of flooding in the following two 
hours).  A complete list of the probes and a copy of the scoring guide can be found in 
Appendix E. 
Experimental Design 
 The study used a single-factor, within-subjects design that assessed the effects of 
automation use on situation awareness in flash flood forecasting.  All participants 
received exposure to both of the treatment conditions.  Scenarios were presented in a 
semi-random order, with probe order and automation condition also randomly 
presented.  Automation was present in two levels (availability or unavailability of 
recommenders).  Dependent variables were captured during the procedure: eye fixation 
count, total fixation duration, percentage of fixation duration within an AOI, SA score, 
and task duration.  
Procedure 
 Upon arrival, participants received an explanation of the study’s goals and 
activities.  Participants read through a brief training guide on the forecasting tools, and 
were given an opportunity to ask questions. Following the training, participants 
received the prompt that they had just begun their shift and a significant rainfall event 
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was underway.  A hypothetical colleague needed them to review the prior two hours of 
model data and radar scans in order to identify areas of highest flash flooding risk.  
Participants prefaced each scenario by reading a short briefing on the status of the 
environment leading up to the two-hour span contained in the scenario.  Briefings were 
selected from operationally issued heavy rainfall watches, flash flood 
watches/warnings, and mesoscale discussions produced by the Storm Prediction Center.  
An example briefing can be found in Appendix F.  
Following the briefing, participants took part in the randomly presented 
scenarios.  During each trial, participants viewed the AWIPS-II four-panel display 
showing each of the different weather forecasting decision aids.  In the recommenders 
unavailable condition, the decision aids appeared with no alterations, but in the 
recommenders available condition, the recommenders were shown as white polygons 
overlaid on the upper-left quadrant of the display.  Although participants could view the 
recommenders in the recommenders available condition, they were not constantly on 
the screen; due to technical constraints, the recommenders only appeared during the 
timestamp that they referenced.  Thus, even in the available condition, participants were 
not always able to see the recommenders.  The two experimental conditions were 
distinguished from each other in that in one, participants could choose to use the 
recommenders, whereas in the other, they were not given the option.  Participants were 
allowed up to seven minutes to assess the state of the environment. 
 During each scenario, the Tobii TX300 eye tracker captured eye fixations and 
fixation times.  In between each scenario, participants answered six probes, classified 
into one of the three SA processing levels (perception, comprehension, and projection).  
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Following the first set of probes, participants viewed the second half of the scenario 
with the reverse automation condition and the same instructions.  At the end of the 
second half, participants answered another six probes.  This process repeated for each of 
the three scenarios.  Following the data collection, participants completed a background 
experience questionnaire and were debriefed.  The experiment took 1 to 1.5 hours to 
complete. 
Results and Analysis 
 At the end of each of the six scenarios, participants completed a six-item 
questionnaire that followed the modified SAGAT protocol; display screens were frozen 
and made blank while participants attempted to answer questions related to perception, 
comprehension, and projection based on the information they had seen.  For each 
participant and simulation, we calculated an accuracy-based score for SA at Level 1, 
Level 2, Level 3, and as a mean composite of overall SA.  In addition to SA scores, we 
also measured the task duration, or amount of time a participant spent completing each 
scenario.  The eye tracking measures also produced a wealth of data, and provided 
insight into participants’ behavior related to information scanning patterns. 
The composite scores satisfied the assumptions of normality (W = 0.9759, p = 
0.05406) and constant variance (Fligner-Killeen χ2 = 0.2208, p = 0.6384).  However, 
while the individual SA level scores satisfied the constant variance assumption (Fligner-
Killeen χ2Level 1 = 1.0599, pLevel 1 = 0.3032; χ2Level 2 = 0.3781, pLevel 2 = 0.5386; χ2Level 3 = 
0.0116, pLevel 3 = 0.9142), none of the level scores satisfied normality (WLevel 1 = 0.8797, 
pLevel 1 < 0.001; WLevel 2 = 0.9715, pLevel 2 = 0.02426; WLevel 3 = 0.9449, pLevel 3 < 0.001). 
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 In the recommenders-unavailable (control) condition, participants had a mean 
composite SA score of 33.59%, whereas participants had a mean composite score of 
32.81% in the recommenders-available condition.  Figures 23 and 24 present the 
distribution of SA scores (mean, Level 1, Level 2, and Level 3) between SA levels and 
automation condition, respectively.  With a further reduced sample to ensure a balanced 
dataset (n = 12), a paired two-tailed t-test failed to identify a significant difference in 
composite score performance between the recommender-present (µ = 0.32, σ = 0.09) 
and recommender-absent condition (µ = 0.31, σ = 0.11),  t(11) = 0.22, p = 0.83.  While 
the composite (mean) SA score measure was normally distributed, the individual level 
scores were not.  Accordingly, the Wilcoxon Rank-Sum test did not find any significant 
differences in performance between recommender conditions in the Level 1 score (W = 
1381.5, p = 0.8498), Level 2 score (W = 1441.6, p = 0.5621), or Level 3 score (W = 
1357.5, p = 0.9741).  This suggests that recommender condition neither significantly 
affected a forecaster’s overall nor sublevel SA. 
 
 
 
Figure 23. Boxplots showing the distribution of SA scores across performance levels 
and between automation levels 
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Task Duration 
 To address the task duration hypothesis, which posited that task duration in the 
experimental condition would differ from that of the control condition, we compared 
the mean task durations using a paired two-tailed t-test for samples with equal 	
variances.  Task duration was measured from the moment that a participant first viewed 
a scenario until the point when he or she stopped the eye tracker recording.  The 
normality assumption was confirmed with the Shapiro-Wilk test (W = 0.9785, p = 
0.1048), and the equal variance assumption was confirmed with Levene’s test (F = 
0.1920, p = 0.6622).  In Figure 25, the boxplot compares the mean task duration 
between the scenarios where participants could access recommenders and scenarios 
where participants could not. 
	
Figure 24.  Mean SA score by level and condition, with standard error bars 	
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 Participants spent slightly less than one minute longer evaluating the display 
when recommenders were available (µ = 4.563 minutes, σ = 1.33 minutes) than when 
evaluating the same displays without having access to recommenders (µ = 3.757 
minutes, σ = 1.71 minutes).  A paired t-test revealed a statistically significant difference 
between conditions, t(16) = 4.04, p < 0.001.  This suggests that the presence of the 
recommenders on the display was related to an increase in task duration.   
Eye Tracking Metrics 
 The eye tracking dependent variables (total fixation duration, time to first 
fixation, and number of fixations) were dependent upon assignment of Areas of Interest 
(AOIs), or geometric regions surrounding display components that the researcher is 
interested in evaluating.  Using the eye tracking analysis software, Tobii Pro Studio, we 
created four AOIs, shown in Figure 26.  We assessed dependent variables in relation to 
the core AOIs (MRMS, RP, FFG, and USF). 
 
Figure 25. Task duration comparison between experimental conditions 
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Total Fixation Duration.  The total fixation duration measures the amount of 
time a participant fixated within an AOI over the entire recording period.  In this 
analysis, this measure includes zero values if the participant did not fixate within an 
AOI.  The full dataset satisfied the equal variance assumption (F = 0.5161, p = 0.8222), 
but it did not satisfy the normality assumption (W = 0.9270, p < 0.001).  Outliers 
beyond 3σ were removed from the full dataset and the tests were run again.  The new 
distribution still failed the Shapiro-Wilk normality test, but maintained equal variance.  
Thus, differences in total fixation duration were assessed using high breakdown and 
high efficiency robust linear regression and a Robust Wald test. 
Although standard linear regressions frequently use the ordinary least squares 
(OLS) method for estimating effects, robust linear regression parameters can be based 
on several different estimation algorithms.  Here, we chose MM-estimation with the 
bisquare weighting function; this technique uses iteratively reweighted least squares 
 
Figure 26. AOI assignment used during the analysis 
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(IRLS) to assign weights to the residuals, is appropriate for nonparametric data, and is 
also robust against outliers. 
After fitting the robust linear regression, shown Table 13, a Wald test based on 
the robust linear regression coefficients identified a significant main effect of the AOI 
variable (Wald = 21.72, p < 0.001).  The main effect of recommender presence was not 
significant (Wald = 0.5154, p = 0.4728) and the interaction between the AOI and 
recommender condition was not significant (Wald = 0.4175, p = 0.5182).  In Figure 27, 
one can see that the mean total fixation duration within the MRMS AOI (the radar data) 
was greater than fixation duration in any of the other AOIs. 
Percentage of Total Fixation Duration.  Total fixation duration measured total 
time spent within an AOI; however, as task duration differed among participants, an 
alternative measure was needed to normalize fixation patterns.  Moore and Gugerty 
(2010) found that taking the percentage of total fixation duration relative to task 
duration was a significant predictor of SA.  In line with this, we assessed percentage of 
total fixation duration to determine whether this confirmed the previous conclusions 
related to total fixation duration. 
 
Table 13. Robust linear regression parameters for the total fixation duration data 
 Estimate Std. 
Error 
t-value Pr(<|t|) 
(Intercept) 36.844 4.055 9.086 < 0.0001 
Rec[Available] 4.281 5.963 0.718 0.473 
AOI[MRMS] 26.991 5.792 4.66 < 0.0001 
AOI[RP] 3.729 5.770 0.646 0.519 
AOI[USF] -4.796 5.778 -0.83 0.407 
Rec[Available]:AOI[MRMS] -8.117 8.508 -0.954 0.341 
Rec[Available]:AOI[RP] -12.572 8.522 -1.475 0.141 
Rec[Available]:AOI[USF] -5.108 7.865 -0.649 0.517 	
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After removing two statistical outliers, the data fulfilled the equal variance assumption 
(F = 1.902, p = 0.06976) but not the normality assumption (W = 0.9759, p < 0.001).  As 
with the previous analysis, a robust linear regression was used to fit the data.  The 
Robust Wald test failed to detect a significant interaction between recommender 
condition and AOI (Wald = 0.1889, p = 0.6638), but did identify a significant main 
effect in proportional fixation duration between AOIs (Wald = 24.23, p < 0.001).  
However, an alternative approach to robust ANOVA based on a robust F-test did detect 
a significant interaction between condition and AOI (Robust F = 28.12, p < 0.001).  The 
means displayed in Figure 28, particularly in the USF AOI, lends support to the 
conclusion that the proportion of time spent fixating across the AOIs changed with 
recommender availability. 
Figure 27. Mean total fixation duration by AOI type 
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Figure 28 illustrates that when recommenders were unavailable, participants 
spent the greatest proportion of their time fixating within the MRMS AOI and the least 
amount within the USF AOI.  However, when recommenders were available within the 
USF AOI, the proportion of time spent within the AOI increased moderately.  In 
comparison to the total fixation duration results, the normalized results lead to several 
interesting conclusions.  Specifically, the mean absolute time spent within the USF AOI 
was the lowest in both recommender conditions, yet the proportion of time increased 
with recommenders.   
Mean Number of Fixations by AOI.  The number of fixations variable 
measures the number of times a participant fixated within an AOI.  This parameter has 
	  
Figure 28. Percentage of fixation duration to task duration by AOI and recommender 
condition 
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been used to indicate the salience or relative importance of an AOI to a decision maker; 
AOIs with a greater number of fixations may attract a user’s attention to a greater 
degree (Poole and Ball, 2006).  Whereas the mean total fixation duration reflects the 
absolute time that a participant fixated within an AOI, the number of fixations reflects 
the frequency of fixations within an AOI.  The full dataset was not normally distributed 
(W = 0.8978, p < 0.001), but it did satisfy the equal variance assumption (F = 1.791, p = 
0.0896).  After removing the statistical outliers, the reduced dataset still satisfied the 
equal variance assumption (F = 1.1817, p = 0.3142) and was normally distributed (W = 
0.9881, p = 0.05233). 
An ANOVA test indicated that recommender availability produced a significant 
effect on the number of times a participant fixated during any scenario (F = 4.066, p = 
0.045).  A significant main effect in the number of fixations between AOIs was also 
observed (F = 8.031, p < 0.0001), although no interaction between the AOI type and 
recommender condition was found (F = 1.888, p = 0.133); Figure 29 shows the mean 
number of fixations by AOI type and recommender condition.  A Tukey’s Honestly 
Significant Difference test revealed that the number of fixations in the MRMS AOI 
significantly differed from those in the USF, FFG, and RP AOIs; however, the mean 
number of fixations within the USF, FFG, and RP AOIs did not significantly differ from 
each other.  This may be due to the visual salience of radar imagery in the MRMS AOI, 
or alternatively because radar imagery updated every two minutes during the 
simulations, which was faster than the other AOI types. 
Mean Time to First Fixation by AOI.  Mean time to first fixation indicates the 
amount of time it takes a participant to fixate on a particular AOI (in seconds).  This can 
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be used to interpret the order in which participants viewed AOIs, and could also reflect 
salience of the information contained with each AOI.  Following the removal of 
statistical outliers beyond 3σ from the mean, the data still did not satisfy the assumption 
of equal variance (F = 5.600, p < 0.001) nor the normality assumption (W = 0.6164, p < 
0.001).  Exponentially transforming the dependent variable led to homoscedastic 
residuals (F = 0.9673, p = 0.4554); however, the residuals were still non-normally 
distributed, according to the Shapiro-Wilk test (W = 0.1063, p < 0.001).  Using the 
transformed data, robust linear regression using MM-estimation and bisquare weighting 
was used to estimate differences in first fixation time between recommender condition 
and AOI; the coefficients are shown in Table 14 (Multiple R2 = 0.001895). 
		  
Figure 29. Number of fixations by AOI and condition 
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A Wald test on the robust coefficients failed to identify any significant main 
effects from AOI (Wald = 1.346, p = 0.2459), recommender condition (Wald = 0.8024, 
p = 0.3704), or any significant interaction (Wald = 0.05402, p = 0.8162).  The mean 
first fixation time per AOI by recommender condition is shown in Figure 30; from the 
figure, one can estimate the average order in which AOIs were first viewed.   The mean 
first fixation time on the USF AOI was greatest when recommenders were available.  
This was an unexpected observation; we anticipated that participants would assess the 
USF AOI first in this condition, due to the recommender automation’s novelty.  
Assessing the USF panel after each of other AOIs may suggest that participants were 
developing SA with the more familiar guidance products, then evaluated the goodness 
of the automated recommendations with that foreknowledge; this hypothesis, however, 
is speculative in nature and would require further investigation.	 
Exploratory Analysis of Scanning Behavior.  In addition to recording 
information related to fixations, the eye tracking system also captured information about 
gaze direction.  Whereas the time to first fixation estimates can reflect the order that 
participants moved between AOIs, gaze direction analysis reflects scanning patterns 
Table 14. Robust linear regression parameters for the mean time to the first fixation 
by AOI and recommender condition	
 Estimate Std. 
Error 
t value Pr(>|t|) 
(Intercept) 525.1 342.2 1.534 0.126 
Rec[Available] -446.7 498.6 -0.896 0.371 
AOI[MRMS] -521.3 449.3 -1.16 0.247 
AOI[RP] -126.2 543.1 -0.232 0.816 
AOI[USF] -284 493.2 -0.576 0.565 
Rec[Available]:AOI[MRMS] 561.6 651.9 0.862 0.39 
Rec[Available]:AOI[RP] 228.8 761.3 0.301 0.764 
Rec[Available]:AOI[USF] 445.2 788.1 0.565 0.573 
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among display elements.  In the present study, we hypothesized that the recommenders 
would attract the user’s attention to the USF AOI in which the recommenders were 
embedded in scenarios with the recommender-present condition.  We estimated the 
number of movements between the core AOIs by calculating the frequency of 
bidirectional exchanges; for example, a fixation within the MRMS AOI followed by a 
fixation within the USF AOI would count as an MRMS-USF exchange.  Exchanges 
between AOIs and any part of the display not captured in an AOI (e.g. the menu bar at 
the top of the display) were excluded intentionally.  
Figure 31 presents a comparison between gaze movement exchanges between 
the recommender-present and recommender-absent conditions shown as a percentage of 
 
Figure 30. Mean first fixation time versus AOI type and recommender condition	
 
	202 
all core AOI exchanges.  When recommenders were absent, participants frequently 
compared the MRMS AOI with the USF and FFG AOIs.  When recommenders were 
present, participants slightly changed their scanning behavior; participants had fewer 
comparisons between the MRMS and FFG AOIs, but slightly more RP-USF and 
MRMS-RP exchanges.	 
 Evaluating guidance usage on a participant-by-participant basis revealed 
individual differences in forecast guidance usage during the forecast decision making 
process.  Figure 32 shows the mean fixation duration percentage by AOI in both 
automation conditions.  While some trends appear, it is clear that each participant had 
unique assessment strategies.  Participants P05 and P13 appeared to have a consistent 
approach for evaluating guidance products, independent of automation condition.  
Conversely, Participant P09’s assessment approach appeared to be swayed by the 
		
 
Figure 31. Bidirectional gaze movements between the core AOIs with and without 
recommenders (always placed in the USF AOI)	
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availability of recommenders, but she generally relied upon the familiar radar imagery 
(MRMS AOI).  Similar to P09, participant P17 showed interest in the recommenders 
but not the unit streamflow visualization itself; otherwise, he was fairly consistent in his 
evaluation strategy.  It is possible that some of these differences were due to variations 
in individual expertise, familiarity with flash flood forecasting guidance products, or 
level of understanding with regard to the recommenders.		
Links Between SA Performance and Eye Movements 
 Although no differences were observed in SA scores between the recommender 
conditions, we also hypothesized that eye tracking metrics would predict SA.  In order 
		   
  
Figure 32. Differences in fixation duration percentage among four participants 
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to identify the predictive power of eye tracking variables on the composite SA score, we 
fit a multiple regression model to the data.  The dataset used for the regression was 
limited in size by the number of eye tracking observations available (n=65).  Apart from 
the eye tracking factors (Total Fixation Duration by AOI (FixDur[AOI]), Percent of 
Duration by AOI (PerDur[AOI]), Number of Fixations by AOI (n[AOI], and First 
Fixation Time by AOI (FF[AOI]), we also included the task duration variable 
(continuous), scenario location variable (categorical, Scenario A, B, and C), and 
recommender condition variable (categorical, available/unavailable). 
Analysis of multicollinearity revealed that six factors (Condition, Scenario, Task 
Duration, Fixation Duration (USF), Fixation Duration (MRMS), and the Number of 
Fixations (USF)) and two interaction terms (Condition*Task Duration and 
Scenario*Task Duration) were highly correlated.  As expected, all Total Fixation 
Duration parameters were highly correlated with the percentage of duration parameters; 
to overcome this, we fit two distinct models, one using total fixation duration and the 
other using percentage of duration. 
Regression with Total Fixation Duration.  We fit the regressions first by 
fitting the maximal model with all the other non-correlated main effects and two 
interactions; the results are shown in Table 15.  While several coefficients were 
significant predictors of SA, the Adjusted R2 value was low (Adj. R2 = 0.1703).  Of all 
the variables included in the maximal model, the only significant main effects identified 
by an ANOVA were related to scenario location (F = 5.952, p = 0.005955) and the 
Fixation Duration in the RP AOI (F = 7.189, p = 0.01111).  Thus, the search for a more 
parsimonious model began. 
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In order to fit the minimal adequate model, we used both the forward and 
backward stepwise selection methods.  The selection method, in which variables are 
iteratively added to or removed from the model, terminated at the inclusion of only two 
variables: the scenario variable and the mean fixation duration within the QPE Return 
Period (RP) AOI (Adj. R2 = 0.4204).  An ANOVA found that both main effects were 
significant (FixDurRP: F = 29.93, p < 0.001; Scenario: F = 9.385, p = 0.0002843).  The 
coefficients for the forward selection minimal adequate model are shown in Table 16. 
 
Table 15. Coefficients for the maximal model (predicting composite SA score) after 
correlated variable removal 
 Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|) 
(Intercept) 0.2730 0.09186 2.972 0.0053 
FixDur[FFG] 0.002009 0.002431 0.8260 0.4142 
FixDur[RP] 0.001360 0.002379 0.5720 0.5712 
n[FFG] -0.0008008 0.001160 -0.6910 0.4944 
n[MRMS] -0.0004548 0.0005594 -0.8130 0.4218 
n[RP] 0.0002446 0.001141 0.2140 0.8315 
FF[USF] 0.002134 0.002209 0.9660 0.3406 
FF[FFG] -0.001258 0.001977 -0.6360 0.5288 
FF[MRMS] -0.0006129 0.004405 -0.1390 0.8901 
FF[RP] 0.0003372 0.001153 0.2930 0.7716 
Rec[Available] 0.003209 0.08228 0.03900 0.9691 
Scenario[A] 0.1160 0.08830 1.314 0.1975 
Scenario[C] -0.07205 0.08660 -0.8320 0.4111 
Rec[Available]:
Scenario[A] 0.02115 0.1173 0.1800 0.8579 
Rec[Available]:
Scenario[C] 0.06459 0.09879 0.6540 0.5175 	
Table 16. Regression coefficients for the minimal adequate model (predicting 
composite SA score) as identified with a forward stepwise selection method. 
 
 Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|) 
(Intercept) 0.2195 0.03680 5.964 < 0.0001 
FixDur[RP] 0.002275 0.0005113 4.450 < 0.0001 
Scenario[A] 0.1023 0.03414 2.995 0.003980 
Scenario[C] -0.03928 0.03512 -1.118 0.2679 	
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The forward stepwise regression technique selected the RP AOI as a significant 
predictor, the backward stepwise regression technique selected the MRMS AOI as a 
significant predictor (at the α = 0.10 significance level) of composite SA score.  While 
no effect from automation condition was identified, the results suggest that assessment 
of specific in-development guidance products can improve overall SA. 
Regression with Percentage of Duration.  As with the total fixation duration 
regression, a minimal adequate model was selected with forward and backward 
stepwise regression method.  The forward selection method fitted a model with a higher 
adjusted R2 value than the backward selection method.  Similar to the previous analysis, 
the model contained the scenario variable and the percentage of total duration within the 
QPE Return Period (RP) AOI.  
 In a secondary analysis to predict SA scores at Level 1, 2, and 3, it was found 
that the percentage of total duration within the QPE Return Period (RP) AOI was also a 
significant predictor of SA Level 1 accuracy.  Fixation times did not appear to have any 
significant effect on Level 2 accuracy.  However, the SA Level 3 regression suggested 
that the percentage of total duration within the Unit Streamflow (USF) AOI was a 
significant predictor. 
Confidence Level Analysis 
 Following data collection, participants completed a debriefing questionnaire.  A 
component of the questionnaire assessed their confidence levels during each scenario.  
Confidence scores were self-reported on a scale of 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly 
agree).    Overall, participants reported having a moderate degree of confidence in the 
Indiana scenario (scenario B; µ = 3.89, σ = 0.66), the West Virginia/Ohio Valley 
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scenario (scenario C; µ = 3.78, σ = 0.53), and the New Jersey scenario (scenario A; µ = 
3.69, σ = 0.77).  No significant difference was identified in confidence between 
locations.  As confidence in task performance level was equivalent between geographic 
locations, this indicates that no scenario was subjectively more challenging than 
another.  
Discussion 
This research explored the relationship between SA and recommenders, a type 
of attention-directing automation.  The experiment assessed SA with a probe-based 
measure, and in addition, we investigated the ability of eye tracking metrics to predict 
SA in a flash flood forecasting task.  Eye tracking is a direct assessment method, yet has 
had only recent applications in the weather forecasting domain.  However, results have 
shown that the method provides researchers with insight into forecaster information-
seeking behavior (Bowden et al., 2016).  In the present study, this novel combination of 
probe-based assessment and eye tracking contributed to a deeper understanding of how 
graphical attention-directing mechanisms affected forecaster SA. 
Independent from SA scores, we hypothesized that participants would fixate on 
the USF AOI more often and for longer durations when recommenders were available 
than when they were not.  Increases in both measures under the recommender-available 
condition were expected due to the additional information provided by the 
recommenders.  This hypothesis was partially confirmed; the number of fixations within 
the USF AOI was significantly greater when recommenders were available than when 
they were not.  This was a logical outcome when one assumes that participants would 
want to familiarize themselves with the unfamiliar recommenders.  However, the 
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fixation duration results also indicated that greater attention to the USF AOI did not 
noticeably diminish the amount of time participants spent assessing information in the 
other AOIs.  This observation was supported further by the task duration results, which 
found that when recommenders were available, participants spent, on average, 
approximately one minute longer assessing the entire dataset than when recommenders 
were unavailable. 
The difference in task duration between conditions may be due to two possible 
causes.  First, the increase in duration may have been related to the additional 
information presented by the recommenders.  Previous research has shown that the 
forecasting process involves a large amount of comparison between information sources 
to make sense of the situation and to assess bias (Kirschenbaum, 2004).  It is likely that 
when confronted with the uncertainty surrounding how to use new information sources, 
the study participants spent the same amount of time reviewing the more familiar AOIs 
but also spent additional time assessing the recommenders.  The evaluation of fixation 
time percentage lends support to this hypothesis. 
The second possibility is that participants took more time to complete the 
scenarios with recommenders due to the unfamiliarity with the recommenders 
themselves.  During the study, several participants commented that they were not sure 
that they were using the recommenders correctly.  When in such a situation, it is 
possible that such participants spent more time assessing the information in the 
recommenders.  Still, this supports the expectation that recommenders would draw 
participant attention from other areas of the display. 
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While several of the eye tracking and task performance metrics indicated a 
significant difference in the recommenders-available condition, not all original 
hypotheses received support.  Specifically, the results did not support the hypothesis 
that the recommenders-available condition would be associated with greater total 
fixation durations in the USF AOI.  Unexpectedly, the USF AOI received the lowest 
total fixation duration of any of the AOIs whether recommenders were available or not.  
Participants spent the greatest amount of time fixating within the MRMS AOI (the radar 
scans).  There are several possible explanations for this outcome.  This panel held the 
radar imagery, and it updated more frequently than the hydrologic models did.  These 
updates meant that the visual stimuli changed more frequently, which may have 
attracted the eyes and motivated participants to reassess the panel more often than the 
other AOIs.  Secondly, the radar imagery had the added benefit of being the most 
familiar information source available in the study.  Participants had varying levels of 
experience with the other three guidance products. 
The comparative nature of situation assessment in weather forecasting has been 
well established in the decision making literature (Kirschenbaum, 2004; Pliske, 
Crandall, & Klein, 2004; Trafton & Hoffman, 2007).  The gaze movement analysis 
revealed that some of the most frequent bidirectional exchanges involved the MRMS 
AOI.  Considered alongside the total fixation duration and fixation duration percentage 
data, this suggests that participants not only used the familiar radar imagery to establish 
a baseline understanding, but they also used it in comparison tasks, perhaps to calibrate 
their mental models to the less familiar guidance products.  This hypothesis may also be 
supported by the first fixation time results.  On average, participants fixated upon the 
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radar imagery before looking anywhere else on the screen, regardless of the 
recommender condition. 
Implications for Eye Tracking as an SA Assessment Method 
The present study suggests that direct, eye tracking-based measures can predict 
SA accuracy, a finding that is consistent previous research (Moore & Gugerty, 2010; 
van de Merwe et al., 2012).  In a study of air traffic controllers, Moore and Gugerty 
(2010) found that percentage of time fixating on an AOI was the strongest predictor of 
overall awareness; the regression analyses in the present study support this.  
Additionally, Moore and Gugerty (2010) observed that low error rates were associated 
with higher number of fixations.  Based on this precedent, we hypothesized that 
participants with large fixation durations (both absolute and percentage-based) and 
fixation counts within the USF AOI would have a higher level of SA than participants 
with low fixation duration and few fixations with the recommenders. 
Similar to the previous studies, we found that the fixation duration percentage 
was a significant predictor of overall SA.  We expanded upon Moore and Gugerty’s 
(2010) work by assessing the predictive power of additional variables and found that the 
total fixation duration and, to a lesser degree, number of fixations within specific AOIs 
were alternative predictors.  The present findings also weakly support Moore and 
Gugerty’s (2010) observation of the inverse relationship between fixation counts and 
error rates.  The stepwise regression analysis showed that one of the eye tracking 
measures—number of fixations within the QPE Return Period (RP) AOI—was a 
significant predictor of overall SA in terms of probe accuracy.  This was unexpected, 
but introduced a new question regarding the utility of other in-development flash flood 
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prediction models.  Although radar scans and Flash Flood Guidance-based (FFG) 
guidance products are available in operational settings, the QPE Return Period (RP) and 
CREST Unit Streamflow (USF) products are currently in-development and not 
available for use in formal work display systems.  In the experimental scenarios where 
recommenders were available, the recommender polygons were always overlaid within 
the USF AOI, so it was intriguing to identify the relationship between frequent use of 
the QPE Return Period guidance product and SA. 
 Although this study did not identify a strong relationship between fixation count 
and SA accuracy, analyses of fixation entropy may provide insight into why participants 
experienced generally low levels of SA.  Entropy, a measure of fixation location 
variability, has been used to evaluate human attention (van de Merwe et al., 2012).  
Moore and Gugerty (2010) found that as error rates increased, participants exhibited 
less focused scanning patterns; the same was found by van de Merwe et al. (2012).  
Moore and Gugerty (2010) found that successful participants tended to fixate in tight 
clusters, whereas low-performing participants fixated in seemingly random motions 
throughout widely spaced areas.  High entropy was attributed to uncertain goals as well 
as high workload (van de Merwe et al., 2012).  However, measuring entropy within the 
weather forecasting display posed a great challenge; whereas aircraft are generally static 
entities, we question whether this behavior would exhibit itself among weather 
forecasters. 
Air traffic control tasks require focus on distinct areas of interest (e.g. aircraft), 
but weather forecasting displays often contain many different types of guidance 
products.  Indeed, the four-panel display used in the present study was a simplified 
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version of the type of displays used in operational forecasting; the simplified display 
was chosen because it allowed for greater control in the experimental design and eye 
tracking analysis.  The decision making literature has suggested that forecasters attend 
to information in a goal-directed manner (Trafton et al., 2000).  Yet, the layout and 
dynamic nature of many forecast guidance products lead to information attributes 
changing not only in location, but also in shape, size, and velocity, among others.  Thus, 
we hypothesize that in an operational forecasting task, a weather forecaster’s attention 
would be more dispersed across a display, and the relationship between entropy and 
error rate may not be generalizable to all domains.  Gugerty (2011) suggested that 
attention allocation capacity could impact an operator’s ability to develop SA; future 
research should explore the role of attention allocation processes on the situation 
assessment process in weather forecasting.   
Implications for Recommender Development 
An investigation of the effects of recommender automation on forecaster SA 
formed the core of this study.  We hypothesized that the recommender polygons would 
act as cues for focal attention, and as such, participants would attend to the highlighted 
areas and develop more accurate SA than when not exposed to recommenders.  While 
the eye tracking performance metrics did reveal differences in scanning behaviors 
between automation levels, the probe-based technique did not identify any significant 
improvements in SA.  There are several possible explanations for this outcome, ranging 
from technological design to individual factors.  
In human-computer interaction domain, the literature has suggested that SA and 
decision making may falter when operators lack experience and trust with technical 
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systems (Kaber & Endsley, 1997).  In the present study, participants received an 
overview of the technical design and purpose of recommenders.  In addition, the 
number of scenarios afforded an opportunity for each participant to work through the 
initial learning curve.  Even so, none of the participants had ever worked with 
recommenders prior to the study, and several were even unfamiliar with the concept.  
Discussions of the out-of-the-loop decision making problem have contained cautions 
against drawing conclusions about the relationship between SA and decision making 
when operators lack necessary experience (Endsley & Kiris, 1995).  Nevertheless, we 
do not think this solely explains low SA scores in the present work, as participants were 
all experienced, professional forecasters with some degree of subject matter expertise in 
hydrologic forecasting. 
Apart from a lack of experience, it is possible that the participants did not trust 
the information provided by the recommenders.  In a study of a severe hail 
recommender system, Karstens et al. (2015) found that forecasters only used 
recommenders in fewer than 20% of the opportunities in which they were provided, 
which the authors interpreted as an indication that the forecasters were not interested in 
using them, or that they didn’t trust the recommendations.  Studies have shown that low 
trust in automation can affect operator performance (Hoff & Bashir, 2015; Kaber & 
Endsley, 1997).  Operators can learn to trust a system if it has a transparent and usable 
design, and if system performance is effective, reliable, and predictable (Hoff & Bashir, 
2015).  As automated decision support systems for weather forecasting develop and 
gain more time in use, we believe that user trust in recommender systems would 
improve with a transparent creation process coupled with a training program.    
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The recommender system’s design may also have influenced participants’ 
abilities to develop SA.  Many previous studies have evaluated the impact of level of 
automation (LOA) on SA; for example, Kaber and Endsley (2004) found that SA level 
and task performance were best with the aid of low to moderate levels of automation.  
They hypothesized that SA decrements could have been due to active and passive 
information processing styles, a conclusion that prefigured Moore and Gugerty’s (2010) 
work.  The present findings, in combination with qualitative studies of weather 
forecasting, suggest that comparison among forecast guidance products and decision 
support automation involves passive as well as focused processing, but that forecast 
guidance use may exhibit itself differently in weather forecasting than in other domains, 
such as air traffic control or driving. 
Lastly, it is also possible that the recommenders did affect SA but that the 
probes lacked the power to detect the differences.  Similar to the current work, in an 
evaluation of LOA and SA, Dao et al. (2009) failed to detect a significant difference in 
SA probe response accuracy during a short-duration task; however, they observed a 
significant effect of automation level on response latency measure.  A preliminary 
analysis of response times in completing SA probes in this research, however, failed to 
detect any significant differences between automation conditions.  Following this 
realization, we hypothesized that the forecast areas in each scenario were too spacious, 
and that participants may have had high levels of SA for smaller sectors, something not 
captured in the scoring metric.  A case study of the scanning patterns of two low-SA 
(overall score) participants revealed that they focused their attention on small sections 
of the forecast area, rarely deviating out to assess other areas of the map.  As a result, 
	215 
they received points for the areas of risk they correctly identified, but received no points 
for the areas of the map they neglected to view.  This may have been a mechanism for 
dealing with the workload, the short timeframe, or it may even have been due to prior 
professional training.  In future work, it would be of benefit to extend this research by 
assessing SA in sectorized forecast decision making. 
Limitations 
Several things may limit the generalizability of this study.  First, participants 
were asked to identify areas of risk over regions of the US that they may not have been 
familiar with.  For example, one participant had extensive experience forecasting in 
Indiana, and so he was very familiar with county names and river structures during the 
two Indiana scenarios.  Others, however, expressed discomfort with being able to assess 
risk accurately in areas with which they were not familiar.  They also had trouble 
remembering the county names and river structures.  As past research into forecasting, 
experience, and SA has shown, experience is a large factor in SA, and such a lack of 
experience may be a contributing factor to diminished performance in this experiment. 
Technical Limitations.  At the time of this study, recommender systems, 
particularly for flash flooding, were in the early development stages.  The recommender 
algorithm used in the present study was based on a threshold from the QPE Ratio 
product.  The QPE-to-FFG ratio product was chosen due to FFG’s familiarity to most 
forecasters across the United States; however, it might have been better either not to 
display FFG as one of the four panels in the display, or to select a different 
recommender product.  Even displayed over the unit streamflow (USF) map, it was 
clear that the recommenders were only highlighting the items that were visible in the 
	216 
QPE-to-FFG ratio map; however, it did provide a way to directly compare the two 
products in a way that overlaying the two maps on top of each other did not (overlaying 
tends to be messy and hard to interpret when the color tables conflict).  Forecasters 
often engage in comparison activities and so this may be a way to facilitate comparison 
and mental model building (Kirschenbaum, 2004; Trafton & Hoffman, 2007). 
In addition, few participants were familiar with the concept of recommender 
systems, which likely impacted general understanding in terms of usage.  In the 
understanding that recommender systems would become more complex prior to 
operationalization, we did not want to mislead participants in terms of the current 
recommender capability.  It is possible that participants may not have fully understood 
how to incorporate recommenders into their decision process.  Nevertheless, the eye 
tracking measures showed that participants did consult the recommender AOI in those 
scenarios where recommenders were available.  As recommender systems take on a 
higher degree of complexity, their place within the situation assessment process may 
adapt.  Due to technical constraints imposed by the current state of recommender 
technology, the present work was not able to capture such user behavior, but we suggest 
that this work has implications on understanding the relationship between SA and 
graphical mechanisms for directing attention in a weather forecasting display. 
 Threats to Internal Validity.  Several measures were taken in order to reduce 
threats to the study’s internal validity.  In terms of a maturation effect, the study was 
designed to be approximately one hour in duration, and in the longest case, the 
participant in question took about one and a half hours to complete the study activities.  
This timeframe was selected to minimize effects from participants’ moods or behaviors 
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changing due to tiredness, inattention, or other factors caused by the experiment.  
Likewise, in order to determine whether the results were affected by testing effects, the 
researcher conducted a statistical test to identify potential differences in responses 
caused by order.  As previously discussed, no significant difference in terms of fixation 
duration was found. 
 Lastly, as with many human-subjects studies, a possible threat from participant 
reactivity exists.  As the experiment occurred in a controlled laboratory environment, 
and participants were aware that the procedures used eye tracking and an experimental 
form of automated guidance, it is possible that participants altered their typical situation 
assessment strategies as a result.  In order to combat this, participants were instructed to 
review the provided data as they usually would.  Nevertheless, several participants 
commented that using the four-panel AWIPS-II display was akin to “trying to work at 
someone else’s desk.”  In future work, a longitudinal study or a naturalistic decision 
making approach could be used to assess effects of recommenders with participants in a 
more natural setting, though this, too, might produce observational bias. 
Summary 
The current study points to several avenues for future work that could improve 
understanding about how weather forecasters develop and maintain SA, particularly 
during tasks involving decision support automation.  While the probe-based technique 
did not reveal a significant effect from the recommender system on overall SA 
accuracy, the eye tracking analysis did reflect differences in scanning behaviors when 
participants had access to the automation.  From these results, we can conclude that the 
recommender system did not distract attention from areas of risk; with that in mind, 
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participants largely had low SA scores across all levels.  Going forward, additional 
work should extend the methodology to forecasting over a smaller sector.  Furthermore, 
using eye tracking with a more naturalistic approach with eye tracking may permit 
researchers to capture data from forecasters in operational settings in a relatively non-
intrusive manner.  This type of approach could provide insight into real-time situation 
assessment in scenarios with real-world impacts.  
 The greatest contribution of this work is the validation that eye tracking can be 
used to assess SA in weather forecasting, a complex sociotechnical work domain.  In 
the few other studies that have explored the use of eye tracking as an SA assessment 
method, research has frequently focused on aviation, air traffic control, and driving.  
The current findings provided direct evidence of the impact of focused attention on 
forecaster SA, and from a methodological perspective, showed that several eye tracking 
metrics can be used, to varying degrees, as predictors of SA.  This research suggests 
that eye tracking has potential for use in operational forecasting environments, and it 
may be an effective tool for assessing training needs for forecasters. 
  
  
	219 
Chapter 6: Discussion and Conclusions 
 
Weather forecasters frequently work with large quantities of data, and previous 
research has sought to address concerns related to information overload, increased 
workload, and diminished performance (Daipha, 2010; Karstens et al., 2015; Stuart, 
Schultz, & Klein, 2007).  In the present work, we have been concerned with 
understanding technological design factors that influence situation awareness (SA) and 
decision making during flash flood forecasting tasks.  Here, we have argued that the 
forecasting process and outcomes can be improved by designing decision support 
technology to suit the cognitive and task-related needs of forecasters.  In Chapter 3, we 
investigated the effects of visualization algorithm and visual display properties on 
perception and recognition of a flash flood threat.  In the following chapter, we explored 
the relationship between information requirements, situation assessment, and 
uncertainty management along the forecasting timeline.  Finally, in Chapter 5, we 
analyzed the effects of an automated decision support technology on SA with a novel 
eye tracking methodology. 
The current work sought to enhance current understanding of decision making 
with several studies focused on identifying interactions among decision support design, 
weather forecasting, and SA.  Each study contributed to the user-centered development 
of the Flooded Locations and Simulated Hydrographs (FLASH) suite of flash flood 
forecast guidance products.  In the first study, we found that data aggregation methods 
affected signal detection during a flash flood prediction task.  Signal detection, a 
component of Level 1 SA (perception), involves an operator determining whether or not 
two stimuli are different (Stanislaw & Todorov, 1999).  When evaluating guidance 
	220 
products during a weather event, a forecaster must be able to detect patterns and 
comprehend their significance.  Based on the findings, we concluded that the data 
aggregation method did influence incidence rates of error types in a threat detection task 
within one of the FLASH visualizations.  Participants were statistically most likely to 
make correct threat assessments when the stimulus event had small spatial coverage, 
minimal property damage, and was visualized with the average-based aggregation 
method. 
 The mixed methods analysis in Chapter 4 led to several insights into 
information seeking and uncertainty management behaviors during flash flood 
forecasting.  In the quantitative component, we established that forecasters had different 
SA requirements at different scales, particularly with regard to time and environmental 
activity level.  Like Daipha (2010) and Morss and Ralph (2007), we observed that 
forecasters compared a diverse collection of guidance products prior to making a 
forecast decision.  Out of all the decision support products available to participants in 
the Hazardous Weather Testbed experiment, radar imagery, hydrologic models, and 
flash flood guidance-based guidance products were viewed for the most time prior to 
issuing a watch, whereas radar imagery, flash flood guidance, and quantitative 
precipitation estimates (QPE) guidance products received the most screen time in the 
warning phase.  These observations support Kirschenbaum (2004), who suggested that 
weather forecasters construct their mental models by comparing information sources 
and extracting information. 
In addition to data comparison and goal-directed information extraction, the 
forecasters attempted to develop their SA under uncertain conditions by employing 
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uncertainty management tactics.  Lipshitz and Strauss (1997) proposed that decision 
makers cope with uncertainty through reduction, assumption-based reasoning, weighing 
alternatives, forestalling, and suppression, known as the R.A.W.F.S. heuristic.  Using a 
theoretical coding framework based on work by Lipshitz and Strauss (1997), we found 
that forecasters frequently discussed individual-level tactics, such as reduction and 
suppression, as well as organizational-level tactics, such as acknowledgement.  These 
findings indicate that when under uncertainty, situation assessment involves more than 
intuition and analysis, as proposed by others (Doswell, 2004).  With examples drawn 
from the focus group discussions, we illustrated that SA in weather forecasting is in part 
governed by an individual’s ability to cope with uncertainty. 
The mixed methods study gathered information about situation assessment and 
SA requirements for flash flood forecasting in a naturalistic environment, and the third 
study built upon this foundation to assess the effects of automation on comprehension 
and projection, while also testing the efficacy of eye tracking as an SA predictor.  
Whereas the first two studies primarily assessed elements of Level 1 (perception) and 
Level 2 (comprehension) SA, the final study evaluated SA across all three levels in an 
automation-aided forecasting task.  We hypothesized that availability of flash flood 
recommenders would draw forecaster attention away from other areas of risk, leading to 
an operator-out-of-the-loop phenomenon and diminished awareness.  This hypothesis 
was not supported; no statistical differences were observed in SA scores collected with 
a probe-based technique.  This finding suggests that recommenders hold promise as 
decision support tools for weather forecasting.  Although we had hypothesized that 
recommenders would reduce SA, the results indicated that this did not occur.  Still, 
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participants across the board exhibited low levels of SA, which was attributed to large 
forecasting sectors and levels of local knowledge among participants. 
In relation to the literature, these findings are intriguing.  While Endsley and 
Kiris (1995) observed a negative correlation between automation level and SA, Kaber 
and Endsley (2004) found that moderate levels of automation were associated with 
higher levels of SA.  We suggest that, similar to Kaber and Endsley’s (2004) work, the 
recommenders acted at a moderate level of automation.  Eye tracking showed that 
participants did fixate upon the automation, but as the study did not require participants 
to base decisions on the automation alone, we propose that SA and task duration would 
improve as operators become more experienced with the new systems.  Particularly in 
terms of task duration, as duration decreases, forecast lead time has the potential to 
increase.  In addition, while Dao et al. (2009) did not detect any significant difference in 
SA accuracy between automation levels, they did find that SA as measured by response 
time did correlate to automation level.  A preliminary investigation did not reflect a 
significant correlation between response times and the current results, but further 
research would be needed.  
Limitations 
 As discussed in the prior chapters, each study had several limitations.  Primarily, 
sample sizes, participant expertise, and technical issues had the greatest potential to 
limit the findings and generalizable conclusions.  Here, we reflect upon several of the 
limitations and discuss their relative importance. 
Conclusions from the research were constrained by attributes of the samples.  In 
the data aggregation method evaluation (Chapter 3), the sampled participants did not 
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possess professional expertise, which may reduce the ability to draw generalized 
conclusions about signal detection by expert forecasters.  While the participants were 
not professional forecasters, the sample was selected from the population of 
meteorology students and postdoctoral researchers at the University of Oklahoma.  We 
justified this choice based on the assumption that those engaged in meteorological 
studies would have relevant experience with regard to interpreting map-based 
environmental visualizations. 
Participant experience may have also limited performance in the recommender 
evaluation (Chapter 5).  In weather forecasting, an SA requirement is awareness of 
regional geography, known as local knowledge.  While a sample of expert forecasters 
was used, levels of regional forecasting experience varied.  As overall SA scores were 
generally low, it is possible that some participants lacked geographical knowledge on 
some of the areas used in the scenarios.  Likewise, performance may have also been 
limited by large forecasting sectors. 
In the mixed methods study (Chapter 4), the small sample may cause concern 
that not all viewpoints were captured in the focus groups.  It is worth noting that 
although the sample size was smaller than the literature has recommended, the 
qualitative data achieved saturation.  There is concern that dominant perspectives can 
overshadow alternative, minority comments in small sample focus groups.  This 
limitation was considered in the study design and was addressed with proper facilitation 
techniques.  However, in the quantitative analysis of SA requirements, sampling issues 
may have had a greater impact.  Despite having the potential to collect more than 800 
hours of forecasting data, issues with the recording software and external influences 
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(e.g. participants using personal computing devices) led to a greatly reduced sample.  In 
order to accommodate for this, data quality was ensured with sampling techniques that 
removed inadequate recordings.  Still, conclusions drawn from this data only reflect a 
partial image of information seeking behavior during flash flood forecasting.  
 Upon reflection, these limitations could be overcome through several means in 
future work.  Conducting additional data collection of forecast guidance usage in future 
testbed studies could add to the data corpus.  The same would apply for future 
applications of the focus group methodology.  Circumventing limitations associated 
with participant experience poses a greater challenge, however.  Presenting experienced 
participants with scenarios located in their regions of employment risks biasing 
performance if participants recall the actual weather event.  As such, we recommend 
that future studies consider using non-invasive observational techniques or qualitative 
research methods, such as Cognitive Task Analysis, to assess SA and decision making 
in an operational or quasi-operational forecasting environment. 
Decision Making in Weather Forecasting 
 Through this work, we have provided a complementary perspective to Doswell’s 
(2004) account of decision making heuristics and biases in weather forecast decision 
making.  Doswell (2004) presented a framework of forecast decision making in which 
forecasts were determined through a combination of analytical and intuitive processes.  
Analytic decisions were procedural and rule-based, whereas intuition-based decisions 
were subject to a number of cognitive biases and heuristics, such as the availability and 
representativeness heuristics.  Supporting this framework, Stuart et al. (2007) argued 
that a successful integration of analysis and intuition is at the heart of recognition-
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primed decision making (RPD).  Similarly, as a result of interviews with professional 
forecasters, Pliske, Crandall, and Klein (2004) found that experts were distinguished 
from non-experts in that they used a more flexible approach to forecasting, seeking and 
comparing information sources in order to build a model.  Non-experts had a more fixed 
approach, and primarily relied on computational predictions and procedural policy.  In 
the present work, findings from the focus group analysis corresponded to these earlier 
works and provided an extended understanding of decision support technology’s effects 
on SA under uncertainty. 
Situation awareness (SA) is not only regarded as an influential factor in decision 
making, but much research has focused on its impacts on safety.  While some research 
has focused on effects of SA loss in aviation accidents (Endsley, 1995b; Endsley & 
Garland, 2000), we argue that the implications from loss of SA in weather forecasting 
can have just as great impacts.  In a review of the warning operations during the May 3, 
1999 tornado in Moore, Oklahoma, Andra, Quoetone, and Bunting (2002) attributed 
forecaster SA to tightly-coupled interactions between decision support technology and 
individual expertise.  The authors associated insufficient SA with conditions involving 
situational uncertainty and incorrect forecaster preconceptions.  Insufficient SA was 
compounded by information that was “changing and sometimes unexpected, ambiguous 
or conflicting” (Quoetone, Andra, Bunting, & Jones, 2001).  In the current work, 
observations revealed that forecasters cope with such uncertainty primarily through 
reduction and suppression tactics, although organizational policy also contributes to 
uncertainty and risk management.  However, this revealed a major challenge related to 
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assessment of SA in the forecasting domain: as framed by several existing SA 
frameworks, SA is assessed in relation to a “ground truth.” 
Ground truth has been a point of contention in the literature.  Dekker, 
Hummerdal, and Smith (2010) questioned the appropriateness of accuracy-based 
assessment techniques, expressing the concern that such a method based would require 
an “omniscient, normative arbiter or homunculus that knows completely and accurately 
the interdependencies of all contextually dependent variables” (Dekker et al., 2010). 
While this perhaps poses slightly less of a problem in the weather domain, where events 
can be verified objectively after the fact, some observational systems may still contain 
inaccuracies.  This is relevant to the present work, where “ground truth” was 
determined from historic records and environmental sensor networks (e.g. stream 
gages), which may contain incomplete entries or imprecise recordings.  In our view, 
minimizing the effects of the role of ground truth on probe-based assessment methods is 
deserving of attention in future research.  
  It is possible that a solution could involve reframing “ground truth” in SA 
assessment to align with definitions of forecast goodness.  In domains involving high 
levels of uncertainty, establishing a situational model mirroring the actual environment 
may pose a great challenge.  For example, in long-term weather predictions, a forecaster 
may only have access to climatological data and environmental models, and if initial 
conditions or modeling parameters involve even a small degree of error, predictions can 
diverge from the eventual actuality.  An additional element of complexity is introduced 
when shifting from deterministic to probabilistic forecasts.  One may then ask, is it 
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appropriate to speak of “good SA” if a forecaster’s situational model is dependent upon 
predictions that lack accurate, real-time observations? 
In response to this, we suggest that future studies of SA in weather forecasting 
consider the definition of forecast goodness as discussed by Murphy (1993).  In his 
essay on characterizing forecast quality, Murphy (1993) proposed that a “good” forecast 
was one that best matched current model predictions, led to societal benefit, and most 
relevantly, conformed to the forecaster’s best conception of the current situation.  If one 
assumes the normativist perspective, then one believes that there is a ground truth for all 
decisions (Dekker et al., 2010; Parasuraman, Sheridan, & Wickens, 2008).  While 
recognizing that SA, action selection, and performance are governed by different 
cognitive mechanisms (Wickens, 2015), we question what is the most appropriate type 
of ground truth to use for assessment.  As Endsley (1995c) has pointed out, accurate SA 
does not necessarily equate to good performance.  Indeed, the opposite could easily be 
imagined, in which a forecaster has a high level of awareness of what the models 
predict, and then makes a forecast matching their SA, only in retrospect realizing that 
the prediction was overinflated (or perhaps worse, missed).  Based on the present and 
past research, we suggest that SA is a core component of weather forecast decision 
making, but accurate assessment of it requires further discussion within the scholarly 
community. 
A Reflection Upon Situation Awareness in Theory and Practice 
 In addition to exploring situation assessment in weather forecasting, the findings 
provide insight into human reasoning and judgment under uncertainty.  Underpinning 
this dissertation was Endsley’s 1995 Model of SA, which provided a consistent and 
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widely accepted framework for the design of each experiment.  In conducting the 
present work, we identified several aspects of the construct that have as of yet received 
little attention in the literature. 
 Several of the longstanding tenets of Endsley’s 1995 Model of SA were 
observed in the present work.  In the recommender evaluation, we determined that 
while forecaster SA was not diminished when exposed to the automation, the decision 
support tool did influence certain scanning measures.  In Endsley’s (1995c) model, 
automation is identified as a limiting factor to SA in many decision environments.  
However, Kaber and Endsley (1997) also found that when automation allowed 
interactivity between the operator and the system, SA improved.  This difference in 
levels of automation provides a likely explanation for the present findings. 
 Additionally, Endsley’s 1995 Model of SA recognizes the impact of interface 
design on an operator’s ability to acquire and maintain SA.  Indeed, Endsley (1995c) 
states that interface design affects “how much information can be acquired, how 
accurately it can be acquired, and to what degree it is compatible with the operator’s SA 
needs.”  In the data aggregation evaluation in Chapter 3, we found that the algorithm 
used to aggregate points within a large dataset influences an operator’s Level 1 and 
Level 2 SA.  Although the current goal was to identify an aggregation algorithm that 
minimized missed forecasts, we suggest that these findings could be applied to conform 
to one’s own risk tolerance level. 
The present findings also support recent arguments in favor of the nonlinearity 
of the three levels of SA.  Perhaps misconstrued due to the term “level,” some scholars 
have presumed that the Level 1 precedes Level 2, which in turn precedes Level 3 SA 
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(Chiappe, Strybel, & Vu, 2012; Klein, 2015b).  However, in a recent treatise to address 
misperceptions of the 1995 Model, Endsley (2015) argued that the three levels of SA 
are not necessarily a linear sequence.  While it is easy to view the three levels of SA as 
a process, our findings support Endsley’s (2015b) viewpoint.  The present findings 
support previous work that has showed that situation assessment involves both bottom-
up and top-down processing (Endsley, 1995c).  The findings, particularly from the 
mixed methods analysis, suggested that Level 3 SA preceded a goal-directed search for 
information, which was then coded into Level 1 and Level 2 SA.  The present work 
supports the application of the 1995 Model of SA to the field of forecast decision 
making, an explanatory framework already accepted by practitioners within the weather 
community (Jones, Quoetone, Ferree, Magsig, & Bunting, 2003; Quoetone et al., 2001).  
Nevertheless, this dissertation has shown that several outstanding issues need further 
investigation. 
In the present and related works, the question of external props has consistently 
stimulated debate.  Recent additions to the field, such as the Situated Approach to SA, 
draw their origins in part from the idea that SA can exist in the environment, not solely 
within the head, as they suggest the 1995 Model of SA proposed (Chiappe, Strybel, et 
al., 2012; van Winsen & Dekker, 2015).  Addressing misperceptions of the 1995 Model 
of SA, Endsley (2015b) argued that while SA is affected by situational context, the 
construct is meaningless if it is not contained within memory.  The link between 
memory and SA has been well established in the literature (Endsley, 1995c; Adams, 
Tenney, and Pew, 1995; Wickens, 2015) but we suggest that the role of props needs 
examination.  For example, in the present work, the freeze-probe measure revealed low 
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levels of SA among the participants.  We hypothesized that this may have been due to a 
combination of large forecasting sectors and a divergence between reality and the 
experimental design.  Specifically, we observed participants having difficulty orienting 
to the blank maps presented in the probes.  It is possible that had participants been given 
access to the displays while answering the probes, performance would have improved.  
Indeed, this would be a more familiar process for professional forecasters; few, if any, 
operational forecast decisions without an external prop (e.g. a radar scan or a numerical 
model output) visible on the display.  Thus, while SA acquired from additional 
guidance products would theoretically be contained within the forecaster’s memory, the 
awareness and subsequent action selection does not occur independent of the 
environmental props and cues.  We concur with Endsley (2015a, 2015b) that inanimate 
displays do not possess SA, but we do suggest that further discussion is needed in order 
to establish a role for memory props in existing frameworks. 
Interestingly, the systems-level perspective on SA (also known as the Joint-
Cognitive Systems approach) may provide some insight into the question of props and 
cues.  The scope of this dissertation was delimited to the level of the individual decision 
maker.  However, operational forecasting environments involve a high degree of 
interaction among actors and technological systems.  Although not discussed at length 
within this work, further investigation of how SA is distributed throughout the weather 
forecasting system would contribute to a greater of understanding of the factors that 
influence how SA is dynamically distributed throughout the weather domain.  The 
Team SA framework corresponds to the 1995 Model of SA, and as such, has received 
considerable attention within the literature related to group decision making and 
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performance (Endsley & Jones, 2001; Kaber & Endsley, 1998; Salas, Prince, Baker, & 
Shrestha, 1995).  While yet to receive the level of attention that has been given to the 
1995 Model of SA, newcomers to the field, such as Distributed Situation Awareness 
(Salmon, Stanton, Walker, Jenkins, and Rafferty (2010); Stanton et al. (2006)) and the 
Situated Approach to SA (Chiappe, Rorie, Morgan, and Vu (2012); Chiappe, Strybel, et 
al. (2012)) offer new insights into SA at different levels of decision making.  The 
foundation for both these frameworks, the Joint-Cognitive Systems perspective frames 
SA as an emergent property of a system in which the human operator is a part.  We do 
not suggest that research should only be concerned with decision making at the 
individual- or the systems-level; simply, we argue that in order to gain a more 
comprehensive picture of the factors and processes that influence SA, both levels 
require study. 
Future Work 
The exploration into SA in weather forecasting revealed several new questions 
that could extend models of situation awareness in complex systems.  Particularly in the 
automation study (Chapter 5), we hypothesized that the resulting low SA scores may 
have been due, in part, to the probe technique: a modified Situation Assessment Global 
Assessment Technique (SAGAT; Endsley (1995a)).  When designing the experiment, 
we selected a freeze-probe technique in order to test the assumption that SA was 
construct limited by individual memory.  In Endsley’s (2015b) view, “information that 
exists in the environment… but of which the operator is not aware… does not constitute 
SA.  It is by definition information of which he or she is not aware (hence the opposite 
of SA).”  However, in the automation study as well as the observational work described 
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in Chapter 4, we observed that forecasters appeared to rely on external cues within the 
decision support systems during the reasoning and judgment processes.  Therefore, we 
recommend that future research should extend the method presented here with an 
alternative freeze-probe technique, such as the Situation Present Assessment Method 
(SPAM), which allows operators to access relevant data in order to respond to probes. 
In addition to contributing to a more comprehensive understanding of individual 
cognition, research should also examine the sociotechnical and interactive aspects of 
situation awareness.  Although not the focus of the present work, weather forecasting 
involves a large degree of interaction between human operators and technical systems.  
Particularly, the theoretical frameworks provided by Team SA (Endsley & Jones, 2001; 
Kaber & Endsley, 1998) and Distributed Situation Awareness (Stanton, Salmon, 
Walker, & Jenkins, 2009; Stanton et al., 2006) may partially describe factors affecting 
the transmittance of SA among decision makers within the forecasting system.  Viewing 
SA as a systems-level construct, as does the Distributed Situation Awareness (DSA) 
theory, may have bearing on the study of weather forecasting.  We suggest that a 
comparative evaluation of theoretical models of SA, including DSA, Team SA, and 
Endsley’s 1995 Model, could build on the present findings and ultimately lead to new 
insights into SA and reasoning within the weather forecasting domain.  Such an 
evaluation could provide guidance for training, best practices, and policy in the 
operational forecasting environment.   
From a methodological perspective, the present work confirmed previous 
research regarding eye tracking as a direct measure of SA.  Like Moore and Gugerty 
(2010), we found that fixation duration predicted SA accuracy.  While eye tracking 
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allowed for direct inspection of situation assessment and information scanning 
behavior, it is possible that constraints imposed by the laboratory environment affected 
experimental outcomes, to some degree.  We suggest that incorporating an eye tracking 
method, similar to that used in Chapter 5, within a study framed with the naturalistic 
decision making philosophy would theoretically overcome potential experimenter bias 
while allowing forecasters to work with decision support systems with which they have 
experience. 
Still, limitations within the weather forecasting and environmental sensing 
system add further challenges to adequate assessment of SA.  Scholars have previously 
pointed out that establishing a ground truth for every situation can be difficult, even 
unfeasible, in some situations (Dekker et al., 2010).  While establishing the “ground 
truth” in weather forecasting is possible, limited observational sensor systems and 
verification challenges constrain current ability to receive feedback rapidly during 
forecasting (Gourley et al., 2013).  Indeed, as some of the present focus group findings 
indicated, verification of a flash flood may not even occur if the potentially affected 
area was remote and unlikely to cause direct impact to humans or property.  
Furthermore, in weather forecasting tasks, “ground truth” may not even be possible to 
perceive accurately with existing technology; as has been cautioned throughout this 
work, decision support tools—particularly computational models—involve varying 
degrees of uncertainty introduced by incomplete understanding of environmental 
processes and uncertain initial conditions (Doswell, 2004).  In weather forecasting, 
developing an accurate situational model involves continuous comparison and 
assessment of information sources.  It is our view that until environmental observational 
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systems mirror those found in systems like air traffic control or aviation, forecaster SA 
will be limited to what can be gathered from an incomplete representation of the 
environment. 
Conclusion 
From a theoretical perspective, this work contributed to a greater understanding 
of situation awareness in complex systems involving uncertainty.  Furthermore, this 
research was able to contribute to the development of a flash flood prediction decision 
support system through its transition from research to operations.  While some have 
suggested that it is more appropriate to view SA at a systems-level when studying 
collaborative, sociotechnical systems (Salmon et al., 2008; Stanton, Salmon, & Walker, 
2015), we argue that for weather forecasters, understanding SA at an individual level 
can have several benefits.  From a practice-oriented perspective, studying the 
relationship between SA and technology may provide foundations for design 
improvements to decision support systems (Endsley & Hoffman, 2002).  Secondly, 
designing systems to support situation assessment has been linked to performance, 
specifically in terms of workload- or attention-related errors (Klein, 2000). 
Based on current findings, we conclude that weather forecasting decision 
support systems assist operators in coping with uncertainty in order to acquire and 
maintain situation awareness.  Decision makers leverage technology to maintain SA, 
but it is also important to minimize overreliance upon such systems, which can also lead 
to errors.  This work described SA and situation assessment in the weather forecasting 
domain, but findings and recommendations may provide insight in additional decision 
making environments where uncertainty is high, such as emergency medicine or 
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military command and control.  To expand the power of the present findings, we 
recommend that future research should attend to the interactive nature of situation 
assessment in the weather forecasting domain.   We recommend that development of 
decision support systems, particularly those for weather forecasting, should incorporate 
a user-centered design phase.  SA errors and performance limitations may be reduced 
with increased attention to the effects of interface design and visualization methods on 
human decision making.  
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Appendix A: Logistic Regression Odds Ratios from Chapter 3 
 
 Marginal Effects Conditional Effects 
 Ordinary Logistic Random int. logistic 
 OR   (95% CI) OR  (95% CI) 
Fixed part   
Intercept 6.50 (4.60, 9.50) 6.50 (4.60, 9.50) 
exp(β2) [size] 0.011 (0.003, 0.032) 0.011 (0.003, 0.032) 
exp(β3) [threat] 0.15 (0.089, 0.23) 0.15 (0.089, 0.23) 
exp(β4) [display] 0.29 (0.18, 0.47) 0.29 (0.18, 0.47) 
exp(β5) [size*threat] 206.87 (63.16, 946.22) 206.87 (63.16, 946.22) 
exp(β6) [size*display] 17.39 (5.21, 80.19) 17.39 (5.21, 80.19) 
exp(β7) [threat*display] 11.92 (5.93, 24.37) 11.92 (5.93, 24.37) 
exp(β8) 
[size*threat*display] 0.043 (0.008, 0.18) 0.043 (0.008 0.18) 
Random Part   
ψ -- 0 
ρ -- 0 
Goodness of Fit 
Log likelihood 
 
-630.80 
 
-630.80 
Hosmer-Lemeshow 1.00  
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Appendix B:  Guidance Products Available in HWT-Hydro 2014 	
 
Experimental Products 
	
Experimental Models	 CREST Maximum Return Period 
HRRR-Forced CREST 
CREST Soil Moisture 
CREST Streamflow 
SAC-SMA Soil Moisture 
SAC-SMA Streamflow 	
Precipitable Water (PW)	 Precipitable Water Analysis (RAOBs) 
Precipitable Water Percentile (RAOBs) 
Precipitable Water Analysis (RAP) 
Precipitable Water Percentile (RAP)	
Quantitative Precipitation 
Estimate (QPE)  
 
MRMS QPE 
Quantitative Precipitation 
Forecast (QPF) 
 
MRMS QPF 
Flash Flood Guidance Ratio 
(FFG)	 QPE to Flash Flood Guidance Ratio QPF to Flash Flood Guidance Ratio 	
Average Recurrence Interval 
(ARI)	 Precipitation Return Period (QPE) Precipitation Return Period (QPF) 		 	
Operational Products 
 
FFA/FFW/LSRs Flash Flood Advisories 
Flash Flood Watch (FFA) 
Flash Flood Warnings (FFW) 
Experimental Flash Flood Warnings 
Flood Warnings 
Local Storm Reports (LSRs) 
 
Radar MRMS Seamless Hybrid-Scan Reflectivity 
MRMS Quality-Controlled Composite Reflectivity 
 
Satellite Infrared (IR) Window 
Water Vapor Satellite 
Visible Satellite 
3.9u, 13u, 11u-3.9u, 11u-13u, 3.7u, 3.7u-13u 
WV/IR 
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Ensembles and Data 
Assimilation 
 
ECMWF-HiRes Model 
GFS20 
GFS 
HiResW-ARW-East and West 
 HiResW-NMM-East and West 
High Resolution Rapid Refresh Model (HRRR) 
LAPS 
NAM12, NAM40, NAM80 
RAP13, RAP40 
SREF 
UKMET Ensemble 
 
Observations Surface Plots 
METAR Station Plots 
Synoptic Plots 
 
Overlays State Boundaries and Names 
County Boundaries and Names 
Rivers and Streams 
Lakes 
River Drainage Basins 
Cities 
County Warning Area Boundaries 
River Forecast Center Boundaries 
Interstates and US Highways 
Railroads 
High Resolution Topographic Imagery 	 	
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Appendix C: Portion of a Screen Recording Transcript from HWT-Hydro 
 
Product Start Time End Time 
Web Maximum Return Period CREST 2:28:28 2:32:28 
FLASH Surface MRMS Seamless Hybrid-Scan Reflectivity 2:32:28 2:32:51 
FLASH Surface 1-hr Precipitation Return Period (Forecast) 2:32:28 2:32:51 
FLASH Surface 3-hr Precipitation Return Period (Forecast) 2:32:28 2:32:51 
FLASH Surface 6-hr Precipitation Return Period (Forecast) 2:32:28 2:32:51 
FLASH Surface HRRR-Forced CREST 2:32:51 2:32:56 
Local Storm Reports 2:32:56 2:33:06 
Flood Advisories 2:32:56 2:33:06 
Flood Warnings 2:32:56 2:33:06 
Flash Flood Warnings 2:32:56 2:33:06 
Experimental Flash Flood Warnings 2:32:56 2:33:06 
FLASH Surface MRMS Seamless Hybrid-Scan Reflectivity 2:32:56 2:33:44 
FLASH Surface 1-hr Precipitation Return Period (Forecast) 2:33:06 2:33:44 
FLASH Surface 3-hr Precipitation Return Period (Forecast) 2:33:06 2:33:44 
FLASH Surface 6-hr Precipitation Return Period (Forecast) 2:33:06 2:33:44 
Flood Advisories 2:33:44 2:34:31 
Flood Warnings 2:33:44 2:34:31 
Flash Flood Warnings 2:33:44 2:34:31 
Experimental Flash Flood Warnings 2:33:44 2:34:31 
FLASH Surface MRMS Seamless Hybrid-Scan Reflectivity 2:33:44 2:35:33 
FLASH Surface 1-hr MRMS Radar-Only QPE to FFG Ratio 2:33:44 2:34:09 
FLASH Surface 3-hr MRMS Radar-Only QPE to FFG Ratio 2:33:44 2:34:09 
FLASH Surface 6-hr MRMS Radar-Only QPE to FFG Ratio 2:33:44 2:34:09 
Local Storm Reports 2:34:09 2:34:31 
FLASH Surface 1-hr Precipitation Return Period (Forecast) 2:34:31 2:34:36 
FLASH Surface 3-hr Precipitation Return Period (Forecast) 2:34:31 2:34:36 
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Appendix D: Focus Group Questions in HWT-Hydro 2014 
 
General	Forecasting	Experience		
1. Please describe your approach in issuing forecasts and warnings this week.  
What tools and products do you usually use to guide your decisions when 
issuing flash flood watches and warnings?  (If issuing watches and warnings is 
not part of your current job, what products have you used in the past or during 
training exercises?) 
2. What challenges or difficulties did you encounter while forecasting this week? 
 
Uncertainty, Probability, and Confidence 
 
3. What role does your personal confidence (in terms of what the models predict, 
what your background experience indicates, your extrapolation of future events, 
etc.) play in producing the flash flood watches?  Flash flood warnings? 
 
We are interested in knowing more about your opinions about categorization of flash 
floods: 
4. How did issuing attributes of severity for watches and (nuisance v. major) 
enable you to communicate threat information? 
5. What did you find helpful about the categorization?  What would you change 
about the categorization? 
6. Did participating in HWT-Hydro 2014 affect how you view probabilities in 
flash flood forecasting?  How? 
7. When assigning uncertainty estimates to the magnitudes, what factors affected 
your decisions?  For example, were there any cases where you were more or less 
likely to issue a warning based on factors like geography? 
 
We would now like to ask some questions about watches and lead times. 
8. What are your thoughts on the current paradigm for issuing flash flood watches? 
9. What benefits and challenges do producing flash flood watches with long lead 
times afford?  Can you think of any lead time that would to absolutely too long? 
10. What benefits and challenges do producing flash flood watches with short lead 
times afford?  
11. What kind of products would be most useful to you at the flash flood watch 
scale?  Warning scale? 
 
12. Do you have any further comments about your experiences with issuing watches 
and warnings during the past week?   
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Appendix E: List of Probes Used in Chapter 5 	
SA 
Level 
Probe Administration    
(in Qualtrics) 
Scoring Method 
1 Using the provided (blank) map, point 
out the area(s) that received the highest 
[return period / streamflow / QPE-to-
FFG ratio] values in the past two 
hours. 
Heat Map +1 point for selecting 
an area within the 
correct area 
+0.5 point for 
selecting an area 
within the correct 
county 
+0.25 points for 
selecting an area 
within an adjacent 
county 
+0 point for being 
outside of range or a 
miss 
 In [units] over the past two hours, what 
was the peak [metric, e.g. return 
period] value reached? 
Manual entry +1 for being within ± 
20 units from target) 
+0 for being outside 
range 
2 Using the provided (blank) map, point 
out all the areas that have conditions 
associated with flash flooding at the 
most recent timestamp. 
Heat map +1 point for selecting 
an area within the 
correct area 
+0.5 point for 
selecting an area 
within the correct 
county 
+0.25 points for 
selecting an area 
within an adjacent 
county 
+0 point for being 
outside of range or a 
miss 
 Using the provided map, click which 
polygons highlight areas with 
conditions associated with flash 
flooding at the current time. 
Hot spot +1 for each correct 
identification 
+0 for not warning on 
either areas 
3 Using the provided (blank) map, point 
out all the areas you would expect to 
be under greatest risk for flash flooding 
in the next two hours. 
Heat map +1 point for selecting 
an area within the 
correct area 
+0.5 point for 
selecting an area 
	260 
within the correct 
county 
+0.25 points for 
selecting an area 
within an adjacent 
county 
+0 point for being 
outside of range or a 
miss 
 In hours, indicate the lengths of valid 
time you would assign to the warnings 
in this region. 
Manual entry +1 point for matching 
time to stream gage 
falling below flood 
stage 
+0.5 point for ± 2 
hours past stream gage 
falling below flood 
stage 
+0 for being outside 
range 					 	
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Appendix F: Example Briefing Used in Chapter 5 	
URGENT - IMMEDIATE BROADCAST REQUESTED 
FLOOD WATCH 
NATIONAL WEATHER SERVICE NORTHERN INDIANA 
826 PM EDT MON JUL 13 2015 
 
INZ003-012-013-015-020-022>027-032>034-140800- 
/O.EXT.KIWX.FF.A.0005.000000T0000Z-150714T0800Z/ 
/00000.0.ER.000000T0000Z.000000T0000Z.000000T0000Z.OO/ 
LA PORTE-STARKE-PULASKI-FULTON IN-WHITE-CASS IN-MIAMI-
WABASH-HUNTINGTON-WELLS-ADAMS-GRANT-BLACKFORD-JAY- 
INCLUDING THE CITIES OF...MICHIGAN CITY...LA PORTE... 
KNOX...NORTH JUDSON...BASS 
LAKE...WINAMAC...FRANCESVILLE... 
MEDARYVILLE...ROCHESTER...AKRON...MONTICELLO...BROOKSTON..
.MONON...LOGANSPORT...ROYAL CENTER...PERU...GRISSOM 
AFB...MEXICO...WABASH...NORTH MANCHESTER...HUNTINGTON... 
ROANOKE...BLUFFTON...OSSIAN...DECATUR...BERNE...MARION... 
GAS CITY...UPLAND...HARTFORD CITY...MONTPELIER... 
PORTLAND...DUNKIRK 
826 PM EDT MON JUL 13 2015 
 
...FLASH FLOOD WATCH NOW IN EFFECT UNTIL 4 AM EDT /3 AM 
CDT/TUESDAY... 
 
THE FLASH FLOOD WATCH IS NOW IN EFFECT FOR 
 
* A PORTION OF NORTHERN INDIANA...INCLUDING THE FOLLOWING  
  AREAS...ADAMS...BLACKFORD...CASS IN...FULTON IN... 
GRANT... HUNTINGTON...JAY...LA PORTE...MIAMI... 
PULASKI...STARKE... WABASH...WELLS AND WHITE.  
 
* UNTIL 4 AM EDT /3 AM CDT/ TUESDAY 
 
* FIRST ROUND OF STORMS THIS MORNING DROPPED BETWEEN AN 
INCH AND AN INCH AND A HALF ACROSS MOST OF THE FORECAST 
AREA.  
 
* FLOODING WILL QUICKLY OCCUR ANYWHERE STORMS DEVELOP THIS 
EVENING INTO THE EARLY PORTION OF THE OVERNIGHT HOURS WITH 
ANOTHER 1 TO 2 INCHES EXPECTED FROM ANY OF THESE STORMS. A 
FEW ISOLATED LOCATIONS MAY SEE 3 OR MORE INCHES OF RAIN 
TONIGHT...ESPECIALLY IF TRAINING STORMS DEVELOP. 	
URGENT - IMMEDIATE BROADCAST REQUESTED 
FLOOD WATCH 
NATIONAL WEATHER SERVICE INDIANAPOLIS IN 
	262 
347 PM EDT MON JUL 13 2015 
 
...FLASH FLOODING POSSIBLE THROUGH TONIGHT... 
 
.ADDITIONAL ROUNDS OF STRONG TO SEVERE THUNDERSTORMS ARE 
EXPECTED TO DEVELOP THROUGH LATE TONIGHT WITH THE 
POTENTIAL TO PRODUCE SIGNIFICANT RAINFALL AMOUNTS. 
WIDESPREAD RAINFALL OF 2 TO 5 INCHES HAS OCCURRED IN THE 
LAST SIX DAYS... WITH POCKETS AS HIGH AS NEARLY 9 INCHES 
OF RAINFALL. ADDITIONAL SIGNIFICANT RAINFALL WILL BE 
LIKELY TO CAUSE FLASH FLOODING IN THESE AREAS. 
 
INZ021-028>031-035>049-051>057-060>065-067>072-140400- 
/O.CAN.KIND.FF.A.0005.000000T0000Z-150714T0900Z/ 
/O.NEW.KIND.FF.A.0006.150713T2000Z-150714T1200Z/ 
/00000.0.ER.000000T0000Z.000000T0000Z.000000T0000Z.OO/ 
CARROLL-WARREN-TIPPECANOE-CLINTON-HOWARD-FOUNTAIN-
MONTGOMERY-BOONE-TIPTON-HAMILTON-MADISON-DELAWARE-
RANDOLPH-VERMILLION-PARKE-PUTNAM-HENDRICKS-MARION-HANCOCK-
HENRY-VIGO-CLAY-OWEN-MORGAN-JOHNSON-SHELBY-RUSH-SULLIVAN-
GREENE-MONROE-BROWN-BARTHOLOMEW-DECATUR-KNOX-DAVIESS-
MARTIN-LAWRENCE-JACKSON-JENNINGS-INCLUDING THE CITIES 
OF...LAFAYETTE...FRANKFORT...KOKOMO...CRAWFORDSVILLE... 
ANDERSON...MUNCIE...INDIANAPOLIS...TERRE HAUTE... 
SHELBYVILLE...BLOOMINGTON...COLUMBUS...VINCENNES... 
BEDFORD...SEYMOUR 
 
347 PM EDT MON JUL 13 2015 
 
...FLASH FLOOD WATCH IN EFFECT THROUGH TUESDAY MORNING... 
 
THE NATIONAL WEATHER SERVICE IN INDIANAPOLIS HAS ISSUED A 
 
* FLASH FLOOD WATCH FOR A PORTION OF INDIANA...INCLUDING 
THE FOLLOWING AREAS...BARTHOLOMEW...BOONE...BROWN... 
CARROLL...CLAY...CLINTON...DAVIESS...DECATUR...DELAWARE... 
FOUNTAIN...GREENE...HAMILTON...HANCOCK...HENDRICKS... 
HENRY...HOWARD...JACKSON...JENNINGS...JOHNSON...KNOX... 
LAWRENCE...MADISON...MARION...MARTIN...MONROE... 
MONTGOMERY...MORGAN...OWEN...PARKE...PUTNAM...RANDOLPH... 
RUSH...SHELBY...SULLIVAN...TIPPECANOE...TIPTON...VERMILLIO
N...VIGO AND WARREN.  
 
* THROUGH TUESDAY MORNING 
* WIDESPREAD SIGNIFICANT RAINFALL HAS OCCURRED OVER THE 
LAST SIX DAYS...WITH ADDITIONAL SIGNIFICANT RAINFALL 
POSSIBLE TONIGHT. AREAS RECEIVING SIGNIFICANT RAINFALL 
WILL BE LIKELY TO EXPERIENCE FLASH FLOODING.	
		
